him if the Albanians had turned in theirrnguns. He said, yes, they had each turnedrnin a gun —out of the nine or ten thatrneach one of them possessed.rnWith the beginning of the war, Itahanrnforces came to Albania and subsequentlyrnto Kosovo to help establish a Greater Albania.rnBulgarian forces claimed parts ofrnKosovo and Macedonia. The result:rnfrom 1941-1945, between 70,000 andrn100,000 Serbs were forced to flee, andrnabout 10,000 were killed. Serbian Orthodoxrnchurches were plundered or destroyed.rnCemeteries were desecrated.rnSchools were burned. After Italy collapsed,rnNazi troops took over in Kosovo,rnand the number of anti-Serb acts increased.rnAfter the war, Tito’s communistrndictatorship forbade the return of thernSerbs who had fled or been expelled.rnIn his attempt to seize power, Tito andrnhis communist comrades sought thernhelp of the Kosovo Albanians, promisingrnthem self-determination. The latter, althoughrnproviding almost no help, interpretedrnthe promise to include the rightrnto secede. Whatever he had promised,rnTito would not grant secession, butrnsought to mollify the Kosovo Albaniansrnby providing for autonomy within thernrepublic of Serbia. What began as thern”Autonomous Kosovo-Metohija Region”rn(1947) became the “AutonomousrnProvince of Kosovo and Metohija”rn(1963), only formally linked to Serbiarn(through amendments in 1968-1971 andrnthe 1974 constitution). This was not arnmere academic exercise in semantics, forrnunder Yugoslav conditions it meant ascendingrnfrom a faceless geographic entityrnto a “constituent element of the federation.”rnIn communist jargon, Kosovornand Metohija were referred to as Kosmet.rnIn all but name, the 1974 constitutionrnmade Kosovo a separate republic (arnrepublic within a republic). This incongruousrnsituation enabled the autonomousrnprovince to veto proposed legislationrnin the Serbian parliament thatrnhad nothing to do with Kosovo or Vojvodina,rnthe other autonomous provincernwhere Serbs were in a majority. Moreover,rnthe Serbs in Kosovo could not invokernthe minority rights provisions of thernconstitution. Ethnic groups that hadrntheir own republic were by definitionrnnot minorities, and hence could not invokernthose provisions even if they shouldrnfind themselves minorities, as the Serbsrndid in Kosovo.rnEven before the 1974 constitution, thernKosovo Albanians persecuted the Serbs.rnThey desecrated their churches, stole orrndestroyed their property, employedrnduress to get them to sell their holdings,rnand engaged in other acts designed tornforce them to leave Kosovo. Even Serbianrnprofessionals with whom the Albaniansrnwere satisfied were told, as a conditionrnof their continued employment,rnthat they must learn Albanian. Many ofrnthose Serbs, nearing retirement, refused.rnMoreover, in ten years (1971-1981),rnthe Kosovo Albanians brought in fromrnAlbania 240 university teachers, alongrnwith textbooks in Albanian. They importedrnmovies, arranged for AlbanianrnTV and radio hookups, as well as sportsrnand cultural visits. In addition, there wasrnin the years after World War II a largernimmigration from Albania, somewherernbetween 100,000 and 300,000. MostrnSerbs insist that Tito encouraged this,rnand even party comrades, while avoidingrnprecise proof, maintain that he wantedrnto change the ethnic composition ofrnKosovo.rnDuring the Second Yugoslavia, Kosovornwas ruled by the Communist Party ofrnKosovo, part and parcel of the YugoslavrnCommunist Party. In its early years,rnTito’s regime had many difficulties withrnAlbanian nationalists, one of whomrncame into the office of Miladin Popovic,rnthe actual founder of the Albanian CommunistrnParty, and shot him in coldrnblood. The Albanian nationalists werernput down and communist rule solidified.rnStill, the Yugoslav party continued tornhave many troubles with the Albanians,rnthis time with the party comrades.rnTito and his associates had proceededrnon the assumption — erroneous as itrnturned out—that providing increasedrnautonomy and greater economic assistancernto the Kosovo Albanians wouldrnmake them loyal citizens of Yugoslavia.rnWith slightly more than 15 percent ofrnthe Yugoslav population, Kosovo was allocatedrnup to 30 percent of the FederalrnDevelopment Funds. But Kosovo wasrnable to cover less than ten percent of thernneeds of the province. The remainderrnwas provided from funds of the federationrnor the republic of Serbia.rnFollowing Tito’s death in 1980, thernKosovo Albanians in 1981 launchedrndemonstiations in favor of a republic andrnoutright annexation to Albania. Thesernwere put down with some bloodshed, followedrnby measures designed to curb similarrnactions in the future. In 1974, arnCominform (Communist InformationrnBureau) group had been discovered, andrna “movement for the National liberationrnof Albania” had surfaced in 1976. At thernsame time, the Kosovo Albanians continuedrnanti-Serb actions. Today those actsrnwould be called “ethnic cleansing,” andrnthe Serbs painfully point out that in thernpast 20 years no Kosovo Albanian leaderrnhas admitted or apologized for the persecution.rnDuring the 1980’s, before SlobodanrnMilosevic became the principal actor,rnthe Yugoslav Communist Party leadershiprnspent much time on the Kosovornproblem. For example, in May 1987, atrnan “ideological” plenum of the CentralrnCommittee, one member expressed hisrnexasperation: “If we cannot quickly overcomerngenocide . . . then I see as the onlyrnway out an urgent convoking of an extraordinaryrnCongress of the League ofrnYugoslav Communists and the calhng ofrnfree elections with multiple candidates,rnso men can come to the top who canrnbring an end to genocide.” The nextrnmonth, the Cential Committee and thernPresidency of the Party took the positionrnthat “the most difficult part of the problemrnof Kosovo and the whole of Yugoslavrnsociety is to be found in that the policy ofrnthe [League] is not being implemented.”rnMoreover, they said that “the pressure onrnthe Serbs and Montenegrins must bernstopped with all the means of our socialistrnself-management system.”rnTwo years earlier, the Bar Associationrnof Serbs, in letters to the Serbian and Yugoslavrnparliaments, demanded actionrnagainst the “illegal and unconstitutionalrnacts” of the Kosovo Albanians. Similarrnletters were sent to all other federal bodies.rnThe letters spoke of failures to nullifyrnreal estate sales made under duress,rnthe damaging of cultural and historicalrnmonuments and cemeteries, and policiesrnthat forced Serbs, Turks, Gypsies,rnand others to leave Kosovo. While parliamentsrnadmitted that the problems existed,rnno successful actions were taken tornremedy them.rnAmong examples cited by the presidentrnof the Bar Association were the remarksrnof onetime minister of defensernand close ally of Tito, General NikolarnLjubicic, to a joint meeting of the presidencyrnof Serbia and the Party CentralrnCommittee of Serbia: “Some things thatrnare happening are so drastic that I simplyrnask myself how we can tolerate that in arnlegal state.” He proceeded to tell of anrnAlbanian who moved into a Serbianrnhouse and moved the old lady out.rn42/CHRONICLESrnrnrn