actual people of the nation; free tradernand globalism, which threaten both therneconomic interests and sovereignty ofrnthe nation; or multicLdturalism, whichrnneither the mainstream left nor rightrnnow seriously questions. Hence, itrnmakes sense that the high priests of therndominant right would seek to reinventrnnationalism and to redefine it in termsrnthat will offer no serious challenge to thernantinational forces they really represent.rnMr. Kristol’s main formulahon of neoconrnnationalism appeared in the WallrnStreet journal on September 15, in an articlerncoauthored with his colleague atrnthe Weekly Standard, David Brooks. Mr.rnBrooks, in fact, has been busily poundingrnthe pseudonationalist drum for somerntime. In the last few months, he has publishedrnarticles in the Standard praisingrnTeddy Roosevelt as a hero for conservativesrnand extolling the architecture of thernLibrary of Congress as the aesthetic expressionrnof high nationalism. One canrnquibble with either or both, but the kindrnof nationalism he and Mr. Kristol are tr–rning to sell would have little appeal tornRoosevelt and seems not to have penetratedrnvery far into any library at all.rnTheir proposed models for the newrnneocon nationalism include not only TRrnbut also Alexander Hamilton and HenryrnClay. “American nationalism,” theyrnwrite, “the nationalism of AlexanderrnHamilton and Henry Clay and TeddyrnRoosevelt—has never been Europeanrnblood-and-soil nationalism. It’s true thatrnin the absence of a real appeal to nationalrngreatness, some conservatives arerntempted, a la Pat Buchanan, to turn tornthis European tradition. But this can’trnand shouldn’t work in America. Our nationalismrnis that of an exceptional nationrnfounded on a universal principle, onrnwhat Lincoln called ‘an abstract truth,rnapplicable to all men and all times.'” It isrnno accident that these also happen to bernamong the very figures that PatrnBuchanan has cited as exponents of therneconomic nationalism that has been thernnorm throughout most of American history.rnThis tells us all we need to know aboutrnthe Kristol-Brooks school of nationalism.rnIt’s a nationalism that takes the main advocatesrnof a centralized state as its heroesrnbut leaves out of its picture of “nationalrngreatness” any reference to the real nationrn—its people (blood), its land (soil),rnits interests, or its contemporary manifestationsrn(in Buchanan and his following,rnwhich happens to be rather larger thanrnthat of the Weekly Standard). What isrnobjectively wrong with the Kristol-rnBrooks version of nationalism is what Irnargued some years ago was wrong withrnthe Hamilton-Clay-Lincoln version of it.rnDesigned essentially to represent the materialrninterests of a particular section (therncommercial and industrial Northeast), itrnwas an instrumental nationalism, merelyrnan instrument or tool to unify the real nationrnunder the dominance of that sectionrnand its interests by masking them as “nationalism.”rnBut neither Hamilton norrnClay was able to make it prevail, and Lincolnrnand his party succeeded for as longrnas they did only because of the powerrnvacuum generated by the Civil War. Itrnfailed because it ignored the interests ofrnthe real nation. It is one thing to endorsernthe economic and trade policies of thesernleaders, as Buchanan does (and Kristolrnand Brooks do not), but those policiesrncan be justified apart from the general visionrnof the state and nation that Hamilton,rnClay, Lincoln, and Roosevelt entertained.rnThe content of the phony nationalismrnformulated by Kristol and Brooks isrnenough to tell us how it differs from thernorganic nationalism that is actuallyrnemerging on the populist right, whichrnthe Weekly Standard crowd seeks tornsmother in its cradle. “Our pride in settlingrnthe frontier, welcoming immigrantsrnand advancing the cause of freedomrnaround the world is related to our dedicationrnto our principles”—the universalistrnnationalism of Lincoln.rnThat is why American nationalismrnis not narrow or parochial. It doesrnnot believe in closing our bordersrnor fearing the global economy. Itrndoes believe in resisting grouprnrights and multiculhiralism andrnother tendencies that weaken ourrnattachment to our common principles.rnIt embraces a neo-Reaganiternforeign policy of national strengthrnand moral assertiveness abroad. Itrnwould use federal power to preservernand enhance our nationalrnpatrimony—the parks, buildings,rnand monuments that are the physicalrnmanifestations of our commonrnheritage. And it insists that whilerngovernment should be limited, itrnshould also be energetic.rnSo, neocon universalist nationalismrnwould swallow the real nation throughrnmass immigration and continued extinctionrnof the national economic interestrnthrough immersion into the “globalrneconomy” and would reject multiculturalism,rnnot because it threatens the destructionrnof the cultural nucleus of thernreal nation, but because it weakens attachmentrnto “our common principles.”rnLike the instrumental nationalism ofrnHamilton, it envisions an “energetic” nationalrnstate that, at the very least, becomesrna kind of super-janitor for publicrnbuildings and parks. What is conspicuousrnby its absence in the Kristol-Brooksrnvision of nationalism is any referencernwhatsoever to the Constitution as bothrnthe limiting and energizing frameworkrnof the national state.rnNor is it an accident that only a fewrnweeks before the Kristol-Brooks discoveryrnof the nationalism of Hamilton andrnhis heirs, George Will wrote, “The challengernis for conservatism to find a placernin its pantheon for three great nationalistsrn—Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clayrnand Theodore Roosevelt.” For Mr.rnSoulcraft, the invocation of these threernas heroes is not surprising, though the occasionrnand the timing of his column arernof interest. The occasion was the WeeklyrnStandard’s symposium in August on thern”Worldwide Conservative Crack-Up,”rnand the Will column and the subsequentrnKristol-Brooks piece in the journalrnwere the first shots in the new effort tornformulate an ideology for the right thatrncan eventually castrate the radical nationalismrnof the populist right todayrnwhile preserving the managerial state byrnclaiming that it is the natural legacy ofrnthe pseudonationalism of Hamilton,rnClay, and the first Roosevelt.rnIt is doubtful that the nationalist rightrnwill be deluded by the Kristol-Brooks-rnWill counterfeit. Populist nationalism, ifrnnot quite of the blood-and-soil variety, atrnleast proceeds from a more authenticrngrasp of the organic life and people of thernreal nation than theirs, and most of thernmore serious exponents of the nationalismrnof the populist right have long sincerncome to reject the unmitigated statismrnand globalism that lie at the heart of thernneoconservative agenda. The right wingrnof the managerial class will have to comernup with a means of ideological manipulationrnthat is a bit more subtle and a lotrnmore persuasive than either the defunctrnneoconservatism of their parents or thernstillborn neonationalism that the WeeklyrnStandard has invented. Until it does, thernregime on which the American rulingrnclass rests will continue to crumble, crn36/CHRONICLESrnrnrn