ucd U.N. involvement, and MadeleinernK. Albright, America’s Permanent Representativernto the United Nations, toldrnCongress, “The Clinton Administrationrnbelieves very deeply in the potential ofrnthe U.N. system.”rnThe Clinton administration praisesrnthe U.N.’s radical transformation, butrnmany Americans don’t share the optimism.rnPresidential hopeful Senator BobrnDole said, “It is high time we rein in U.N.rnpeacekeeping, which is out of control.”rnSenator Jesse Helms called the U.N. “thernnemesis of millions of Americans.”rnWe must heed the warning signs. Historyrnteaches that the acquisition of militaryrnpower traditionally has been the firstrnstep toward establishing governance overrna territory. Coupling the U.N.’s changingrnmilitary strength with the new operationalrnphilosophy favoring individualrnover state sovereignty sends a warningrnflare that no liberty-loving people can affordrnto ignore.rnGary L. Bauer is the president of the FamilyrnResearch Council and former PresidentrnReagan’s domestic advisor. Robert L.rnMaginnis is a retired Army lieutenantrncolonel and a policy analyst with the FamilyrnResearch Council.rnAre AlliesrnNecessary?rnbv Edward A. OlsenrnThe United States today has numerousrnallies in Europe, Asia, and thernMiddle East whom Americans are committedrnto defend. Despite the end of thernCold War, Americans are regaled atrnhome and abroad with rationales forrnrcinvigorating alliances that skepticsrnquestion in the new era. r essence, wernare admonished bv advocates of the alliancesrnto shun “isolationism” andrnstrengthen international ties that willrnpreserve peace. This message seems reassuring,rnbut on closer analysis there is arnmajor flaw—why do Americans need alliesrnif we have no credible enemy?rnIf the post-Cold War era has anyrndefining characteristic for the UnitedrnStates, it is the clear lack of an adversaryrncapable of a major, sustained assault onrnthe country. We are not in danger of beingrnoverrun by a foreign enemy. Nor isrnone of that magnitude likely to emergernany time soon. During the Cold War,rnthe Soviet Union might have been ablernto inflict such an attack. Hence, it madernsense for Americans to form alliancesrnwith an array of countries. They werernunlikely to help defend the United Statesrnfrom a direct attack, but their shared vulnerabilityrnto assault by the Soviet Union,rnor by a proxy state, provided a sense ofrnunity in a common mission that helpedrnto preserve American security by diffusingrnthe threat.rnToday, however, that linkage has completelyrndissipated. America’s current alliancesrnwith other countries arc intendedrntotally to deter attacks on them or to fightrntheir wars should deterrence fail. Therncountries that might attack our allies, orrnmilitarily endanger their well-being, arernnot capable of inflicting such damage onrnthe United States. This circumstancernraises two possibilities for Americans.rnWe can either choose to retain our currentrnalliances or wc can consider a formrnof security independent of a network ofrnunnecessary allies. If we retain our existingrnalliances in Europe and Asia, wc canrndo so using the same stale rhetoric that isrnanachronistic in post-Cold War circumstancesrnor we can devise new candid rationalesrnfor helping selected countriesrnthat want the United States to subsidizerntheir national security. This would requirerna profound redefinition of the notionrnof “ally.” Of course, either choice isrnlikely to be subjected to popular skepticismrnsooner or later due to the financialrncosts of the alliances or to Americans’rnunwillingness to wage war to defend anrnally’s interests.rnFor example, within NATO, the UnitedrnStates could create new justificationsrnfor keeping a lid on inter-European tensions,rnbut Washington would be compelledrnto do so from a European vantagernpoint that would effectively stress thernquasi-European identity of the UnitedrnStates. In short, Americans would be defendingrnEuropeans as de facto Europeans.rnAmericans also would requirernnew justifications for expending tax dollarsrnfor the security of a continent that isrnnot presently endangered by a potentrnforce and—if it were again endangeredrn—could afford to pay fully for itsrnown defenses but which prefers to keeprnAmericans engaged to dilute the costsrnand spread the risk. Cleariy such a rationalerncould be created, but would it bernplausible to already hard-pressed Americanrntaxpayers who would be asked tornsend their sons and daughters to help defendrnEurope in perpetuity?rnA case for Asia would be equally tenuous.rnWithout the legacy of a regional securityrnnetwork like NATO, it is doublyrndifficult to make a case for the UnitedrnStates possessing an Asia-Pacific identityrnthat it can defend on behalf of bilateralrnallies such as Japan and South Korea.rnThis argument is made, but not very persuasively.rnThese two countries do face arngenuine threat from North Korea and itsrnnuclear capabilities. In these terms, thernregion still echoes the Cold War. However,rnthe handwriting is on the wall forrnthat finite threat, and once it is resolvedrnin the foreseeable future, this regionalrnversion of the Cold War will also pass fullyrninto history. Barring the perception ofrna Chinese threat or the acceptance ofrnperennial Japanese-Korean enmity asrnsufficient reason for perpetuating alliancesrnin the Ear East, the United Statesrnwould have to stretch considerably therndefinition of “ally” to justify an indefiniterncommitment to Asian security withoutrnan Asian adversary that could directlyrnthreaten the United States. The mostrncogent argument is that the UnitedrnStates could be a stabilizing presence inrnan unstable area, because Americans arernless objectionable in that role than anyrnother Asia-Paeifie power. While thisrnmay be as logical from an Asian perspectivernas the counterpart “lid” argument isrnin Europe, it will be a hard sell in thisrncountry.rnWere the United States to shed its unnecessaryrnallies, what is likely to happen?rnClearly we would be in no greater dangerrnof an attack than we are today. In fact,rnthe United States would face a greatlyrnreduced risk of war. Virtually all the contemporaryrnwarfare contingencies contemplatedrnby the American militaryrnestablishment are predicated on thernUnited States meeting a commitment tornany ally or a regional security pact. Furthermore,rnwithout allies the UnitedrnStates would be rid of peacetime pressuresrnto maintain our strategic credibilityrnin their eyes, which permits allies to manipulaternAmerican public opinion andrnpolicy. In post-Cold War circumstances,rnthere is no reason to endanger Americanrncredibility in defense of other countries’rninterests. This has been graphically illustratedrnduring the Bosnian crisis, wherernclear American interests are virtuallyrnimpossible to discern. Nonetheless, greatrnpressures have been exerted on Americansrnto stand by our NATO allies or ourrnU.N. allies for an ill-defined cause.rnOCTOBER 1995/43rnrnrn