a single liody.” His is one of the first modern calls for what hasrnbecome a centerpiece in liberal thought: some form of woridrngovernment that would eliminate the independence of nationstatesrnand enforce global harmony.rnhi addition to world government, there are two other constantrnelements in all reform plans: military disarmament andrnfree trade (meaning economic disarmament). Both of thesernare meant to deprive nations of the abilitv to act independently,rneither against other nations or in resistance to the proposedrnworid government. This triplet runs through the works of therngreat classical liberals from David Hume to Thomas Paine andrnhnmanuel Kant on to Jean-Baptistc Sa’ and Richard Cobden.rnIt was repeated as items three, four, and fourteen in PresidentrnWbodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, issued in January 1918, arnplan Wilson said “rejects the standards of national selfishnessrnthat once governed the counsels of nations and demands thatrnthey shall give way to a new order of things.” Three-quarters ofrna centurx later, they form the core of President Bill Clinton’srnision of a post-Cold War “new order.”rnhi the name of free trade, Clinton completed the LIruguayrnRound GATT negotiations, hicluded was the establishment ofrnthe Worid Trade Organization (WTO), which is to serve as thernultimate legitimate authority over international trade disputes.rnThe WTO will replace the old “power-oriented” system ofrnnegotiations and national vetoes with a new svstcni of “rulesoriented”rntribunals that can declare national practices “illegal”rnand impose sanctions.rnClinton’s desire for global economic integration and the rulernof supranational law is set within a strategy the administrationrncalls “engagement and enlargement.” This seeks to move be-rn-ond the securit- concerns of the Cold War era. The UnitedrnNations would play the central role in this process, with thernUnited States making its military increasingly available to thernUnited Nations for “peacekeeping” operations in remote areas.rnThe Clinton administration’s 1994 paper entitled Policy on ReformingrnMultilateral Peace Operations contained the follow ingrnassertions:rnTerritorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil warsrn(many of which could spill across international borders)rnand the collapse of governmental authority in somernstates are among the current threats to peace. Whilernmany of these conflicts niav not direcri threaten Americanrninterests, their cumulative effect is significant. U.N.rnand other multilateral peace operations will at times offerrnthe best way to pre’ent, contain or resolve conflicts thatrncould otherwise be more costly and deadly, hi such cases,rnthe U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share ofrnthe burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke thernvoice of the community of nations on behalf of causesrnwe support.rnThe paper does not explain how events that do not pose individualrnthreats to American interests can suddenly accumulaternto pose a threat. Instead, it refers to “threats to peace” as arngeneric, and thus open-ended, concern. With this outlook, thernUnited States has seen its costs go up, not down, as the result ofrnpaying for military interventions through the U.N. which couldrnnot have been justified on the basis of American national security.rnClinton’s policy is that of global “collective security.” Thernbasic premise of this notion is that there really is a communityrnof nations that will see all threats in the same way and be willingrnto respond in unison, that a “threat to one will be consideredrna threat to all.” Advocates of collective security who wishrnto substitute concepts of “justice” for “national aggrandizement”rngreath underestimate the ability to win w ide acceptancernof what constitutes justice when ital interests clash. The samernproblem of subjective interpretation applies to branding onernside or another as the “aggressor.” The related principle, thatrnborders are never to be changed by force, is tantamount to proclaimingrnthat the present dixisions of the worid are so perfectrnthey should be frozen in time. This is untenable, as the worldrnhas always been a dynamic s stem, something of which Americansrnshould be well aware given the role westward expansionrnhas pla”ed in American history and mythology. The applicationrnof universal ideals (which are, in fact, not universallyrnaccepted) divorced from practical politics and concrete considerationsrnof security, geographv, resources, and aspirations isrnsimply unsuited to the worid as it is.rnEven when nations express concern oer iolencc or sufferingrnand offer humanitarian aid, they balk at anv substantial expenditurernof scarce resources in parts of the worid where theyrnlack material or security interests of their own. The costs of “altruistic”rnintervention are alwa”s too high because there is nothingrntangible to place on the other side of flie ledger. ConscqucntK’,rnit should not be surprising that there has been no morernof a consensus to use force in Bosnia or to isolate Iran economicallyrnin 1995 than there was to enforce comprehensive sanctionsrnon Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. If effective actionrnis to be taken, it must be done by those nations that feelrntheir interests arc at stake. The Ihiitcd States could halt searntraffic to Iran any time it chose, using the kind of “gunboatrndiplomac” that was once common. And if the Iranian threatrnis as great as Washington claims, it should do so, rather thanrnhide behind the lack of U.N. approval to justify inactivity. But -rnthis is the same administration that loudly proclaimed the needrnto intervene in Haiti and to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia—rnbut refused to act without first getting the U.N.’s approval.rnOne does not have to agree with Clinton’s choices of where torncommit American troops to see how paying homage to thernU.N. can undermine the courage of a nation’s convictions.rnTraditional alliances arc much more effecti’e and crediblernas multilateral groupings because they are formed by nationsrnthat have concrete interests in common that give substancernto their pledge to act. Yet even strong alliances havernfailed to be converted into stable systems of collective securityrnonce common enemies no longer threaten. The dissolution ofrnthe victorious Allied coalitions after both worid wars testify tornthis, with Japan and Italy after World War I and the SovietrnUnion and China after World War II becoming hostile to theirrnformer allies.rnWith the removal of the overarching Soviet threat, alliancesrnare likely to become more flexible, ad hoc, and opportunistic—rnand also less predictable and reliable over time. In such an environment,rncollective security becomes an even less realisticrnconcept. Instead, what is called for are the classical diplomaticrnskills of centuries past, in keeping with Lord Palmerston’s statementrnthat there are “no permanent allies or permanent enemies,rnonly permanent interests.” Unfortunately, prevailingrnliberal opinion in the United States (by no means limited tornself-identified liberals), with its emphasis on Utopian principles,rnmakes such a return to realism neari}’ impossible.rn18/CHRONICLESrnrnrn