strate tliat they arc afraid of no one and that they are strongerrnthan the regular governmental authorities, or to show publiclyrnthat those authorities are with them.” The lawless seemed tornbe protected by “persons in the presidency of the CommunistrnParty.”rnGuberina quoted from remarks by onetime minister of defensernand close ally of Tito, General Nikola Ljubicic, to a jointrnmeeting of the presidency of Serbia and the Party CentralrnCommittee of Serbia (September 5, 1988): “Some thingsrnwhich are happening are so drastic that I simply ask myself howrncan we tolerate that in a legal state.” Ljubicic then proceededrnto tell (with name of place and family) of an Albanian whornmoved into a Serbian house and moved the old lady out.rnWhen the son went to settle the matter, he found her sittingrnon a stump outside. He had to resort to legal action over a periodrnof two to three vears, and he won. But when an officerrncame to carry out the court order, the Albanian said that hernhad a machine gun and warned: “Whoever approaches will bernmowed down!” The militiaman had to return with his task unaccomplished.rn”What kind of state are we?” asked Ljubicic.rnIn another speech, Guberina said that Serbia’s crippledrnconstitution does not permit Serbia to exercise its governmentalrnauthority on the territory of the provinces, and thatrnfederal bodies which have that authority are quiet, while openrnenemies of Yugoslavia escalate their evil deeds. It is clear, hernsaid, that “the Serbian people has again found itself in a situation,rnas in 1941, to be or not to be!”rnConcern about developments in Kosovo was also on thernagenda of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership, at a timernwhen all Yugoslav ethnic groups were represented and beforernSlobodan Milosevic became the principal actor. In June 1987,rnfor example, the Central Committee and the Presidency of thernParty (officially the I .eague of Yugoslav Communists) took thernposition that “the most difficult part of the problem of Kosovornand the whole of Yugoslav society is to be found in that thernpolicy of the [League | is not being implemented.” Moreover,rn”the pressure on the Serbs and Montenegrins must be stoppedrnwith all the means of our socialist self-management system.”rn(Belgrade newspaper Politika, June II, 1987.)rnA month cadier, at an “ideological” plenum of the CentralrnCommittee, one nicnil^cr, Dusnn Dragosavac, asserted: “If wcrncannot quickly overcome genocide . . . then I see as the onlyrnway out an urgent convoking of an extraordinary Congress ofrnthe League of Yugoslav Communists and the calling of freernelections with multiple candidates, so that men can come tornthe top who can bring an end to genocide.” (Communist Partyrnorgan Borba, May 23, 1987.)rnSome Yugoslav newspapers openly used the term “genocide”rnas early as May 1987, along with expressions of surprisernthat six years after the 1981 Kosovo Albanian demonstrations,rnthere still had not been a single resignation in Kosovo or at therntop in Yugoslavia that might suggest a feeling of responsibility.rnInstead, the authorities “continue with the same announcementsrnin which they a’oid naming criminals.”rnIt was clear that the situation, instead of improving, wasrnbecoming worse. In the summer of 1987, a scandal—somernreferred to it as “administrative genocide”—came to lightrnwhen Serbian Orthodox Church authorities in Pec discoveredrnat the local cadastral office that many of their churches hadrnlegally disappeared. Someone had simply listed them asrnmosques. The ancient Serbian Patriarchate at Pec was listedrnas an ordinary “religious object.” One church had been transformedrninto a cemetery. The pearl of medieval Serbian culture,rnthe monastery Gracanica, was listed as general publicrnproperty. The equally well-known 650-year-old Decanirnmonastery was listed as an “ordinary building.” In some areas,rnSerbian Orthodox churches had become pasture lands; in others,rnproperty of the state forestry enterprise. As might be expected,rnthese actions against Serbian history and culturernevoked bitterness among the Serbs, particularly when no individualrnculprits were named.rnIronically, the Kosovo Serbs could not appeal to thernminority rights provisions of Tito’s 1974 constitution. Byrndefinition, all ethnic groups that had their own republics werernclassified as nations, while others were categorized as nationalities,rnmeaning minorities. Hence, Albanians, Hungarians,rnand other minorities could call upon the minority rightsrnprovisions of the constitution, but those provisions could notrnbe invoked to protect the rights of Serbs, Croats, and othersrnwho might be living in republics other than their own.rnIn the spring of 1989, two years after his 1987 visit to Kosovo,rnSlobodan Milosevic tackled the Kosovo problem. Herndid so by engineering an amendment to the Serbian constitution,rnlimiting Kosovo’s autonomy. The police, the courts,rnand defense came under direct Serbian control. Though in allrnother spheres local autonomy was not curtailed, the Kosovo Albaniansrninsisted nevertheless that “their autonomy” had beenrntaken away, and they promptly refused to participate in anyrngovernmental activities. They refused to operate schools orrnhealth facilities and established their own schools and clinicsrnin private homes. And they went on strike in governmentoperatedrneconomic enterprises. Their refusal to cooperate inrnany way led the Serbian government to establish a strong policernand military presence. This in turn enabled the KosovornAlbanians to push their claim that they were forced to live underrndictatorial rule. This was also the position taken by foreignrnsupporters of the Albanians, such as United States SenatorrnRobert Dole. The result has been a stalemate, one examplernof which was the issuing of diplomas stamped “Republic ofrnKoso’o” or the “Independent Republic of Kosovo,” which Serbianrnauthorities refuse to recognize.rnSome of Milosevic’s critics have accused him of Great Serbianrnnationalism, and cite the so-called Memorandum of thernSerbian Academy of Arts and Sciences as his political platform,rnarguing that Kosovo was merely a pretext. They seemrnto have overlooked the fact—if they ever knew it—that Milosevic,rnalong with other Serbian communists, criticized thernmemorandum. This is not the place for a detailed examinationrnof the document, but a few things need to be said aboutrnit. In the first place, it was a draft of an internal academy documentrnthat was never circulated publicly. The draft somehowrnfell into the hands of the communist newspaper Borbd, whichrndid not publish the text but attacked it as a Serbian nationalistrndocument. Second, its main authors, Antonije Isakovic andrnDobrica Cosic, had such a solid party past that they could notrnbe put in the camp of counterrevolutionaries or enemies of Yugoslavia.rnThird, the authors asserted that Yugoslavia could notrncome out of the critical crisis in which it found itself withoutrnfundamental changes in the economic and political systems.rnThe memorandum analyzed the many shortcomings of therneconomic system (e.g., ruinous competition among and betweenrnthe republics, unprofitable enterprises, waste and generalrninefficiency). It also pointed to the unworkability andrn16/CHRONICLESrnrnrn