flicts in perspective, stressing the widerrnrelationship, including trade, whichrnearned China an $84-billion surplus withrnthe United States last year. In the shortrnterm, China will refrain from strong reactions,rnjust as it did after the “accidental”rnbombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgradernin 1999. It will grin and bear it,rnwhile pursuing aggressive economicrngrowth and embarking on a steady militaryrnbuildup in cooperation with Russia.rnThis is in line with the late Deng Xiaoping’srnpolicy of too guang yang hui: Hidernyour real strength to buy time for your development.rnThe Chinese know that the readinessrnof the Bush administration to provokernChina and its desire to keep it in check isrncoupled with Washington’s completernunwillingness to limit commerce withrnBeijing or to use trade as a tool of policy.rnThis is the fundamental contradiction ofrnthe United State’s China policy, reminiscentrnof our ambivalent relationship withrnJapan between the two world wars. Beijingrnrightly assumes that America willrnprove too greedy to refrain from givingrnChina’s rulers the tools they need to assertrneventual regional primacy. Theyrnwere greatly heartened when China wasrngranted permanent normal trade relationsrnstatus by Congress last year, giving itrnunconditional and unlimited access tornthe American market. In addition, farrnfrom rebuilding and defending the industrialrnfoundations of its national security,rncorporate America is eagerly transferringrnthose foundations across the Pacific.rnTop Chinese politicians will not staternopenly what economist Wang Jian of thernState Planning Commission in Beijingrnconcluded in a recent interview: “Unlessrnthe Chinese split themselves, I don’t seernhow the United States can frustrate ourrnnational goals.” Those goals unequivocallyrninclude reunification. The “onernChina” principle is an issue over whichrnBeijing will fight: If it wavers over the statusrnof Taiwan, its hold over Sinkiang, Tibet,rnor even Manchuria may become tenuous.rnChina’s consistency on this pointrnis a matter not of its status as a great powerrnbut of its survival as a state.rnOn the other hand, it is unclear whatrnthe “national goals” of the United Statesrnin and around China are. The BluernTeam refers to “essential” surveillancernflights and invokes America’s supposedrn”global responsibilities,” but behind thernglobal-hegemonist rhetoric, there is onlyrnone real question: Is any vital Americanrninterest involved in who rules Taiwan?rnShould America be ready to go to war tornprevent China from establishing contiolrnover its island province?rnFor over 50 years, the Chinese nationalistrnKuomintang Party (KMT) ruledrnTaiwan, having retreated there in 1949rnafter Mao Zedong’s Communists defeatedrnChiang Kai-shek in the civil war. ThernKMT old guard regarded the island as anrnintegral part of China and clamped downrnon any display of Taiwanese particularism,rnlet alone separatism. By the earlyrn1970’s, the claim of the “Republic ofrnChina” to represent the only legitimaternChinese government was no longer takenrnseriously by the rest of the world, andrnmost Taiwanese appeared more interestedrnin economic prosperity than in forcingrnthe issue of their island’s ambiguousrnstatus. Chiang’s successors in Taipeirncould agree with Mao’s successors in Beijingrnon one critical issue: They were allrnliving in the same country and, therefore,rnan eventual reunification was desirablernand inevitable. This accord provided thernbasis for an uneasy but manageable statusrnquo. But in March of last year, the separatistrnDemocratic Progressive Party, supportedrnmostly by the native Taiwanese,rnwon the presidential election andrnchanged the equation. Although PresidentrnChen Shui-bian has toned down hisrnpro-independence rhetoric over the pastrnyear and a half, the latest tension in Sino-rnAmerican relations may encourage Taiwanesernseparatists to conclude that theyrnwould remain under an American securityrnumbrella even if their actions presentrnan intolerable challenge to Beijing.rnTaipei should be disabused of any notionrnthat America will risk its soldiers’rnlives—let alone its West Coast cities—forrnthe sake of Taiwan’s final status. GeorgernW. Bush’s pledge to provide “whatever itrn[takes] to help Taiwan defend itselfrnmust be qualified, because permanentrnAmerican security guarantees to distantrncountries are a bad idea in principle —rnand Taiwan is not even a country. Therncharacter of the regime in China is irrelevantrnhere: Risking an all-out war with itrnover the way one of its provinces is governedrnis plainly ludicrous. Confuciusrnsays, “He who gives no thought to difficultiesrnin the future is sure to be beset byrnworries much closer at hand.” The UnitedrnStates must not paint itself into a cornerrnand face the choice between a humiliatingrnretreat and an unpredictablernmilitary escalation that may lead to nuclearrnexchange. If such escalation takesrnplace, not a single country in East Asiarnwill side with America. Tokyo will providernthe cue for South Korea, Thailand,rnand the Philippines by declaring neutralityrnand annulling the present military alliancernwith Washington. This would irrevocablyrnalter the regional balance tornAmerica’s disadvantage.rnChina will be a “threat” to the UnitedrnStates only if America continues to makernChina its business. Just as Great Britainrnrealized that it could not jeopardize itsrncommercial and security interests by tryingrnto dictate the formula for Hong Kong,rnthe security of the United States must notrnbe made dependent on the resolution ofrnthe Taiwan issue. Only by disentanglingrnitself from its many “global responsibilities”rn—from the Middle East to Korea,rnfrom the Balkans to the Baltics—will thernUnited States regain its ability to define arnstrategic doctiine based on its true interestrnand a foreign policy that balances rationalrnobjectives and the limited resourcesrnused in their pursuit. crnFor the latest news andrncommentary, visitrnChroniclesrnat www.ChroniclesMagazine.orgrnAUGUST 2001/39rnrnrn