group Akin Gump. Strauss, who gainedrna reputation as a man-about-tovvn inrnWashington while a Democratic Partyrnfixer, helped American businesses profitrnfi’om the insider privatization deals of thernYeltsin era and, like Bunker, knew a goodrnlobbying opportunity when he saw one:rnAkin Gump suddenly discovered it wasrnvery concerned about “freedom of thernpress” in Russia and enlisted Toby Goti,rnfreshly retired chief of the State Department’srnintelligence division, to remindrnU.S. congressmen of the importance ofrnglobal democratization. Akin Gump,rnA P C O , Goti, and Mr. Bunker have beenrnsteady contributors to Lantos’ politicalrnwar chest.rnLantos sponsored a resolution in May,rncalling on the G-8 group of industrializedrnpowers to kick Russia out in view of itsrnundemocratic behavior toward thernGoose (something the high rollers ofrnglobal democracy did not worry aboutrnwhen Yeltsin was literally blasting thernRussian parliament in 1993). TheWashingtonrnPost, Akin Gump, APCO, andrnvarious “friends of Goose” mounted arnfull-court press on Bush before the summit.rnThe White House counterattackedrnthrough the Republican-connected headrnof the Nixon Genter think tank, DmitrirnSimes, who pointed out in a letter to thernPosf that the “Russian oligarchs'” ill-gottenrngains were now at work in D.C. “buyingrnthe best representation” available, includingrn”former ambassadors, formerrncabinet members,” and “former senators.”rnSimes, who has to work in thisrntown, omitted mention of current congressmen.rnThe President was obviously resisting,rnbut the shift of power to the Democrats inrnthe Senate, his big plans for NMD, andrnhis collapsing political agenda (his obviousrndefeats on tax cuts and education, forrnexample) meant Bush II could not entirelyrnignore the siren call of globalrndemocracy. Besides, there are those storiesrncirculating about Dick Cheney lobbyingrnfor the oil company Haliburton,rnwhich has business ties to Russia’s TNKrnoil company, which is controlled by thernAlfa Group, which, in turn, works handin-rnglove with Russian organized crime.rnSo George, Jr., just had to bring up thatrnGusinsky business again.rnMeanwhile, one-time Gusinsky rival andrnformer “Oligarch No. 1” Boris AbramovichrnBerezovsky (BAB), after falling outrnwith “the family,” arrived in New Yorkrnalong with his wife, under-aged mistiess,rnand assorted burly business associates.rnBAB is now the object of a Kremlinbackedrncriminal investigation, so he hasrnset himself up as a defender of Russianrndemocracy and is canvassing his Americanrncontacts for potential business partners.rnThe word is out that the Goose isrnwilling to share the influence of hisrnAmerican friends with BAB for a price.rnWhat that price might be is anybody’srnguess; rumor has it that BAB is seeking anrnaudience with White House officials.rn—Denis PetrovrnSLOBODAN MILOSEVICS deliveryrnto a NATO airbase in Tuzla marks thernend of an era —but which one? It appearsrnto conclude the period in whichrnthe Serbian people tried to find leadersrnwho would not accept that their nationalrninterests should be defined either by a socialistrnYugoslavia or by the great powers.rnTheir willingness to elect Vojislav Kostunicarnprobably depended on the notionrnthat he was more of a patriot than his predecessorrnand that he would keep hisrnpromise not to accept the jurisdiction of arnforeign court created as an instrument ofrnpropaganda by Serbia’s enemies. ZoranrnDjindjic might have been unelectable.rnBut even he was not an o’ert anti-nationalist,rnand it was possible to imagine thatrnthe foreign policy of the victorious coalitionrnwould combine Kostunica’s patriotismrnwith Djindjic’s pragmatism. Itrncould have produced a stable policy—rnbased on legal self-respect and technicalrncooperation with The Hague War GrimesrnTribunal (ICTY) —which most of Europernwould accept because Europe isrnmore interested in stability’ and democracyrnthan in the project of Serb submissionrnprescribed by Zagreb and Washington.rnWe now know that this has not happened.rnSerbia could not have experiencedrna more humiliating surrender tornIGTY than to watch its ministers defyrntheir constitutional court on their highrnholy day, Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day). Thernpeople did not vote for it; the law did notrnpermit it; and the highest court—whateverrnits composition —had ordered otherwise.rnBy the time Milosevic was sent to ThernHague, Kostunica had already concededrnthe essential principle and agreed that extraditionrnshould be made possible by lawrnor by federal decree. The foreign aidrnAmerica might have withheld in Junernwould, no doubt, have been availablernslightly later, after Belgrade had sortedrnout its lingering scruples. The decisionrnto submit and to take the money had alreadyrnbeen internalized. The suddenrnrush to Tuzla airfield was designed,rnabove all, to break the will of a stiibbornrnSerbia.rnThe Vidovdan capitulation was thernmoment of truth between the Serbianrnpeople and the anti-nationalist section ofrnthe intelligentsia. The political venom ofrnthe action, the wild impatience at Serbianrnpride, and the reckless contempt forrnSerbian democracy, law, values, and seltrespectrnwere all perfectly deliberate.rnThey represent the rejection of everythingrnthat Serbia has done and stood for:rndefiance of the “international community,”rnthe illusions of sovereignty, the possibilityrnof patriotism in arms. The theor’rnthat the will of the international community’rnis the supreme law of the land hasrnbeen imposed like a lash on the back ofrnevery citizen.rnThis capitulation did not need to happen.rnMilosevic might have been on trialrnin Belgrade bv now, facing chargesrnwhich had not even been laid againstrnhim at The Hague when the Vidovdanrnabduction took place. If such a trial hadrnbeen under wa—with evervone grippedrnby new testimony—no one would haverndared to interrupt the proceedings withrnan illegal kidnapping on behalf of ThernHague’s chief prosecutor, Carla delrnPonte. Those responsible would havernended up in prison. Now, a probing, discursive,rnand surprising trial of Milosevicrnwill never take place. Wliat we will havernis a much more technical, sterilized, andrnevasive legal process. There were peoplernwho wanted a real trial in Belgrade, butrnthev were willing to be overruled by thosernwith stronger convictions. For PresidentrnKostunica (perhaps the biggest loser inrnthe affair), there may be a story of covertrnpressure from countries he wanted torntrust. There was also a moment of selfunderstanding:rnthat the era of crisisrnshould not be prolonged by any choice ofrnhis. He might have defied the UnitedrnStates with sufficient backing but not, ultimately,rnagainst a nominal political majority.rnSomehow, he found himselfrngrudgingly agreeing with his interlocutorsrnthat the preference of the Serbianrnpeople could be set aside.rnWhy has the party of Serbian inadequacyrnbeen so effective? It may be thernenergizing tonic of foreign patronage.rnBut the true explanation is probablyrnlong-term. The belief that submission tornEurope is essential is, at bottom, anrneconomic theory that unites extremern8/CHRONICLESrnrnrn