cent of the public remain steadfast inrntlieir opposition to American interventionrnin tiic European war, FDR had assuredrntliem on the ee of tlie 1940 electionrnthat “our boys are not going to be sent intornan foreign wars.” He even persuadedrnJoseph P. Kennedy, the American ambassadorrnto England and a strong anti-intcr-rnentionist, to endorse him for the presidencyrnand to deny Repulilican charges that hernwas conspiring with England to involve therncountr in a world war. AlthoughrnKcnnedv knew that the charges were true,rnhe assured the public on a nationwide radiornaddress that Republican claims werern”false.” (Roosevelt had promised his su[>rnport for Joseph Kennedy, Jr.’s run for therngocrnorship of Massachusetts.)rnThe leak of Rainbow Eie provedrnRoosevelt to be a liar, as well as arnman utterly contemptuous of the expressedrnwill of the American people. Forrnthis reason, most assumed that a patrioticrnand noninterventionist member of thernWar Department had leaked the plan.rnBut Heming provides strong evidence tornsuggest that Roosevelt himself authorizedrnthe leak. The master “juggler” hopedrnthat the revelation that the United Statesrnwas planning to wage total war againstrnGermans would prooke Hider into declaringrnwar on the United States. Thernruse worked. On December 11, 1941, arnweek after the leak and four davs afterrnPearl Harbor, German’ declared war onrnthe Unites States.rnThe leak was the final step in a series ofrnprovocations that Roosevelt had initiatedrnin the hope of either goading the Americanrnpublic into demanding war withrnGermany, or provoking Germany intorndeclaring war on the United States. Duringrn1941, Roosevelt increasingly involvedrnthe I’nited States as an active belligerentrnon the side of England, hi August at PlacentiarnBay, Newfoundland, Rooseveltrntold Churchill that he was determinedrnthat the United States would enter thernwar. He “planned to wage war but notrndeclare it” and to be more and morern”provocative.” Just weeks later, the U.S.rndcstro er Greer joined a British attack onrna German submarine. By the fall, U.S.rndestroyers were exchanging fire with thernGerman navy. As Fleming points out,rnRoosevelt consistently lied to the publicrnabout these incidents, claiming that eachrnwas an unprovoked attack by a Germanrnsubmarine when, in fact, the AmericanrnNavv initiated hostilities in ever- case.rnHoweer, to Roosexelt’s increasing frustration,rneven the sinking of an Americanrndestroyer was not enough to spm thernpublic to demand war. ,s a result, Rooseveltrnand his circle saw war with Japan asrnthe only way to get into the war in Europe,rnand a Japanese attack as the onlyrn\av of setting these events in motion.rnJust as FDR was w aging an undeclaredrnnaval war in the North Atlantic and shippingrnarmaments to Cireat Britain, he wasrnpursuing a similar strategy’ of provocationrnagainst the Japanese. In particular, he orchestratedrna combined Anglo-American-rnDutch oil embargo against Japan whichrnbegan in the summer of 1941. Yet, whilernFleming cites a mountain of evidence tornprove that FDR goaded Japan into becomingrnhis “back door to war” andrndemonstrates beyond any doubt that diernPresident knew that the Japanese wererngoing to strike U.S. forces in earlv December,rnhe shrinks from charging himrnwith either welcoming or having foreknowledgernof the attack on Pear! Harbor.rnAccording to Fleming, Roosevelt expectedrnthe blow to fall in the 1^’ar East, probablvrndie Philippines, but not in Hawaii.rnHe cites as evidence the remark made b’rnSecretary of the Nav Frank Knox thatrnRoosevelt expected “to get hit but notrnhurt.”rnFleming should know better. Hisrnwhole narrative is full of evidence of Roosevelt’srncapacit}’ for deceit and betraxal, asrnwell as his ruthlessness and lack of scruplernin pursuit of his ends. Furthermore,rnFleming’s own evidence indicates Roosevelt’srncomplicity. P’leming points outrnthat Roosevelt removed Admiral JamesrnO. Richardson from command of the Pacificrnfleet precisely because Richardsonrnprotested that the fleet was vulnerable torna Japanese attack while based at PearlrnHarbor. Fleming is also aware of FDR’srnrather suspicious emotional reaction tornthe “surprise” attack. Secretary of LaborrnFrances Perkins observed that, whilernFDR had seemed “tense, worried” onrnFriday night (before the attack], on Sundayrnevening he seemed to have “a muchrncalmer air. His terrible moral problemrnhad been solved by the event.” He finallyrnhad liis war. And, of course, Knox’srnstatement coidd sinipK mean that Rooseveltrndid not expect that a Japanese airrnraid on Read Harbor would do as muchrnilamaee as it did. Fleming simp] V Ignoresrnthe compelling case for FDR’s foreknowledgernmade by revisionist historians.rnHe makes no reference to eitherrnJohn ‘Poland’s Infamy (1982) or RobertrnStinnett’s Day of Deceit (2000). (‘i’o bernfair, Fleming’s book may have gone tornpress before the latter’s publication.)rnFleming does not neglect die importantrnc[uestion of why Roose’elt was so determinedrnto inolve the United States inrna world war when her strategic situationrnand die sentiments of her people allowedrnfor peace. Many Reprd)licans claimedrnthat Roosevelt turned to w ar out of desperation.rnHe could think of no other wayrnto end the Depression than bv a transitionrnto a war economy with its centralrnplanning, massive militar) expenditures,rnconscription, price controls, and rationing.rnWlnile this was true at some level,rnRoosevelt’s motivation appears to haernbeen more prosaic. He was bored andrnfrustrated battling the Depression, andrnhis policies had failed. Wliv not turn hisrnattention to saing the world from fascism?rnFleming’s evidence indicates thatrnRoosevelt was a diehard Wilsonian whornsaw the war as an epic struggle betweenrnprogressive democracy and the forces ofrndark reaction. In his mind, it was a conflictrnof good and evil in w-hich no compromisernor peaceful resolution was possible,rnand the victorious side would imposernits system on the world. Moreover, as arnmegalomaniac, FDR realized that warrnoffered him power on a scale far exceedingrnw hat he had so far possessed andrngranted him the opportunity of joiningrnthe ranks of the “great” American warrnpresidents, Lincoln and Wilson.rnTo make his case for an ideologicalrnwar, Fleming summarizes a revealingrn1942 speech by “Vice President HenryrnWallace, who characterized the war asrnthe climactic moment in a 150-vear-oldrn”people’s revolution” that had begun atrnLexington and Concord, hi Wallace’srnmind, the American, French, and RussianrnResolutions were all part of the samernunfolding movement, and World War IIrnwas its denouement. Wallace thunderedrnthat “the people’s revolution is on thernmarch and the devil and all his angelsrncannot prevail against it. They cannotrnprevail. For on the side of the people isrnthe Lord.” Upton Sinclair made thernsame point, though less bombastically,rnwhen he wrote, “Eitiier the war is a NewrnDeal War or it is not worth winning.” Inrnthe same vein, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’srnclosest advisor, explained that thern”New Deal of Mr. Roosevelt” was thernarchenemy of the “New Order of Hitier.”rnThe latter could never be defeated bvrn”the old order of denioerac” (meaningrnFrance and Great Britain), but onK “bvrnthe new- order of democracx, which is thernOCTOBER 2001/27rnrnrn