curring is what scholars of the reolutionaryrnprocess call a “crisis of legitimac”:rnmore and more subjects of thernregime are ceasing to believe that whatrnthe regime (the government, the dominantrnculture, and the economic elite) dornand say and tell them to do and say possessesrnany legitimacy, and gradually theyrnare withdravying their allegiance, theirrneveryday activities, and their minds fromrnthe regime. In place of the institutionsrnof the regime—its media of communication,rnits schools, its churches, its politicalrnformulas and belief-systems—thevrnare elaborating their own system, underrntheir control and directed toward doingrnwhat they want it to do.rnThe collapse or erosion of the legitimacyrnof a regime is one of the critical developmentsrnin the emergence of whatrnscholars of revolution have come to identifyrnas a “revolutionary situation,” a conditionrnof society in which not only thernpower but also the authority of the incumbentrnregime is vulnerable. There isrna good deal of back-and-forth amongrnscholars as to what the other features of arnrevolutionary situation are, but mostrnagree on at least two others in addition tornthe crisis of legitimacy.rnOne is a “critical event” that exposesrnthe incapacity of the regime to governrnand to carry out the other functions it isrnsupposed to carry out. If the crisis of legitimacyrnis the collapse of the authorityrnof the regime to do what it is supposed torndo, the critical event is the collapse of thernpower of the regime. The critical centrnis what Lenin was thinking of when hernvTote that no government eer fallsrnunless it is first dropped. In the h’renchrnRevolution, the critical event was thernfinancial crisis and insolvcnc of the government,rnwhich required Louis XVI torncall the Estates General for the first timernin 175 years. Once the Estates took theirrnseats, they proceeded to rid the countryrnof the king, the queen, the church, thernaristocracy, and the other vestiges of thernold regime, and there was little or nothingrnLouis and his allies could do to stoprnthem (or at least nothing they were willingrnto do). In the Russian Revolution,rnthe critical event was the collapse of thernRussian army in World War I. In the EnglishrnRevolution of the 1640’s, it was arnwar with Scotland, coupled with rebellionrnin Ireland, that required Charies I torncall Parliament in order to get moneyrnwith which to fight the war.rnToday there is no obvious “criticalrnevent” in the United States such as thesernhistoric ones, but such is the situation inrnthis country that such an eent could occurrnat any time. The perennial budgetrncrises, the mereasing arrogance of therncourts, the incompetence of the governmentrnto control crime and immigration,rnand the decline of legitimacy itself allrnsuggest that a revolutionary critical eventrncould occur in the United States in thernnot too distant future. What if Congressrnshould just refuse to approve a budgetrnand the government has to shut downrnmore or less permanentU? What if thernCrips or the Bloods or some other gangrndecides to take over a eit- or e’en a state?rnWhat if some states or parts of the countryrnsecede or refuse to pay taxes, enforcernfederal laws, or obey federal court orders?rnWhat if the Armed Forces refuse to carryrnout the orders of the Commander inrnChief to enforce federal laws and courtrnorders? I do not predict that these situationsrnwill occur, but they arc no longerrnunimaginable, and if am of them do occur,rnit could constitute the erv “criticalrnevent” that precipitates rcNolution.rnThe other feature of a revolutionaryrnsituation that is probabh necessary is thernexistence of a reolutionary apparatus.rnLenin obviously had one at his disposalrnin the form of the Bolshevik party. ThernEnglish revolutionaries also had one, inrnthe form of Puritan cells, churches, andrneventually a political party that dominatedrnthe Parliament Chades I was forced torncall. In the American Revolution the apparatusrnconsisted of the “committees ofrncorrespondence” that coordinated communicationsrnand activism among thernpatriots. In the French Revolution therernwere several apparatuses, including salons,rnwhere Enlightenment doctrinesrnwere crafted, discussed, and disseminated,rnand Freemasonry, which served similarrnpurposes. To historian Crane Brinton,rnsuch apparatuses “begin to go beyondrnlobbying and propaganda, begin to planrnand organize direct action, or at least arnsupplanting of the government in somerndramatic way. They are the beginningsrnof . . . the ‘illegal government,'” andrneventually, if their work is successful,rnthey essentially become the real governmentrnand replace the old governmentrnthat can no longer perform its functions.rnIn the United States today there is nornsuch apparatus, but there may be the beginningsrnof one, or several. The populistrnunderground described above may be itsrnembryo, and if today all it seems to do isrnweave sometimes preposterous conspiracyrnfables, it may soon in the future turnrnto planning and organizing direct actionrnof some kind or other. Some portions ofrnit arc alreadv’ involved in such action, atrnleast politiealh’, and the victory of suchrnpopulist initiatives in recent years asrnpropositions 187 and 209 in California,rnAmendment 2 in Colorado, and therngrassroots defense of the ConfederaternFlag in several Southern states are indicationsrnof such incipient activism.rnTheir political activities are not yet revolutionary,rnbut given the absolute refusalrnof the incumbent regime to accept theirrnfaidy moderate reforms (cutting off welfarernto illegal aliens, ending affirmativernaction, denying affirmative action tornhomosexuals, etc.), it would hardly bernsurprising if they started pushing morernradical causes.rnBut the apparatus, insofar as it now exists,rnis far too rudimentary to act as an effectivernrevolutionary agent. Its doctrinernis vague and sometimes incoherent, centeringrnmerely on the criminality of thernpresent system and its leaders and lackingrna clear vision of what it wants in placernof the system and how that can bernachieved. Some parts of it are religiousrnto the point of fanaticism, others are onlyrnnominalK’ religious or outright pagan.rnSome demand the restoration of thernConstitution, but many betray no morerncommand of the meaning of the Constitutionrnthan the courts themselves. Untilrnthe populist network articulates a coherentrnand credible doctrine, develops arnmeans of spreading and enforcing itsrndoctrine on its adherents, and is able tornrepresent itself as the emergent de factorngovernment, it will not function as an effectivernagent of revolution.rnThe transformation of the Americanrnright from a conservative force intent onrnpreserving the present system into onernthat at least sympathizes with thernimagery of revolution shows that thernright has at last begun to grasp the truthrnthat it no longer exercises control of therncountry. That is an anomalous situationrnfor many who conceive themselves to bernon the right, and much of the lack ofrnpreparation they exhibit derives from thernanomaly and the discomfort those of thernright experience when the techniquesrnand tactics of revolution are seriouslyrndiscussed. It mav be premature to talkrnabout “revolution from the right” today,rnbut it is not idle to do so, and the soonerrnthe right understands that it no longerrnhas any business being “conservative,”rnthe sooner its revolutionary impulses willrnquicken in the womb. crn42/CHRONICLESrnrnrn