of the latest war, Bosnia can only functionrnas an evenly treated and finely balancedrnarrangement among its constituentrnpeoples: Serbs, Croats, andrnMuslims. The European Union is stablernbecause its member-nations have chosen,rnover a period of years, to eliminaterncustoms barriers, passport controls, andrntariffs, and to allow completely freernmovement of goods, services, and capital.rnThis may happen in the former Yugoslavia,rntoo, if America allows people onrnall sides to see the benefits of associationrnand cooperation.rnThe Dayton Accords, as GeneralrnCharles Boyd wrote in Foreign Affairs,rnjust may succeed—but only if the UnitedrnStates puts the security of Muslims,rnSerbs, and Croats before their integration.rnEach group of “Bosnians” feels safernonly with its own kin, and their self-createdrnpartition should be allowed to standrnwhile the trauma of war fades. Meanwhile,rnthe powers-that-be in the outsidernworld need to rectify the gross disparityrnbetween the reconstruction aid and militaryrnsupplies flowing to the Muslims andrnthe crumbs allotted to the Serbs.rnReinterpretations of the Dayton Accordsrnare detrimental to the prospects forrnpeace. “Dayton” is a balanced document,rncarefully worded, and its applicationrnneeds to be balanced too. The perceptionrnin Europe still persists, however,rnthat the United States cares less for thernletter of “Dayton” and more for the integrativern”spirit” that would enable Albrightrnand company to continue withrntheir ad hoc reinterpretation of the agreement.rnThe situation is complicated by therncontinuing split within the Bosnian-rnSerb leadership between the embattledrnPresident of the Republika Srpska, BiljanarnPlavsic, and the loyalists of the formerrnpresident. Dr. Radovan Karadzic.rnPlavsic is often dubbed “pro-Western,”rnbut her position is actiially akin to that ofrnPhilippe Petain in the summer of 1940:rnaccept a bad outcome and pretend yournare doing it with a good grace, lest the alternativernproves to be infinitely morernpainful. Having witnessed what happenedrnto the Serbs in the Krajina, Plavsicrnknows that only a sympathetic West mayrnprevent a repeat performance in Bosnia.rnPlavsic’s Western interlocutors, forrntheir part, understand that building up arnpliant Serb leader in an emaciated RepublikarnSrpska is the only way they canrnveto the preferred Muslim scenario: anrnall-out military offensive, which wouldrn”unify” Bosnia (minus a million Serbrnrefugees pushed into Serbia) under thernrule of Alija Izetbegovic.rnThe Muslim scenario clearly calls forrnthe continuous presence of Karadzic asrnthe Bosnian Serb puppet-master. Thisrnfact would in itself provide an alibi forrnthe “full and final liberation of the entirernstate territory” (in the language of thernSarajevo media). The Muslim leadershiprnis well aware that Karadzic’s controlrnat Pale would also make it politically impossiblernfor any Western leader to try tornprevent the Bosnian Serb catastiophe.rnPlavsic’s desperate game plan also reliesrnon the potential for renewed Muslim-rnCroat conflict if Sarajevo and Zagrebrncannot agree on the division of thernspoils after a Bosnian Serb collapse. Nornsuch agreement seems possible, for havingrnfinished off the Krajina, Croatia regardsrnMuslims as a worse threat to its regionalrninterests than its traditional Serbrnrivals. Croatian President Franjo Tudjmanrnhas never given up on his plan to dividernBosnia along ethnic lines. It is onernof the worst-guarded secrets that thernMuslim-Croat Federation in the non-rnSerb half of Bosnia —so lovingly nurturedrnby the experts at the U.S. StaternDepartment—is dead, primarily becausernCroatia has completed its de facto annexationrnof western Herzegovina.rnTudjman therefore would be loath tornsee Izetbegovic’s triumphant army onrnthe west bank of the Drina River, separatingrnBosnia and Serbia, unless hisrncheckered Croat flag were to be raised inrnBanja Luka. This, in turn, is unacceptablernto Izetbegovic because a two-wayrnsplit of Bosnia — between Croats andrnMuslims—would probably prove morerndefinite than the three-way arrangementrnadopted at Dayton. This he will neverrnaccept without a fight—and a speedyrnMuslim victory over the Serbs could igniternrenewed hostilities between the victorsrnand the Croats.rnAmid such nightmarish scenarios, itrnmakes sense for both sides to preempt itrnall by cooperating. It is encouraging thatrnat least some elements within the Clintonrnadministration have understood, finally,rnthat the Pax Americana in the Balkansrnis a disastrous strategy. Thernresultant instability would produce arnnew round of bloodshed within a generationrnat most. American support forrnPlavsic and a limited Serb self-rule underrnDayton could therefore be taken as arnclear signal—primarily to Messrs. Tudjmanrnand Izetbegovic—that there will bernno next round in Bosnia for years torncome. After all the blunders it has madernin the Balkans over the past decade, thernUnited States would do well to adopthoweverrnbelatedly—this pragmatic attitudernand stick with it. Otherwise thernGIs, stuck in the Balkans for years torncome, may easily get in harm’s way.rn—SrdjaTrifkovicrnT H E N E W YOKK POST’S editorialrnpage has been one of the few brightrnspots in the City of Dreadful Night.rnCenerally a steamy tabloid in its newsrncoverage, the Post has nevertheless offeredrnthoughtful and informed editorialsrnand commentary of a mainstream conservativernorientation under its editorialrnpage editor, neoconservative Eric Breindel,rnand his deputy, Scott McConnell.rnLast summer, the Post editorial pagernunderwent a shake-up. Mr. Breindelrnmoved upstairs to a management position,rnand his position was filled by Mr.rnMcConnell, whose own column hadrnestablished his reputation as a thoughtfulrnmainstream-right critic of America’s immigrationrnpolicy and of such matters asrnmulticulturalism and the kind of racialrnbellyaching that has enveloped the cityrnand the nation for the last decade. It wasrnexpected that Mr. McConnell’s editorialrnpage would reflect at least some of hisrnviews.rnIt did—but not for long. On July 14,rnthe paper published Mr. McConnell’srneditorial on Republican legislation promotingrnstatehood for Puerto Rico, arnpiece that rehearsed the standard set ofrnstatistics on Puerto Rico’s poverty, welfarerndependency, and alien cultural andrnlinguistic heritage. Pat Buchanan, WilliamrnRusher, National Review, and otherrncritics of the Republican legislation soonrnpublished columns or articles that offeredrnmuch the same facts and point ofrnview.rnAlas, such candor proved too muchrnfor Mr. McConnell’s supervisors at thernPost. In an article in David Horowitz’srnHeterodoxy describing what followed,rnMr. McConnell recounted how Postrnpublisher Martin Singerman, who hadrnread the editorial and complimentedrnhim on it, stacked a meeting with disgruntledrnPuerto Rican leaders who commentedrnon Mr. McConnell’s ethnicrnbackground (he’s Irish). Some threerndozen Puerto Ricans showed up at thernPosf’s offices to grouse about the insensitivityrnof the editorial and the distastefulrnMARCH 1998/7rnrnrn