CHRONICLES INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTrnThe E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights:rnA New Totahtarianismrnby Roberto de MatteirnThe F,.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, approxed inrnNice on December 8, 2000, sets forth the principles uponrnwhich the future European constitution should be based.rnDrafted by a commission of experts from various countries, therndocument consists of a preamble and 54 articles. It was presentedrnto the F..U. Council as “unamcndable”: The charterrnmust be accepted or rejected as a whole.rnWhen tlie Maastricht TreaU’ vas adopted ten years ago, itsrnobjective was said to be of a mcreK economic nature: F’irst, arnsingle Furopean market would be constituted through the freerncirculahon of goods, services, and capital; the abolition of exchangesrnand the introduction of a single European currencyrnwould follow. Toda, the declared objective is political unification.rnThe Charter of Fundamental Rights is a major step inrnthis process, though the imnrediate attempt to turn it into anrnE.U. constitutional charter has failed. As a matter of fact, therncharter (as Italy’s minister of foreign affairs, Lamberto Dini,rnclaims) marks a crucial contribution to the constitutionalizationrnprocess of the Furopean Union, for it “provides a networkrnof rights around which a European constitutional patriotismrncan be gradually built up.”rn”Constitutional patriotism” is t’pical of the language employedrnby such leftist European intellectuals as Jiirgen Habermas.rnI labermas opposes Verfassungspatriotismus, the constitutionalrnpatriotism of rights, to traditional patriotism, tied to anrnhistoric countr)-. Habermas and his disciples want to denationalizerncitizenship, to disconnect die idea of cihzenship from thatrnof nation in order to reattach it to the idea of a democratic andrnimiversalist constitution. The architects of the EuropeanrnUnion identify with this vision. Since it is impossible to foundrnEuropean citizenship on a European nation that has never existed,rnthey want to found it on a constitution—a core of figurativernprinciples and “new rights.” These new principles andrnrights are a postmodern rcinterpretation of human rights thatrnconstitutes a qualitative leap beyond een the modern formulationrnushered in by the Declaration of the Rights of Man.rnArticle 21 is the core of the charter. It reads: “Any discriminationrnbased on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic orrnsocial origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, politicalrnor any other opinion, membership of a national minorify,rnproperfy’, birth, disabilify’, age or sexual orientation, shall be prohibited.”rnThis article takes up and extends Article 13 of tiie AmsterdamrnRoberto de Mattei, a professor of history at the Universityrnof Monte Cassino, is the author of eight books, most recentlyrnPio IX.rn1 reat’, which states: “the Council, acting unanimously on arnproposal from the Commission and after consulting the EuropeanrnParliament, may take appropriate action to combat discriminationrnbased on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,rndisabilify, age or sexual orientation.” In both cases, a newrnjuridical tenet is being created: the principle of nondiscrimination.rnAs a matter of fact, this principle is tiie old Jacobin one ofrnabsolute equality, reformulated in new language and adapted torncontemporary sensitivity’- It is difficult to find a term as ambiguousrnas “discrimination.” The very idea of justice—which,rnin the traditional formulation, means giving to each his due (suumrncuique trihiiere) — implies some sort of “discrimination.” Arnreal law discriminates to the extent that it promotes or safeguardsrnsome behavioral patterns, seeing them as just and appropriate,rnand discourages and represses others, deeming them unjustrnand harmfid. Each law is somehow compelled torndiscriminate by the ver)- fact that it la’s out what is just and unjust,rnlicit or illicit, promoting the former and curbing the latter.rnThe pretense of abolishing any form of discrimination constitutesrnan act of brutal egalitarianism.rnArticle 21 identifies more than 15 possible discriminations:rn”Sex” is the first and “sexual orientation” the last. Wliat is therndifference between these two tenns? Sex—like race, color, geneticrnfeatures —is received from nature and cannot be changedrnat w ill. “Sexual orientation,” however, stems from human willrnand can be treated like such choices as religious beliefs or politicalrnconvictions. Pretending not to discriminate on the basis ofrnsexual orientation means applying a strictiy egalitarian criterionrnto all acts of human sexuality’. A coherent egalitarian criterionrnwould lead us to accord juridical protection to any sort of moralrndisorder, from homosexual unions to pedophilia and incest, atrnleast when people are consenting and there is no explicit violence.rnh’urthermore, any public criticism of a behavior regarded asrndisordered and immoral will constitute a fonn of “discrinrination.”rnPredictably, any activity’ or expression criticizing sexualrnorientation will be banned and eriniinally and heavily repressed.rnWill a priest from die pulpit or a professor from thernchair be able to present the natural and Christian family as “superior”rnto lietero- and homosexual “de facto unions,” withoutrnthis quality’ing as “discrimination” worthy of criminal sanction?rnWill a religious institution, a private school, or a Christianrngroup be able to dismiss members who promote or practice behaviorsrnthey consider immoral, without this being consideredrndiscrimination?rnUnder the pretext of impeding discrimination, all those whornprofess an objective system of values are discriminated againstrn24/CHKONICLESrnrnrn