archists, Mussolini caught the Italians’ collective imagination.rnHis physic[Lie was impressive, his stle of orator}’ superb, his attitudesrnhighly theatrical. His ideas were contradictory, his fectsrnoften wrong, but his words were dramatic and his metaphors sornapt and striking that he captivated the crowds.rnFascism grew and provided an antidote to the looming threatrnof Bolslievism, but b its abandonment of traditional codes ofrnbehavior in the struggle against socialism it came close to its redrnopponent, using not only its ideas of social justice and its vocabular)-rnof simplified cliches but also its social base. The ecstaticrnNaples crowd that responded to Mussolini’s threat tornmarch on Rome in 1922 with the chant of “Koma, Roma, Roma”rnwas largely proletarian.rnThe die was cast a week later when fascist militias advancedrnupon tile Eternal Cits’. The biggest gamble of Mussolini’s careerrnpaid off when the liberal-democratic government collapsedrnand King Victor Emmanuel III sent the longed-for telegram.rnBut the ease with which Mussolini took power reflected thernweakness of the liberal system rather than his own strength.rnThere was no real “march on Rome”: The cih’ was there for therntaking.rnThe rise of Mussolini was welcomed bv many Italians notrnbecause of the ideological appeal of fascism —still vaguelyrndefined at the time—but because it seemed to offer practical solutionsrnto two specific problems: the “red menace” at home andrnthe “mutilated victory” abroad. From the outset, Italy’s internationalrnstatus was perceived as the criterion bv which the fiiscistrnexperiment would stand or fall. Mussolini freely acknowledgedrnthis, but his activist foreign policy reflected a faulty grasp of foreignrnaffairs that went beyond impatience with the old diplomacy.rnHe confused stratcg}’ and policy. His emphasis on “action”rnconflated ends and means in semantic imprecision until thernmeans, the acquisition of strength, became an end in itselfrnWhen the rhetoric of the regime became identified with a statementrnof ends, Italian policy became the prisoner of thatrnrhetoric.rnThis became obvious in 1935 with the shipid and unnecessaryrnEfltiopian adventure, which reflected Mussolini’s vanityrnand his lack of true statesmanship. Italy’s alliance with Germanyrnwas made possible, and in a sense unavoidable, bv thernAbyssinian war. This affair preoccupied the Western powersrnand Italy for more than a year, and it helped conceal the naturernof the real threat to peace in Europe. Unwittingly, Mussolinirndid a favor to Hifler by drawing attention away from him. In thernend, the split between Italy and her former allies could not bernrepaired—and Hifler was the beneficiary. The withdrawal ofrnGermany and Italy from the League of Nations marked the finalrnabandonment of flie Europe of Versailles, Not only was thernst’le of Italian foreign policy changed, but its substance as well,rnwhich was reflected in Mussolini’s (not Hitler’s) coining of fliernterm “Rome-Berlin Axis.” The Spanish civil war infused an ideologicalrnelement into the picture. By pitting Germany and Italyrnagainst the left and against the Western democracies, it createdrnan impression of ideological solidarity.rnThe presumed strategic community of interests betweenrnItaly and Germany remained unclarified, and fliis ambiguityrnhad sweeping consequences in later years. Mussolini was preparedrnto fight to secure a resurrected Mediterranean RomanrnEnipire and gain acce.ss to the oceans; Hifler ultimately strovernfor nothing short ofWeltmacht. Italy’s aims were “rational” andrnlimited, but in flieir pursuit Mussolini was erratic and inconsistent.rnHe eventually limited his options to the point where hernhad to make an alliance with the infinitely stronger Germanrndictator, whose goals were unlimited —and therefore irrationalrn—but who displayed great skill and “rationality” in theirrnexecution.rnThis was Italy’s calamity and Mussolini’s personal doom. Herndid not trust Hifler (as his frequent outbursts to his foreign ministerrnand son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano amply testiiy’), but he allowedrnhimself to be bullied and cajoled into obedience timernand again. Mussolini’s greatest failure as a statesman and as anrnItalian was his abandonment of autonomy to Hifler. He enteredrna war he could never win, and he did so for eminenfly unfascistrnreasons, afraid that the spoils woifld be Germany’s alone.rnEven if Hifler had been successful, Italy would have existed onrnGermany’s sufferance, iiot on its own strength.rnWith his senseless, infantile dream of imperial glory—onrnwhich he finally parted company with his hitherto supportivernsubjects —Mussolini painted himself into a corner. The onlyrnexit was into German captivity —in Otto Skorzenv’s plane inrnthe summer of 1943, and into that retreafing Wehnnacht columnrnin the spring of 1945, from which he was taken to a communistrnfiring squad and the Milanese meat hook. But for hisrndreams of imperial expansion, 11 Duce, Italy’s man of destiny,rncould have remained a hero at home and abroad until hisrndeath.rnUntil Abyssinia, Mussolini was hailed as a genius and a supermanrnon both sides of the Aflantic, primarily because of hisrneconomic and social policies. When FDR was inaugurated inrnMarch 1953, the world was praising Mussolini’s success inrnavoiding the Great Depression. Roosevelt and his “BrainrnTrust,” the architects of flie New Deal, were fascinated by Italy’srnfascism —a term which was not pejorati e at the time. In America,rnit was seen as a form of economic nationalism built aroundrnconsensus planning by the established elites in government,rnbusiness, and labor.rnAmerican leaders were not very concerned with the luidemoeratierncharacter of Mussolini’s regime. Fascism had “effectivelyrnstifled hostile elements in restricting the right of free assembh’,rnin abolishing freedom of the press and in having at itsrncommand a large militar)’ organization,” the U.S. Embassy inrnRome reported in 1925. But Mussolini remained a “moderate,”rnconfronting the Bolsheviks while fending off extremists onrnthe right. Ambassador Henry Fletcher saw only a choice betweenrnMussolini and socialism, and the Italian people preferredrnfascist “peace and prosperity” to the “free speech and loose administration”rnthat risked bringing Bolshevism to power. Secretaryrnof State Frank Kellogg joined Fletcher in labeling all oppositionrngroups as “communists, socialists, and anarchists.” Thernchief of the State Departmenf s Western European Division,rnWilliam Casfle, declared in 1926 that “the methods of thernDuce are not by any means American methods,” but “methodsrnwhich would certainly not appeal to this countn.’ might easilyrnappeal to a people so differenfly constituted as are the Italians.”rnAs the political and social effects of the Great Depression hitrnEurope, Italy received mounting praise as a bastion of order andrnstabilit}’. “The wops are unwopping themselves,” Fortune magazinernnoted with awe in 1934. State Department roving AmbassadorrnNorman Davis praised the successes of Italy in remarksrnbefore the Council on Foreign Relations in 1933, speaking afterrnthe Italian ambassador had drawn applause from his distinguisliedrnaudience for his description of how Italy had put itsrn”own house in order… A class war was put down.” Roosevelt’srnAUGUST 2000/1 7rnrnrn