telligencc reported the Iraqi buildup onrnthe border with Kuwait, the Bush administrationrndiscounted it. Without a coherentrnresponse to the invasion, the administrationrnwas simultaneously pulled inrnseveral directions. Secretary of DefensernCheney wanted to expel the Iraqis fromrnKuwait as soon as possible, while GeneralrnColin Powell had been reluctant tornsend even deterrent forces. The StaternDepartment proved to be as bellicose asrnCheney. Secrctarv’ of State James Bakerrnand his staff advocated the use of force, arnposition that was strengthened bv thernsupport of British prime minister MargaretrnThatcher.rnWithin a few days, Washington hadrnsettled on expulsion; pcacefullv if possible,rnb’ force if necessary. The questionrnvas “How?” The Persian Gulf wasrnhalfway around the worid from the EasternrnCoast of the United States, and morernthan halfway from the West Coast. Vastrnair and sea lifts would be essential.rnWhile the former were easily accomplished,rnlong-standing neglect of thernmerchant marine, both ships and sailors,rnhad left the nation with a weakened capacit’rnto move heavy forces to the Gulf.rnThe reserve fleet was elderly and unreliable,rnand tlie engineers qualified tornoperate the stream propulsion plantsrnwere clderU- too; one recalled chief engineerrnwas 84! Despite the Reagan militaryrnbuildup, the Pentagon had neglectedrnboth logistics and mine warfare. Inrnthe authors’ words, “The Pentagon actedrnlike a bachelor who forgot to pay his electricrnbill.” That an enormous buildup ofrnground forces would be required wasrngospel to the Arm’ chiefs, who had beenrnimpressed by Iraqi military prowess duringrntlie Iran-Iraq War. So great, indeed,rnwas their awe that even after the Marinesrnpunctured the myth at the battle ofrnKliafji, they refused to take notice. Thernghosts of Vietnam were apparentlyrnhaunting during the Army’s operationsrnin the Gulf. The war would be prosecutedrnby the Central Command (CENTCOM),rna unified command under arnGommandcr-in-Chief (in this case.rnGeneral H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S.rnArmy), who would in theory report directlyrnto the Secretary of Defense but inrnreality to Colin Powell. Prior to the GulfrnWar,CENTCOM, which covered thernMiddle East and Southwest Asia (exceptrnIsrael), had been a “backwater” command.rnIndeed, the Pentagon had mtendedrnto abolish it. Schwarzkopf wasrnappointed C-in-C only upon the insistencernof General Carl Vuono, ArmyrnChief of Staff. Smee CENTCOM wasrn”backwater,” Schwarzkopf could do littlernharm—or so it was thought.rnThe Air Force would be the firstrnservice to attack. The planning team establishedrnby Air Force Chief of StaffrnGeneral Michael Dugan and headed b)’rnColonel John Warden developed a strikernpriority system that emphasized disruptionrnof the central command, control,rnand communications, as well as “decapitation”rnof the leadership, rather than therndestruction of the Iraqi military forces.rnThe Air Component Commander,rnLieutenant General Charles “Chuck”rnHorner, objected and sent the teamrnhome, replacing it with another headedrnby Brigadier General Buster Glosson.rnGlosson, however, did not object to Warden’srnapproach. He wanted to “go tornBaghdad,” and merely reworked thernstrategy.rnIn order to make the strikes effectivernwith minimal losses, the Iraqi air defensernsystem would have to be taken out. Thisrnsystem, called “Kari” (Iraq spelled backwardrnin French), was of Erench designrn(Thomson CSF) and quite sophisticated.rnThe Air Force found that it was vulnerablernto low-level attack and to antiradiationrnmissiles. Suppressing it wouldrnnot be difficult if sufficient drones couldrnbe found to activate the system duringrnthe air attack phase. Border radar stationsrnwould be destroyed bv Army helicopters.rnTo develop strategy for the groundrncampaign, Schwarzkopf established arnspecial isolated staff under the directionrnof Lieutenant Colonel James Purvis.rnThe staff, which called itself “the JedirnKnightsV contained no Marine officersrnalthough it did have a British representativernassigned to it. The absence ofrnMarines was to have a profound influencernon combat operations. There was arnjustifiable concern over both the competencernand the good will of the Saudirnarmy. The Saudi attitude toward cooperationrnwas a constant source of frictionrnand irritation. In fact, the leaders of thernFrench light division assigned to workrnwith the Saudis swallowed their pridernand asked to be placed under Americanrncommand in the XVIII Corps. Meanwhile,rnthe Marines were developing theirrnown attack plans quite independently ofrnSchwarzkopf’s staff.rnThe attack plan included two phases.rnFirst, the air war was to destroy or suppressrnair defenses, then decapitate thernleadership and its command and controlrnsystem, eliminate weapons of mass destruction,rnand disrupt the economy. Inrnthe second phase, the ground forcesrnwould attack, the Marines holding thernIraqis in Kuwait while VII and XVIIIrnCorps circled behind the RepublicanrnGuard and, in the words of Colin Powell,rn”cut it off and kill[ed] it.” The failurernfully to attain any of these objectives, andrnthe reason for this failure, form the bodyrnof the book.rnIn the opening hours of the air war, arnvast armada of aircraft took to thernskies: B-52’s from the continental UnitedrnStates and tankers to refuel them, F-117rnstealth aircraft and F-I5’s from Saudirnbases, carrier-based F/A-18’s and A-6 attackrnaircraft. Army Pavelow helicoptersrnto take out the border radars, and thernNavy’s sea-launched Tomahawk cruisernmissiles. The hunt for Scud missiles thatrnwere designed to deliver Iraqi weapons ofrnmass destruction was completely unsuccessful,rncontrary to Air Force claims.rnWhile the air attack was proceeding andrnthe ground forces were still training, thernIraqis attacked what thev thought was arnweak link in the coalition defenses—thernSaudi army deployed near the coastalrnhighway. The attack was initially successful.rnIt routed the Saudis, nearly overranrnmarine outposts to the west, and ledrnto the capture of the town of Khafji.rnWhen the Marines counterattacked, usingrna combination of air and groundrnforces, the Iraqis fled. In fact, theyrnshowed so little taste for combat thatrnthe commander of the 1 st Marine ExpeditionaryrnForce, Lieutenant GeneralrnWalter Boomer, quickly became convincedrnthat the Iraqi army was “hollow.”rnBoomer sent a complete action report tornSchwarzkopf’s staff, but the message wasrndisregarded, despite the presence of arnMarine general as Chief of Staff. Failurernto appreciate the Kliaf ji battle profoundlyrninfluenced the course of the war.rnThe poor condition of the Iraqi troopsrnwas evident even before the air phasernhad ended. Thousands of Iraqis, includingrnsenior officers, surrendered wheneverrnthey saw an opportunity. Others deserted.rnOf the 10,000 man Hammurabi Divisionrnof the Republican Guard, 5,000rnhad deserted and 400 were casualties onrn”G-Day.” Moreover, the Iraqis neverrnpicked up changes in the coalition deployment.rnThey could not navigate inrnthe open desert and assumed that therncoalition forces could not either. Nevertheless,rnthe coalition high commandrnDECEMBER 1995/29rnrnrn