phies taught in schools, it is clear thatrnEastern Europe will either be saved by itsrntraditions—yes, including ethnic selfaffirmationsrn—or will go under for centuries,rnunder the burden of so-calledrnWestern values. The safely living andrnhappilv consuming West simply doesrnnot grasp the primacv of national identitvrnas a source of survival and will to live.rnThe ecr-prcsent hostile elements in thernEast cannot be canceled by treaties andrnsummits.rnOver a period of a hundred vears or sorn(roughh- from 1848 to 1949, from modernizationrnto a modicum of prosperitv)rnthe nations of Eastern Europe werernallowed to acquire muscle, to develop arnmiddle class, to mix in a rather healthyrnva’ its historical tradition with the openingrnto the West. This positive evolution,rnwith promoters and resisters balanced,rnrested on historv and nationhood, onrnpride in achievement, whether artistic,rnreligious, urbanistic, or military. Inrnthe last half-century, communism asrnwell as the general drift of modernityrnhae wiped out the middle class and outlawedrnnational pride. Writers, thinkers,rnpainters, and priests ha’e either been totalKrnsilenced or constrained bv this orrnthat political correctness. It is a miraclernthat much of the earlier consciousnessrnsur-ied; in fact, one meets it at everyrnstep, tattered, worn, humiliated—butrnalive! In high school classes, at religiousrngatherings, in academies, at dinners withrnscintillating poets, patriots, publishers,rnprofessors—and in nostalgic “average citizens.”rnThe tragedy today, and for years torncome, is that this virile heritage that refusedrnto die and even to wither underrncommunism is now encountering a dryrnand bureaucratic, materialistic and commercial,rndegenerate Western import,rnwhich impresses people not by truth orrnvirtue, but by the outpouring of vulgarrnpublicity and degrading merchandise.rnThe neobourgcoisie now in evidencernabove layers and lavers of miserable andrnexhausted grev masses is thus not an organicrnsuccessor of the old one, but a sociologicalrnstratum in expansion, with therncultural features of the proletariat inrnDickens and Zola. The old values findrnthemselves suddenly neutralized inrnwaves of postcommunist anarchy. Therngreat and central question is whether thernold nations and their ordering principlernof rcalitv and imagination will survive orrnsuccumb to a cosmopolitan ideology.rnIn the main. Eastern Europe hasrnfollowed, since 1848, the Russian patternrnof indecision between populists andrnWesternizers, Bakunin and Herzen, Dostoyevskyrnand Turgenev, Stalin and Trotsky,rnSolzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Thernstrange thing is that under Bolshevik rulerna combination won out, with the worstrnfrom each. This is a natural developmentrnin the ex-satellite countries and inrnRussia itself. For the moment, the tug ofrnwar is between equally strong militantsrnon both sides: between nationalism, alsornin its populist version, and the socialistliberalrnleft (contrary to my friends on thernright, it is not a communist comeback,rnbut hardly less dangerous for nationhood),rnwith the left complaining thatrnthe right is “fascist.” But one cannot underestimaternthe force of inertia on eitherrnside: the liberals advocate cosmopolitanrnvalues which are alien except to thernworld of artists, students, journalists, andrnpart of the ambitious political class; thernnationals have deep roots but misjudgernthe genuine forces of a necessary modernization.rnIn sum, the observer witnessesrna replay of an old game. The left constitutesrna small, city-based minority, butrnit knows how to spread its theories andrnslogans since it owns or browbeats thernpublishing houses, the newspapers, thernintellectual magazines. It has a nearmonopolyrnon attractive ideas, it definesrnthe consensus on television. The rightrntrusts people’s common sense and believesrnthat “truth wins out.” It consequentlyrnneglects the media and engagesrninstead in whispering campaigns. Sincernit typically loses (elections, popularityrnpolls, academic posts), the right oftenrnfinds consolation in vast conspiracyrntheories. “Have you read the book byrnX? He tells it all. They plan a finalrntakeover of the regime, of television, ofrnthe b a n k s . . . “rnWhile the liberal left thus preparesrnthe ground in small moves, the right retreatsrnand sulks. Society itself, deprivedrnof leadership, makes its choices pragmatically,rnaccording to its interests of thernmoment. One may find comfort in thernthought that the infightings are knownrnto all modern democracies, and one mayrneven rejoice over the right-left eonflictsrnin African “democracies” as well. But inrnEastern Europe, democracy is and willrnremain an import article, and will turnrninto a vicious brawl. The stake is, ofrncourse, power, but since we speak of impecuniousrnsocieties, the stake is naked financialrngain—and Swiss bank accounts.rnEastern Europe is in many respects atrna crossroads—where the roads may leadrnsomewhere, anywhere, possibly to chaos.rnThe shipwreck of the middle class—rnofficers, civil servants, teachers,rnentrepreneurs, publishers, the steadilyrnemployed—resulted not merely in anrnall-too-frequent vacuum, but also in arnnihilistic mood. These countries nowrnsimultaneously suffer the pangs of independence,rnof social restructuring, of economicrnupmanship, and of national consolidation.rnThese, plus the burdenedrnsoul of the recent past, create a generalrndistrust, limitless ambitions (also calledrnthe free market), and vast corruption atrnevery level. Western influence and pressurernarrive at the wrong time, since thernproblems. East and West, have little inrncommon, yet the remedies applied underrnforeign pressure tend to be uniformrnfrom the Volga to the Danube. Thernremedies—democracy, free market, andrnhuman rights—arc literally meaninglessrnwords and phrases without a backgroundrnand space for validation. They are, alas,rnjust enough to prevent the rise of a patrioticrnand culturally efficient class of leaders.rnBut even if such emerged it wouldrnbe stamped “reactionary” and excludedrnby those who claim precisely pluralism asrntheir virtue.rnJust about the only Western sloganrnnot used in the region—”political correctness”rnis already doing its devastatingrnjob—is “globalism,” since all preoccupationsrnare stricdy local. Its place is takenrnby “geopolitics,” which compels thernleaders to adopt a degree of realism. Andrnthe nature of the realism is an orientationrntoward Germany, as the Bosnianrntragedy demonstrates every day. Thernfear of Russia is very much alive, andrnWestern Europe disappoints newspaperrnreaders daily. At the December summitrnin Budapest, Clinton struck people withrnhis lack of color and personality, as evenrnYeltsin marginalized him. Mitterrandrnwas judged as being out of the game,rnwith his self-administered funeral oration;rnand John Major was visibly illrnat ease with his troubles at home. Somernregional politicians looked to Italy forrnleadership—a tradition south of thernDanube—but they had to acknowledgernthat Helmut Kohl alone made the impressionrnof power. As I recently wrote,rnhistory in Eastern Europe appears to flowrnbackward.rnBut at least history dictates the samernpolicies to the entire region: all countriesrnhave, at the recent elections, returned arnsocialist government, disavowing liber-rnJULY 1995/45rnrnrn