culturally assimilated and whose members would be eligiblernfor any immigration preference equally with other citizens.rnBut nationalist conservatives, especially those attracted byrnMr. Buchanan’s “America First” foreign policy, will be suspiciousrnthat a combination of NATO and TAFTA would be a potentiallyrnentangling alliance. They will want to know if such arnlong-term strategic commitment is in America’s interest—especiallyrnsince the United States faces no serious threats with thernend of the Cold War. Would it not encourage America to embarkrnon a policy of global intervention in a crusade for democracy,rnand inevitably infringe on American sovereignty alreadyrnunder threat from Clinton’s multilateralism and such U.N.rnventures as the Kyoto treaty on carbon emissions?rnThese are reasonable questions. But the answers point inrnsome surprising directions. To begin with, the belief that—rnwith the end of the Cold War—the United States should retreatrnfrom its former alliances is itself a variant of the “lonely superpower”rnhubris which nationalist conservatives rightly criticizernin neoconservatives. America’s current predominance is artificialrnand temporary. New superpowers such as China, a resurgentrnRussia, a federal Europe, and possibly an Islamic bloc willrnemerge in the course of the next century. No one of them willrnbe the equal of America, but several of them together couldrnpose a threat. The danger of such a world will be greatly magnifiedrnif a federal Europe pursues an independent course (andrnalliances) in foreign policy. On the other hand, an AtlanticrnCommunity, built upon NATO and TAFTA, would be sufficientiyrnpowerful to deter any threat to its interests and to discouragernany alliance against itself It would not be a departurernfrom past American diplomacy, but the continuation andrn”deepening” of a bipartisan foreign policy pursued since 1949.rnAs for global interventionism, an American-led Atiantic blocrnwould deter it by making it unnecessary. After all, interventionrnis an admission of failure—the failure of diplomacy, threats,rnand superpower prestige. The aim of statesmanship should bernto safeguard American interests without intervention (which isrnoften costly and unpopular at home). But the more powerfulrnthe bloc —and an Atiantic Community would be extremelyrnpowerful—the less likely any member of it would need to safeguardrnits interests by military means. Ideological interventionismrn(“making the world safe for democracy”) would face a differentrnobstacle: the restraining opposition of America’s allies.rnNations dislike adventurism by their allies because it might involvernthem in trouble. Their cautionar}’ restraints can be frustratingrnat times. This explains why some neoconservatives werernimpatient with NATO during the Cold War and today are, inrneffect, global isolationists. But a conservative statesman shouldrnwelcome the fact that allies are available to urge secondrnthoughts, to offer mediation, and to suggest alternative remediesrnto force — provided he retains the national sovereignty tornreject those restiaints when he deems action vital.rnBut would not a Leviathan as large as an Atiantic Communit)’rnrepresent a threat to American sovereignty? Although superficiallyrnplausible, this argument glosses over a vital distinctionrnbetween internationalism and sujbranationalism.rnOrganizations like the European Union (even when they arernweak) and treaties like the Kyoto treaty on carbon emissionsrn(even when they are tentative) are nonetheless hostile to nationalrnsovereignty in principle because they seek to bind member-rnstates to accept their decisions on unknowable matters inrnadvance. They make nation-states into their agents. That is thernessence of sz^/jranationalism. Organizations like NATO, however,rneither define narrowly and in advance the areas in whichrnfuture collective decisions will be binding or allow memberstatesrneither to block, or to abstain from, such future decisions.rnInternational organizations remain the agents of nation-states.rnThat is the essence of internationalism. The two concepts arernas different as chalk and cheese. An Atiantic Community, likernNATO itself, would be an international organization ratherrnthan a supranational one. The reasons for this are practical, political,rneconomic, and civilizational.rnIt simply would not be practical to construct a tightly administered,rnsupranational organization out of more than 20 countriesrnof varying levels of economic development stretching fromrnSan Francisco to the Ukrainian border. Even the supranationalrnambitions of the much smaller and more homogeneous EuropeanrnUnion —a single currency, harmonization of taxes andrnregulation, regional subsidies—have imposed enormous costsrnon member-states, delayed the accession of Central and EasternrnEurope, and may yet cause the EU to founder. No onernwants another Maastricht for Europe; it would be sheer fantasyrnas the basis for an Atlantic Community.rnPolitically, an Atiantic Community is attractive to both Europernand America precisely because it would be a liberal structurernof inter-governmental cooperation in which each nationrnwould control its own affairs. Europeans know from their experiencernof NATO that the United States has no hegemonicrnambitions for itself (indeed, the main anxiety of Europeans isrnthat the Yanks will go home), but that its presence is a guaranteernagainst the potential hegemony of—let’s pick a nation atrnrandom—the Cermans. And as the world’s leading power, thernUnited States has no interest in subordinating its sovereignty tornany international institution. (The State Department may, ofrncourse, take a different view.)rnEconomically, an Atlantic Community would mean, asrnAdam Smith pointed out, that “the different states into which arngreat continent was divided would so far resemble the differentrnprovinces of a vast empire.” For free trade means that the largerrnmarket required for economies of scale does not itself requirerna larger state. Economic efficiency can be combined with politicalrndecentralization. Only socialists believe that the marketrnand the state must be co-terminous. The member-states of anrnAtlantic free trade group would therefore be economicallyrnsovereign. Of course, if they exercised that sovereignty foolishlyrn(e.g., by imposing regulations or raising taxes above the Atlanticrnnorm), they would suffer for it with either capital flight orrna brain drain. But under conditions of political decentralization,rnthat would be left for the national government to solve.rnFinally, an Atlantic Communit}’ would be the current expressionrnof a civilizational reality. After almost 50 years ofrnAmerican leadership of a more or less united West (with EasternrnEurope looking enviously on from the wrong side of thernbarricades), both Americans and Europeans have developed arnsense of common kinship and destiny. Nor does it hurt that ourrndefense and diplomatic interests are likely to coincide in therncoming centur)’. Of course, any civilizational loyalty is boundrnto be thin gruel in comparison with the hard stuff of patriotismrnand national allegiance—and rightly so. But there is no contradictionrnbetween them; rather, they are at different points of arnprogression from family loyalty to ultimate religious obligation.rnBoth American nationalism and the Western cultural identityrnare historically and culturally well grounded, and their currentrnerosion would quickly be halted by sensible public policy andrncourageous civic leadership. crnJULY 1998/25rnrnrn