New Deal universally extended and applied.”rnIronieally, Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt’srnRepnblican opponent in the 1940rnpresidential eleetion, shared the messianicrnvision of the New Dealers, both atrnhome and abroad, hi his 1943 book. OnernWorld, Willkie insisted that the UnitedrnStates should use the war to imposerndemocracy and freedom on the entirernworld. According to Willkie, the Britishrnand French empires had to go, but thernSoviet Union was a force for progress andrnjustice. Willkie was the John McCain ofrnhis day, a rabid warmonger and internationalistrnvith a tendency to attack his part’rnfrom the left. He once castigated fellowrnRepublicans for failing to adopt thernNew Deal before the Democrats. Flemingrndismisses him as a “political incompetent,rnout for nobody but himself,” “secretlyrnin bed with FDR,” and a “covertrnNew Dealer in Republican costume.”rnAs devastating as Fleming’s accountrnof FDR’s machinations and betrayalsrnbefore the war is, it pales in comparisonrnto his revelations of FDR’s follies andrncrimes dining the conflict. Fleming condemnsrnRoosevelt for insisting upon thernunconditional surrender of Germanyrnand Japan and for his pro-Soviet ,s’mpathiesrnand policies. Roosevelt thoughtrnthat insisting upon unconditional surrenderrngave a moral purpose to the war, butrnFleming finds the policy anything butrnmoral, histead, he describes it as moti-rnated by “a hate-tinged determination torndestroy.” Fleming explains that Rooseveltrnhad a deep-seated and almostrnpathological “hatred of Germany” andrnthe German people, much like his mentorrnWoodrow Wilson. FDR regarded thernGermans as innately militaristic and aggressive,rnnaturally autocratic, and solelyrnresponsible not only for the current warrnbut for the hvo previous European wars.rn(Fleming notes sardonically that FDR’srnunderstanding of history had not improvedrnsince his G- days at Harvard.)rnRoosevelt made no distinction whateverrnbetween the Nazi leadership and thernGerman people, or between pro-Nazi officersrnand those who hoped to overthrowrnthem, hi his mind, the entire Germanrnnation deserved to be punished, bled dry,rncrushed, and even “castrated” (FDR’srnown term). He had no qualms about therncarpet-bombing of German cities orrnabout the hundreds of thousands of civilianrndeaths that resulted from this policyrnof terror. He even endorsed the infamousrnMorgenthau Plan (drawn u]) bv hisrnsecretan’ of the treasury, Henry Morgenthau),rnwhich called for the postwar dismembermentrnof Germany into four vassalrnstates, the destruction of its industrialrnplant, the enipt}’ing of its cities, and therntransformation of the Germans intornprimitive agriculturists. When warnedrnthat his plan could lead to mass staivationrnin Germany, with millions of dead, Morgenthaurnreplied: “I don’t care what happensrnto the population” —a genocidalrnsentiment elearlv shared by the President.rnRooseelt did not hesitate to approvernthe mmderous policy of terrorbombingrnJapanese and German citiesrnwith the intention of killing as many civiliansrnas possible.rnGhurchill, Eisenhower, and otherrnhigh-ranking officers opposed the policvrnof unconditional surrender because theyrncorrectly deduced that it would motivaternthe Germans to fight harder, thereby increasingrnAllied casualties and needlesslyrnprolonging the war. For Fleming, itsrnworst consequence was that it demoralizedrnand hampered the anti-Nazi resistancernmovement within the German officerrncorps. Led by Adni. William Canaris,rnthe head of the Abwehr (flie German intelligencernservice), and including otherrnhigh-ranking officers such as Gen. LudwigrnBeck (former chief of staff of thernWehrmacht) and Gen. Henning vonrnTresckow (chief of staff of Army GrouprnGenter), tiiese patriotic Germans plottedrnthroughout the war to overthrow thernNazi regime. Thev attempted not oncernbut four times to kill Hitler. As Meniingrnexplains, they would have gained evenrnmore support, including that of Gen.rnHans Guderian and Gen. Alfred Jodl,rnwere it not for the U.S. policy of unconditionalrnsurrender. Many anti-Nazi officersrnargued that, as long as the Allies wererndetermined to crush Germany no matterrnwho was in power, they might as wellrnfight on to the end.rnLest ‘ou think that Roosevelt was simplyrna bungler, Fleming proves that, inrnman}’ cases, he knew where his policiesrnwould lead and simply didn’t care.rnFleming provides abundant evidencernthat Roosevelt viewed Stalin as a morernprogressive and genuinely democraticrnleader than Churchill, the Soviet Unionrnas a “constructive force” in the world, andrncommunism as simply a harmless variantrnon the New Deal. Fleming’s descriptionrnof Roosevelt’s pro-Soviet sympathies andrnpolicies makes almost unbelievable reading.rnHere is just a partial list: The UnitedrnStates shipped military hardware andrnsupplies at no charge to the Soviets viarnLend-Lease. FDR once admitted that herndid not care if all of Eastern Europe wentrncommunist. He agreed with Stalin onrnthe need for Soviet-st)’le revolutions inrnBritish and French colonial possessions.rnHe ordered the OSS to return an NKVDrn(Soviet secret police) eodebook that thernAmericans had acquired. He instructedrnthe Army Air Corps to turn over their topsecretrnNorden bombsight to the Soviets.rnHe refused to believe that the Sovietsrnwere responsible for the 1939 Kahn ma.ssacrernof the Polish officer corps, termingrnit Nazi propaganda. (When presentedrnwith irrefutable proof of Soviet guilt by anrninsistent American officer, he grew angr)”,rnordered the offending officer to keeprnquiet, and had him tran.sferred to Samoarnfor the duration of the war.) He ridiculedrnand denigrated Churchill and Englandrnin the presence of both the Englishrnleader and Stalin, to the latter’s greatrnamusement and the former’s humiliation.rnRoosevelt also presided over a governmentrnliterally brimming with Sovietrnspies and agents of influence (329 in all),rnincluding many of his closest advisors.rnOne particularly despicable episodernwas his deal with Stalin over Poland. AtrnTeheran, he agreed that the Soviets couldrnannex the eastern third of Poland and imposerna communist government on the restrnas long as Stalin kept their agreement secretrnuntil after the war. (FDR did notrnwant to lose the domestic Polish vote inrn1944.) It was vintage Roosevelt. Not surprisingly,rnStalin was delighted to havernsuch a fellow traveler in the White House.rnFleming records that, after Teheran, Stalinrnboasted to a Yugoslav communist thatrnthe Slavs would soon rule Europe andrnAsia.rnThe historical establishment will inevitablyrnignore or downplay Fleming’s revisionistrnblockbuster. One reviewerrnclaims Fleming is only mildl}’ critical ofrnRoosevelt and that the author’s researchrnneed not be taken seriously since it isrnlargely based on secondan sources. PerhapsrnFleming’s biggest sin, in the eyes ofrnthe establishment, is that he seems not tornbe interested in theory, fashion, or extollingrnthe greatness of certain figuresrnwho are perceived as harbingers of thernglorious present. On the contran, he is arnreal historian who has an old-fashionedrnconcern with what actually happened inrnthe past, with causes and effects, and withrnthe true motivations and words of actualrnparticipants. crn28/CHRONICLESrnrnrn