erwise, Christianity itself being thernprime example: all Christians claim fidelityrnto the teachings of Christ, yet theirrndifferences, ecumenism notwithstanding,rnonly deepen with time.rnIn arguing against Murray’s optimism,rnSchindler insists that he does not advocaternthe union of church and state—anrnerror he sees as the right-wing equivalentrnof liberation theology—while he hints atrnthe alternative solution by suggestingrnthat Christians should maintain a clearrndistinction between state and society.rnPresumably he means that Christiansrnshould work to transform the culture itself,rnbut he gives little indication of howrnthey might go about it. Indeed, in hisrnbook Schindler slights culture and societyrnin favor of politics. In a sense thernAmerican experience has been a doublernone: if the Founding Fathers really werernsecularists, there has also existed fromrnthe beginning a powerful strain of evangelicalrnChristianity which has affectedrnthe culture more deeply than has thernspirit of the Enlightenment. The characterrnof American public life cannot berndefined solely by its constitutional documents.rnSchindler alludes to this fact in questioningrnthe claim by neoconservativesrnthat America, compared with other advancedrnnations, is deeply religious,rnpointing out how in so many ways thisrnprofessed faith is at odds with behavior.rnTo Schindler the situation demonstratesrnthe hollowness of the claim that thernUnited States is somehow exceptional inrnthe modern West, and he cites Will Herbergrnto explain this secularity as an unintendedrnproduct of Calvinism. A morernobvious explanation, however, is simplyrnsin. There are indeed gulfs betweenrnwhat Americans profess and how theyrnact, but probably no more so thanrnamong the knights and merchants,rncraftsmen and peasants, monks and ministersrnof past societies.rnOnce again: the roots of Americanrnproblems are more social and culturalrnthan political. The practical secularismrnwhich Schindler correctly identifies asrnpart of the prevailing American spiritrnowes much more to the phenomenonrncalled the 60’s than it does to the FirstrnAmendment. The radical reinterpretationrnof the Constitution was made possiblernto a large extent by the cultural revolution.rnAs no less a personage than thernprofessional anti-Catholic Paul Blanshardrnonce admitted, the real issue forrnhim was sex and not, as he claimed, thernalleged dangers of union of church andrnstate. While Schindler rightly points tornthe weaknesses of American religiosity,rnit is true nonetheless that personalrnreligious belief and public religious testimonyrn—religion’s ability to effect bothrnindividual conversions and group actionrn—appear stronger in the UnitedrnStates than in any other advanced industrialrnnation.rnSchindler questions Novak’s defensernof capitalism on the ground that, in callingrnattention to the social benefits producedrnby economic self-interest, Novakrnobscures the obligations Christians arernunder to transcend self-interest for thernsake of love. He revises Adam Smith’s famousrnexample of the baker by sayingrnthat a Christian baker, while not indifferentrnto profit, would make the best breadrnpossible under any circumstance, consciouslyrnseeking the good of his customers.rnNo doubt there are capitalistsrnwho live up to this ideal, but Schindler isrncorrect in saying that the inherent dynamicrnof capitalism does not require thatrnthey do so, thereby prodding the Christianrnto set his religion aside in order tornparticipate fully in the life of the society.rnOne of the most useful parts of the bookrnis its careful analysis of John Paul IPsrnview of liberalism and capitalism,rnSchindler arguing persuasively thatrnthe neoconservatives’ position is not asrnclose to the Pope’s as they claim. YetrnSchindler’s quarrel with the neoconservativesrnis in one sense premature. Thernleaders of American Catholicism, includingrnmost of its bishops, are not neoconservativesrnbut liberals. If this leadershiprnwere to adopt the ideas of Neuhaus,rnNovak, and Weigel, it would be pulledrnsharply to the “right” in ways Schindlerrnwould presumably find agreeable. Werernthis to happen—which is unlikely—therndebate could finally begin.rnResponding to Father Theodore Hesburghrnof the University of NotrernDame (surely an unreconstructed liberal,rnnot a neoconservative), Schindlerrnargues that the liberal idea of the universityrnis incompatible with a genuinelyrnChristian outlook, and that the prescriptionsrnfor a Catholic university offered byrnHesburgh and others are far from beingrnradical enough. He urges that Christiansrntranscend the “objective” approach tornknowledge supposedly honored in modernrnuniversities and accept the full implicationsrnof a love for truth. But here againrnthe American political tradition hasrnlittle to do with the present state ofrnacademia, which long ago chose to modelrnitself on the methodologically secularrnGerman academic system. Until the latern19th century, distinctively American institutionsrnof higher education were pervasivelyrnreligious.rnSchindler’s most valuable, and alsornmost difficult, work in this book is hisrnattempt to establish a proper theologicalrnfoundation for the Christian approach tornthe world. Drawing especially on thernwork of two deceased European theologians,rnHenri De Lubac and Hans Urs vonrnBalthasar, he nevertheless makes his ownrnoriginal contribution to the subject.rnDe Lubac argued against a kind ofrnThomism which so sharply separatedrnreason and faith that it is possible tornthink of human beings in their naturalrnstate as being “a-religious” (except insofarrnas reason leads to God) with a sensernof the “supernatural” subsequentlyrnadded to their makeup. For De Lubacrnand others in the Augustinian tradition,rnthe desire for and movement towardrnGod is part of man’s natural state.rnSchindler argues that Murray’s “a-theistic”rnapproach to politics fails to take accountrnof this religious reality, asking thernbeliever, as it were, to bracket his faith.rnA related issue is the meaning of freedom.rnThe American system guaranteesrn”freedom from” (oppression, discrimination,rnetc.), whereas the properly Christianrnunderstanding is “freedom for.” It isrnnot possible to understand freedomrnwithout knowing how the free personrnshould act; freedom is not an empty vesselrnmerely waiting to be filled. Schindlerrnthinks that contemporary discussions ofrnfreedom, including theological discussions,rnoveremphasize its creative aspect,rndisregarding the extent to which it mustrnfirst of all be “receptive”—free obedience,rnas in Mary’s “fiat” to the Annunciation.rnThe heart of the matter is thern”spousal” relationship between Christrnand His Church taught by St. Paul, anrnunderstanding which allows for bothrnfreedom and obedience, creativity andrnreceptivity.rnThis book deserves to be a crucial partrnof every fruitful theological discussionrnfor some time to come. There remains,rnhowever, the question whether thernapproach to public life by corporaternreligious bodies, as distinct from thatrnby individuals, in fact requires a churchgovernment,rneven though DavidrnSchindler denies that it does.rn32/CHRONICLESrnrnrn