tiires of the communities that reared us and have a duty to Hvernso that we may contribute to them. This is an uncommonlyrnweak argument. It would follow that, should we become a burdenrnon the communit}’, suicide would become legitimate, perhapsrneven required. (Aristotle does not draw this inference.)rnFurther, whatever the communitv did for us, we never olunteeredrnto join it and to become obligated to live when we nornlonger want to. In modern times, involuntary obligations are alwa’rns questionable, although most people recognize some suchrnobligations, e.g., to their parents. An involuntar)’ natural obligationrnto live may be analogously constructed. We also may bernmorallv obligated to obey laws for which we did not volunteer.rnBut laws prohibihng such things as murder or fraud protect usrnfrom one another, whereas the prohibition of suicide wouldrnprotect us from ourselves. This does not seem to be called for.rnIt is unclear to whom the obligation to live is owed and how itrnis justified. Aristotie further thought that suicide violates “rightrnreason” and therefore is “unjust” toward nature and the state.rnPlato, too, opposed suicide without offering much of an argument.rnHe writes, “A person who kills himself [is] violently robbingrnwhat fate has allotted,” without bothering to argue the authorih’rnof fate. Wliv must we obey it when we can do otherwise?rnJohn Locke decided that we own the product of our labor becausern”even,’ man has a property in his own person” and, therefore,rnin whatever he produces. It would be a small step to inferrnthat, since we own ourselves, we can dispose of ourselves andrndecide whether to live or die. Property’, after all, is the right torndispose of what one owns. But, being a good Christian, Lockerndid not take this step. We remain God’s creatures and owe arndut’ to live the life God gave us. “Ever’one is bound to preservernhimself and not to quit his station willfully.” In effect, werndon’t fully own ourselves (contrarv’ to what libertarians believe)rnbut merely are in (temporary) possession, tenants on God’srnpropert}’.rnImmanuel Kant opposed suicide as a violation of the dut)’ tornlie. He thought we owe this dut}’ to ourselves. But a dutyrnowed bv and to ourselves is not vers” different from a debt owedrnb’ and to ourseKes —which we can always forgive. Actually,rnsince the debtor and the creditor are the same person, no debtrnis really owed to anyone by anyone. To say that we owe a debt,rnor a dut)’, to ourselves means no more than that we feel wernought to do (or not to do) something. It adds no argument, onlyrnemphasis, to that feeling, while suggesting that an independentrnargument has been added. In the words of ThomasrnHobbes: “He that can bind can release; and therefore he that isrnbound to himself only, is not bound.”rnThe notion of a dut}’ owed to oneself also may envision a splitrnin the self between a part to which the dut}’ is owed and the partrnowing it. Such internal conflicts do occur (without them psvchotherapistsrncould not make a lix’ing). Quite possibly, consciencern(or our long-term interest) wants one thing and thernpleasure-seeking part of the self another. Still, the duty tornwhich conscience calls us is always a dut}’ either to others or tornsome moral idea which we have accepted. Kant thought thatrnour dut}’ is to reason. (But he did not show that suicide is irrational.)rnThe obligatoriness of the duty depends on the moralrnweight of its demands, not on its being a duty to oneself AndrnKant did not actually offer a convincing argument for the dut}’rnto live.rnArthur Schopenhauer did not think highly of life. He wasrncoininced that the suffering it brings exceeds its pleasures. (Herndid not tel) how he measured and compared.) Since desirernbrings suffering in exxess of the pleasure of fulfillment,rnSchopenhauer felt that we should strive for desirelessness, as hernbelieved Hindus and Buddhists did. Thus, by avoiding life (forrnto avoid desire is to avoid life), we would avoid suffering. Onernmight think that Schopenhauer would justif}’ suicide, but hernactually opposed it as an illegitimate means of achieving desirelessness.rnBuddhists thought that suicide would only bringrnreincarnation, not Nirvana. Schopenhauer’s arguments seemrnunusually murky here. But one must remember that, by justifyingrnsuicide, philosophers would place themselves in an awkwardrnposition: they would have to justify staying alive while argrungrnin favor of being dead if they argued that suicide isrnobligatory, or even desirable. Schopenhauer preferred to makernit attractive (or to make life unattractive) but futile. Amongrnmajor philosophers, David Hume was alone in thinking suicidernlegitimate. He has remained alone.rnFew people want to commit suicide and everv effort shouldrnbe made to dissuade them, for their wish may be teniporar}’.rnHowever, if the’ are altogether resolved, they cannot bernprevented at length from carrying out their intention, and ifrnthey are mentally competent, there is no justification for thwartingrnthem. There is no justification either for denying help tornthose who, although mentally competent, are physically so disabledrnthat they need and request help to end their life. Theirrnwish for ending their life is more intelligible than that of others.rnBut no excuse is needed from a secular viewpoint. It is your lifernto end or to continue.rnWhy do so many people insist that suicide always ought to bernprevented even when preventing it prolongs the hopeless sufferingrnof incurabh’ sick persons? Wiy does suicide horrify people?rnChaste persons not only abstain from illicit sex, but alsornusually think that those who do not are morally wrong (or atrnleast weak) and should be prevented from doing what theyrnwant. That is also how people who want to live feel about peoplernwho want to die. Could it be, then, that we feel that thosernwho do not act according to the survival instinct we all sharernare, as it were, traitors to fife, quitters who give in to a temptationrnthat must be shunned, even though (or perhaps because) itrnis felt at times by nearly ever}’one?rnMurdering others is wrong and a crime because it takes thernlife of those who were entitied to live and did not want to die.rnBut suicide ends the life of a person who no longer wishes tornlie. He obviously consents to taking his own life, or to haingrnit taken. Wliat makes killing others wrong, what makes homicidernmurder, is lack of consent. Consensual intercourse is legitimate,rnbut non-consensual intercourse is rape and a crime.rnThe law acknowledges the difference which consent makesrnwith regard to sex (and to property) but ignores it with regard tornhomicide, including assisted suicide, perhaps because consentrncannot be valid if (as religious dogma asserts) we don’t own ourselves;rnmore likely because consensual intercourse (or propertyrntransfer) is common, whereas consensual homicide certainl}’ isrnnot.rnWe all have an instinctive wish to continue living. But instinctsrnleave us some choice, allowing reason to direct our actions,rnsometimes in defiance of our instincts. Unlike animals,rnwe have a choice, and can act according to our moral norms.rnYet the prevailing hostility to suicide and its infamous reputationrnhave led our societv to cruel and immoral policies. Wernthreaten to punish anyone, including physicians, who helps anotherrnto end his life.rnAUGUST 1998/21rnrnrn