drew no inferences concerning the dispositionrnof the Iraqi army and its lowrnmorale. The plan (if one can call it that)rnadopted by the coalition would, in fact,rnmake it extremely difficult to “close therndoor” on escaping Iraqi forces.rnContrary to the demands of a soundrnstrategy, which would have held as manyrnIraqis in Kuwait as possible, the Marinesrnled the attack. Using ingenuity to penetraternrapidly the Iraqi defenses inrnKuwait, they drove to Kuwait City inrnthree days, foiling an attempt by the aggressiverncommander of the Iraqi IIIrnCorps to hit them on the flank through arnscreen of smoke from burning oil wells.rnIn contrast to the rapid forward movementrnof the Marines, the Army’s VIIrnCorps—a clanking armored monster,rnsomething out of Jurassic Park in configurationrnand tactics, and designed torncounter a Soviet thrust through the FuldarnGap in “the war that never was”—rnwould require seven to ten days to takernout the Republican Guard. Moreover,rnthe Corps would not fight at night despiternthe overwhelming technologicalrnadvantage for night-fighting held by thernU.S. Army. Schwarzkopf exploded whenrnhe learned of the delay, but did little torngoad its commander, Lieutenant GeneralrnFrederick Franks. Meanwhile, XVIIIrnCorps raced ahead. The commander.rnLieutenant General Gary Lucks, hadrnsplit his forces. To the west, the 82ndrnAirborne Division and the (light) 6thrnFrench Division raced across the desertrnwhile the lOIst Airborne and MajorrnGeneral Barry McCaffery’s 34th MechanizedrnInfantry Division charged betweenrnthem and XVIII Corps.rnThe end of the third day of the groundrnwar thus found the Marines at the gatesrnto Kuwait City, XVIII Corps in a positionrnto cross the Euphrates and cut off all thernescape routes of the Iraqis, but thernmighty VII Corps lagging far behind.rnFor Immediate ServicernCHRONICLESrn?vffiW SUBSCRIBERSrnTOLL FREE NUMBERrn1-800-877-5459rn”kilHng gnats with sledge hammers.” Byrnthis time the Bush administration, proddedrnby Colin Powell, had begun to thinkrnof terminating the war. Incredibly, nornplans had been laid for ending the war.rnPowell himself seems to have been concernedrnonly with restoring the Army’srnhonor after the debacle of Vietnam. Notrnonly did he wish a crushing victory, butrnhe wanted to avoid a high number ofrnIraqi casualties. Optimistic reports fromrnSchwarzkopf combined with the Powellrn”spin” persuaded President Bush to endrnthe war at the 100 hour (four day) mark.rnAsked how he felt about this more or lessrnarbitrary decision. Bush replied that hernwas uneasy. Whatever one may think ofrnGeorge Bush, it must be conceded thatrnhis World War II experiences as a Navyrnbomber pilot had made him wary ofrn”quick fixes” in war. Nevertheless, Vietnamrnhad affected him too; he would notrnoverrule his commander in the field.rnWhat is one to make of all this? Is thernstory of the Gulf War presented by Gordonrnand Traynor reliable? In the Junern1993 issue of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,rnColonel John Burton, USAFRetired,rnpublished an article, “PushingrnThem Out the Back Door” (later includedrnas an appendix in his book The Pentagonrn’Wars), which suggested the broadrnoudine of The Generals’ War. A flurry ofrndissenting “comments” from the Armyrnfailed to dent Burton’s thesis. Indeed,rnBurton’s account is quite consistent withrnGordon’s and Traynor’s where the twornoverlap, and both are consistent withrnBob Woodward’s version, presented inrnThe Commanders.rnIf one accepts the Gordon andrnTraynor version of the Gulf War (as thisrnreviewer does), one is led to severalrninescapable conclusions. First, eachrnservice followed the Sinatra method—rnby doing things “its way.” Jointness wasrnan illusion created bv the high commandrnand the Pentagon; it never existed inrnthe Gulf War. And one wonders whatrnSchwarzkopf’s Chief of Staff, MarinernMajor General Robert Johnston, wasrndoing during the planning process. Hernobviously knew the Marines, yet neverrnimplanted their mode of warfare onrnthe collective mind of the staff. Wasrnhe, as many officers were, cowed byrnSchwarzkopf?rnSecond, while the air war was criticalrnto the outcome, it alone did not win thernconflict, as was shown by an independentrnAir Force survey. The Marines alsornengaged in self-criticism, but the Armyrnrefused to do so. Instead, it denied thernimportance of the air attack on the RepublicanrnGuard, and promoted Franks tornfour stars and the important Trainingrnand Doctrine Command.rnThird, American technology simplyrnoverwhelmed the Iraqis, more than compensatingrnfor the mistakes of the coalitionrncommanders.rnFourth, the only members of therncoalition who contributed substantialrnforces to the war effort were the Britishrnand the French. The British 1st ArmoredrnDivision under Major General RupertrnSmith and the French 6th Division werernhard-charging units largely (but not entirely)rnintegrated into the Americanrncommand system.rnFifth, the importance of the prepositionedrnlarge stocks of military suppliesrnand the construction of military facilities,rnespecially airfields, cannot bernoveremphasized. It is most unlikely thatrnsuch favorable conditions could existrnanywhere else outside Western Europernand North America.rnSixth, while the Goldwater-NicholsrnAct did not advance the cause of “jointness”rnduring the Gulf War, it did conferrnenormous authority on the chairman ofrnthe JCS, thus contradicting the rule ofrncivilian control of the armed forces (arnconsideration given little if any notice byrnthe national press).rnSeven, the war in Vietnam, looming inrnthe background, influenced all of thernAmerican commanders up to the Commander-rnin-Chief himself. In an odd andrnundoubtedly unintended way, Robert S.rnMcNamara’s In Retrospect is a timelyrncontribution to national security as thernUnited States revises its national securityrnsystem. The micromanagement characteristicrnof McNamara’s prosecution ofrnthe Vietnam War stands in counterpointrnto George Bush’s propensity to takernthe opposite tack. The extremes of micromanagementrnand over-loose controlrnby the civilian authorities must be avoidedrnin future conflicts.rnEight, Colin Powell deserves criticismrnfor his obsession with recovering thernArmy’s honor at the expense of nationalrninterests (the two do not always coincide).rnIndeed, Powell’s narrow focus arguesrnagainst his fitness for the presidencyrn—and the job of commander-in-chief.rnSchwarzkopf, on the other hand, apparentlyrnpromoted far above his level ofrncompetence, may have been, in the immortalrnwords of W.S. Gilbert, “the veryrnmodel of a modern major general.” crn30/CHRONICLESrnrnrn