Principalities & Powersrnby Samuel FrancisrnAn Infantile Disorderrn”Why, we could lick them in a month!”rnboasts Stuart Tarleton soon after thernConfederates fire on Fort Sumter inrnMargaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind.rn”Gentlemen aKva’s fight better than rabble.rnAmonth—why, one battle.” At thatrnpoint, young Mr. Tarleton is interruptedrnby Rhett Butler, a rather darker characterrnin Mitchell’s novel than the swashbucklingrnplayboy created by Clark Gable onrnthe screen. Butler points ovit that thernSoutherners do not possess what modernrnstrategists would call the industrial andrnlogistical infrastructure with which arnmodern war must be fought—the cannonrnfactories, iron foundries, railroads,rnand woolen and cotton mills that thernNorth has in abundance. “But, ofrncourse,” he says, “you gentlemen havernthought of these things.”rnOf course they hadn’t thought of thosernthings. What the- had thought aboutrnwere the glories of the coming conflictrnand the rights they were going to vindicate,rnand within a few years and a fewrnmore battles than Stuart Tarleton hadrnanticipated, he and his twin brother wererndead, along with most of the others whornhad listened to them, the Confederacv itself,rnand the societ)’ on which it rested.rn/s for Rhctt Butler, he not only surivedrnbut flourished, confident in his philosojihyrnthat there are two times when a manrncan easil)’ nrake a fortune for himself—rnonce when a civilizahon rises, and oncernwhen a civilizahon falls.rnToday, 130 ears after the disasters tornwhich the chatter of valiant fools likernStuart Tarletoir led, secessionism purportsrnto rise from the ashes, this time embodiedrnmainly in the League of thernSouth, of which most of the editors ofrnthis magazine except me are members.rnIts leaders foreswear the use of violence,rnso we need not anticipate that the resultsrnwill be similar—at least not unhl a goodrnmanv more Southerners sign up thanrnseem to have done so in the four vears ofrnthe f ,eague’s existence and until the federalrngovernment pays more attention tornthem than it has done to date. Nevertheless,rnif the physical extermination ofrn600,000 white men oer the burning issuernof whether four million black menrnare to be slaves or serfs is not on the ageirdarnthis time, secessionism promises to bernno less a disaster for those of the Americanrnright than it was for the pretty bellesrnand beaux of Mitchell’s novel. It is unfortunaternthat many of those gentiemenrnmost dedicated to secession seem not tornhave thought of the weaknesses of theirrnposition any more than Stuart Tarletonrnand the other guests at the Wilkes barbecuernhad.rnTwo main forces appear to drive thernresurrection of Southern secessionism.rnIn the first place, the American right as arnserious political movement has collapsed,rnleaving its most dedicated adherentsrnwith no obvious vehicle for pursuingrnits goals of dismantling the federalrnleviathan and ending the cultural andrndemographic inundation of the Southrnand the rest of the nation. Second, arnconcerted onslaught against Southernrnand Confederate symbols and traditions,rnmost clearly represented in the attacks onrnpublic display of the Confederate BattlernFlag, righriv’ excites the wrath of Southernersrnwho remain loyal to the memoryrnof the Confederacy and the culture thatrnthe flag and the war have come to represent.rnCorrectly lacking any confidencernin the Republican Part)’ or the neoconservative-rndominated “conser’ati^e movement,”rnSoutherners of the right have decidedrnto chuck it all and set off on theirrnown, with the goal of invoking the traditionsrnand identit)’ of their own land andrnculture as the basis for resisting federalrnt’ranny and their own racial and culturalrndestruction.rnYet neither of these two forces providesrnan adequate justification for secession,rnand neither suggests any realisticrnprospect of success. There are, to put itrnsinrply, tvvo strong reasons whv secession,rnfor the South or any other part of the nation,rnis not a good idea: it is not practical;rnand even if it were practical, it would notrnbe desirable.rnLeaders of Southern secessionism oftenrnpoint to sister movements abroad —rnto secessionist movements in NorthernrnItaly, Quebec, Scotland, the Balkans,rnand other places —as well as to perennialrndiscussions and controversies about arnkind of secession in various states, cities,rnand regions in this countr}’. But the foreignrnmoxements and those in the UnitedrnStates are irrelevant to what Southernersrnactually propose. Abroad, where secessionismrnhas gathered significant support,rnit has done so because those pushing itrncan claim to be the heirs of real and ancientrnnations or at least of subnational regionsrnthat exhibit far more distinctivenessrnthan the American South, toda orrnat any time in its history, can claim.rnScotland, Quebec, the Balkan peoples,rnand even Northern Italy all can boast ofrndistinctive linguistic, religious, ethnic,rnand historical heritages, far more distinctivernthan those of the Soutli, and somerncan point to some period in their pastrnwhen they actually constituted autonomousrnstates. Indeed, compared tornsome of these nations or regions, thernAmerican South under close scrutiny beginsrnto vanish as a cultural imit’. Therernis at least as much difference betweenrnTidewater Virginia and East Tennesseernor between northern and southernrnLouisiana as there is between Scotlandrnand England or Northern and SouthernrnItaK’ toda’.rnWithin the United States, the periodicrndemands for breaking Staten Island offrnfrom New York Git}’ or East Kansas fromrnWest Kansas or Southern Californiarnfrom Northern California are not secessionistrnmovements in the same sense asrnw hat file Southerners advocate. None ofrnthese other movements contemplatesrnleaving the national political unity of thernUnited States. It makes sense that overrntiiTie some borders and jurisdictions willrnbecome outmoded, and to redraw thernmap ever)’ now and then to suit contemporaryrninterests and needs is unobjectionable.rnBut it is not secession in thernsense that Southerners and most dictionariesrnuse the term, and to cite suchrnmovements (none of which has so f;irrnbeen successful) as examples of the risingrndissatisfaction with the unified nationstaternis fallacious.rnNor do contemporar)’ Southern secessionistsrnmake any compelling case forrnthe separation of their own region fromrnthe larger national unity. Historically,rnthe Southern people have had an arguablerncase for separation, and in 1860,rnwith the prospect of their slave-poweredrneconomy being gradually gutted bvrnNorthern dominance, their case wasrnmore arguable than ever, though evenrnFEBRUARY 1998/31rnrnrn