CULTURAL REVOLUTIONSrnB O R I S Y E L T S I N , SO the conventionalrnwisdom goes, is an impulsive Slavic peasantrnwhose motives are as inscrutable asrnthe enigma that is Russia. Some, probablyrnmost, observers also think Yeltsin isrncrazy. Not crazy like the holy fools of oldrnRussia or the smug suits who make NATOrnpolicy. No, Yeltsin is siniph’ consideredrnsenile or losing his mind to alcoholicrndementia. Neither view is quiternright, as the unexpected and shocking—rnto the neatly pressed prettv boys and girlsrnof NATO and C N N – d a s h of Russianrntroops into Kosovo in June demonstrated.rnThe Russian blitzkrieg short-circuited therntalks on Russia’s projected “role” in Kosovornby forcing the issue: Russia would takernpart in the “peacekeeping” mission onrnher own terms, remaining —cfe facto ifrnnot de jure-outside the NATO commandrnstructure.rnCNN, the wire service of the NewrnWorld Order, was apoplectic, and thern”Iron Lady” of the State Department wasrnso mad she was quaking in her combatrnboots. The West had expected Russia tornplay along: Mer all, that w as part of therndeal. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the stalkingrnhorse of oligarch-in-chief Boris Berezovsky,rnhad supposedly boosted hisrnchances of becoming Boris Fs anointedrnsuccessor by pressuring Miloscic to cavernin and allow NATO to occupy Kosovo,rnwhich made Chernomyrdin’s pal AlrnGore happy. In return, the allegedlyrnnon-political IMF would cough up morernmoney to the Kremlin kleptocracy, buyingrnit time to calculate how to hang on tornpower after Yeltsin’s departure in 2000.rnThey should have known better.rnRussian media boasted that the moverninto Kosovo had saved the nation’s collectivernface, preserved Russia as a greatrnpower, and shown the West that the Balkansrnlie within Moscow’s sphere of influence.rnNATO could just forget becomingrnpoliceman —or mugger —of the world.rnWhat remained unclear, however, wasrnjust who ga’e the order for the 200 Russianrnairborne troops to move into Kosoo.rnBoth Chernomyrdin and the ForeignrnMinistry had clearly been out of the looprnon this one. Did the generals make therndecision on their own? Or was one pickledrnlobe of Yeltsin’s brain—the one thatrntranslates his uncommonly strong will tornpower into the intrigues he is justlyrnknown for —still working? A few observersrnclaimed (correctly, in my iew)rnthat the fading “i eltsin was still functioning,rnalbeit for brief periods, and will berndragged kicking and screaming—if notrnin a body bag—from the Kremlin. BorisrnI does not intend for anybody, especiallyrnChernomyrdin, Berezovsky, Gore, andrn”friend Bill,” to forget just who is the bossrnin Russia and grandmaster of the post-rnCold War Great Cyanic deal or no deal.rnSergei Kurginan, a nuth’ theater directorrnand sometime political strategistrnfor Gorbachex, the “patriotic” anti-rnYeltsin coalition, and Berezovsky, hadrnwarned against counting Yeltsin out ofrnthe game. In a rambling, semi-coherent,rnand extremely Russian essay (he is a RussifiedrnArmenian) published in the newspaperrnSIovo in Ma-, Kurginyan slammedrnthe “mvth” of Yeltsin’s total incapacityrnand predicted that the president still hadrna few surprises in store for both the Westrnand the “family,” the parasitic collectionrnof courtiers, oligarchs, and relaties whornmake up w hat Russian journalists call thern”collectie Yeltsin.” Yeltsin, wroternKurgin’an, is a self-absorbed “politicalrnanimal” who operates in the postmodernrnrealm beyond good and evil. “Withrnimerring reactions with respect to hisrnown interests, absolutely blinkered withrnrespect to anything else” and a “ferocit)'”rnin battle that his opponents cannotrnmatch, the postmodern “political aninral”rndoes not need to work ” 18 hours arnday” but onl- a few hours a week to readrnthe tea leaves and plot his next moe.rnThe model for understanding Yeltsinrnand Kremlin politics is not —as Yeltsinrnwould like tire West to bclieye —KonradrnAdenauer and post-war Germany, butrnRussia in the period bridging the end ofrnthe Great Patriotic War and the rise ofrnKhruschev. Then, an aging and ailingrn”political animal” clung to power untilrnhis death, leaving his countr’ with no apparentrnsuccessor, tense relations with thernWest, and in a state of demographic, economic,rnand social disaster. Hatchingrnplots until the end, his hapless victimsrnseldom knew what hit them. Trustingrnnobody, the political animal’s will tornpower renrained his only companion, thernonly voice his fading mind could stillrnhear.rn— Denis PetrovrnTHE U.S. SUPREME COURT endedrnits October 1998 term on June 23, therneariiest closing date in 30 years. AnthonyrnLewis, writing in the New York Times, declaredrnthat the term “showed us a phenomenonrnthat this country has not seenrnfor more than 60 years: a band of radicalrnjudicial activists determined to imposernon the Constitution their notion of arnproper system of government.” The WallrnStreet journal observed blandly that thernCourt was engaged in “an important effortrnto restore the balance between staternpower and federal power” and that “thernConstitution doesn’t permit Congress tornorder the states around willy-nilly.” Whorngot it right?rnThe three decisions that had set offrnMr. Lewis concerned whether states arernimmune from suit by aggrieved individuals,rnpursuant to the ancient doctrine ofrn”sovereign immunit}’.” The Court hadrnruled that they were. Sovereign immunit}’rnfor the states was clearly a part of ourrnjurisprudence at the time of the Constitution,rnand a cautious return to that doctrinernshould really set off no alarms. It isrnnot as if we don’t have enough litigationrnclogging our courts already, and there arernother means of redress available, throughrnstate or federal legislation or administrativernaction, or through court actionsrnbrought by the federal government. ThernWall Street journal has the better of thernargument.rnIn general, the October 1998 term wasrna good one for believers in the rule of law,rnalthough too many decisions were byrnslim five to four majorities. It is hardlyrnreassuring that the future of constitutionalrngovernment in our republic rests onrnthe discretion of Sandra Day O’Connor,rnthe justice who most frequently shifts betweenrnthe bloc of “conservatives” (Rehnquist,rnScalia, Thomas, and Kennedy),rnand the bloc of “liberals” (Stevens,rnSouter, Breyer, and Ginsburg). JusticernO’Connor was with the conservatives onrnthe three key state sovereign immunityrndecisions, but still voted with the liberalsrnto reverse a lower federal court and declarernthat state school districts could bernsued for failing to prevent elementaryrnschool students from sexually harassingrneach other. Only Justice O’Connorrnknows how these positions can be reconciled.rnEven so. Justice O’Connor wrote arnfine majorit)’ opinion in a case rejectingrnthe Clinton administration’s plan to usernstatistical sampling when conducting thern6/CHROKllCLESrnrnrn