nipulates both sides.rnIf this seems Hke fantasy, it is usefulrnto recall some events closer to home,rnsuch as the spectacular case in the 1980’srnthat began with Frank Varelli, who wasrnemployed by the FBI to investigate thernpossible subversive groups opposingrnAmerican policies in Central America,rngroups such as the Salvadoran solidarityrnorganization CISPES. The ensuing investigationrnwas required for bureaucraticrnreasons to posit a terroristic threat, asrnonly imminent danger of this kind justifiedrnthe suspension of congressional controlsrnon intelligence gathering, and therernwere even spurious reports of a plot tornassassinate President Reagan at the 1984rnRepublican Convention. By this point,rnabout half of the FBI’s field offices wererninvolved to a greater or lesser extent inrninvestigating and combating these imaginaryrnmenaces.rnNor is the CISPES case a rare event inrnAmerican history. It is not quite certainrnif the Ku Klux Klan and their neo-Nazirnallies have ever achieved the status attainedrnby the U.S. Communist Party inrnthe I950’s, when over half the membershiprnwas reporting directly to some governmentrnagency or other, but they camernclose. Such close affinities can probablyrnbe blamed for most of the conspiracyrntheories in our history. When there is arnterrorist outrage or an assassination, it isrnlikely that some official agency will havernhad a suspect group or individual underrnsurveillance, or might have penetratedrnthe group concerned. To avoid chargesrnof complicity or negligence, the agency isrnlikely to go to great lengths to concealrnthis connection, thereby exacerbatingrnmatters by raising questions of a cover-uprnand by drawing suspicion that it hadrnsome responsibility for the atrocity.rnThis is the most probable explanationrnfor bizarre official actions in cases likernthe Greensboro massacre of anti-Klanrndemonstrators in 1979, as well as thernKennedy assassination.rnIn matters of terrorism, covert policingrnposes insuperable dilemmas. Officialrnagencies must attempt to infiltrate potentiallyrntroublesome groups, and agentsrnmust establish their credibility by participatingrnin dangerous or criminal actions.rnBut where and when must the line berndrawn between joining such activitiesrnand actually promoting them, or indeedrnpermitting terrorist actions to occur?rnThe group that probably carried out thernbombing of Pan Am Flight 103 had longrnbeen penetrated by an agent reporting atrnleast to the Jordanian secret service andrnprobably to the Germans, while morernrecently the World Trade Center bombingrnin New York City has revealed a complexrnnetwork of double- and triple-agentrnoperations. At the least, it appearsrnthat the terrorist group was thoroughlyrnpenetrated by an agent of the Egyptianrngovernment and the FBI, who had longrnknown that bomb attacks in New Yorkrnwere planned, though preventive measuresrnwere never taken. The CIA recruitedrnand trained the terrorists, thernFBI spied on them, and they still managedrnto come close to toppling one ofrnthe twin towers. It would be wonderfulrnto think that when the full story of thernWorld Trade Center case is known, itrnwill trigger a long overdue public inquiryrninto the morality and effectiveness ofrncovert policing and counterintelligence,rnbut realistically speaking, hopes are notrnhigh.rnWhen such issues do emerge in publicrndebate, it is in the context of somernhigh intrigue such as a terrorist act or anrnassassination, but this conceals the extentrnto which we have accepted the principlesrnof covert policing, denunciation,rnand secret informants in our everydayrnlives. Often, the “wedge” that justifiesrnsuch intrusions comes in the form of arnparticularly heinous or unpopular type ofrncrime or social menace, against which wernare told that any countermeasures arernappropriate. The vast majority of us willrnnever suffer the consequences of an antiterroristrnoperation gone wrong or bernentrapped in an organized crime sting.rnOn the other hand, we are beginning torntravel the information superhighways,rnand the government has told us that werncannot communicate information freernfrom official surveillance, the rationalernbeing the “ultimate evils” of drugs andrnmoney-laundering. Our children go tornschools where they attend compulsoryrnantidrug agitprop, in which they are encouragedrnto denounce friends or familyrnmembers “for their own good.” Schoolsrnand media spread the same Orwellianrnmessage about evils like child abuse, andrnin both cases denunciation is facilitatedrnby the ever-growing net of anonymousrn”hot lines” and “tip lines.” Among thernmost popular shows on television arerntrue-crime programs in which viewersrnare invited to assist the police by denouncingrnoffenders. Initially, the targetsrnwere egregious serial killers or terrorists,rnbut now the electronic vigilantesrnare urged to search for child-supportrndefaulters, petty thieves, and even cityrnsticker violators. We are not too far fromrnthe day when those who utter politicallyrnor ethnically injudicious remarks willrnsimilarly be denounced before the enragedrnmasses.rnHot lines and clandestine denunciationrnhave become so entrenched inrnAmerican culture that we are starting tornconsider them from a European perspective.rnMost Continental Europeanrnnations derive their legal principles fromrnthe authoritarian traditions of Romanrnlaw, but they have also experienced totalitarianismrnor occupation, often both.rnConsequently, nations like France andrnGermany have a visceral cultural antagonismrnto the encouragement of denunciation.rnIn France, hot lines, rewards,rnand wanted posters were virtually taboornafter 1945, as they raise too many memoriesrnof earlier calls to hand in Jews orrnResistance fighters. They only reappearedrnat the height of a singularlyrnbloody terrorist campaign in the mid-rnI980’s, and they have never been fullyrnaccepted. American police officers secondedrnto Germany have been appalledrnat the seriousness with which their counterpartsrntake legal restrictions againstrnwire-tapping and electronic eavesdropping.rnPartly because they never sufferedrnoccupation, the United States andrnBritain are unusual among Westernrncountries in their desire to turn ordinaryrncitizens into police auxiliaries and communalrnblock wardens.rnThe American culture of denunciationrnmight not be susceptible to thoroughrnreform in the near future, butrnmight we not at least consider limitingrnthe worst potential abuses? One vitalrnstep might be a prohibition on officialrnagencies taking action on any form ofrnanonymous information, without externalrncorroboration. Alternatively, the newrntechnology of telephone-caller identificationrnraises the hope that we mightrnsoon see the regular publication of thernidentities of all public-spirited citizensrnwho regularly turn in their friends andrnneighbors for drug use or possession,rnchild abuse, elder abuse. Sabbathbreaking,rnbattering, or whatever thernvogue offense of the hour might be. Itrnwould be helpful if films and televisionrnprograms would rid themselves not onlyrnof excessive violence, but of romanticizedrnand heroic depictions of the spy,rnthe defector, and the eavesdropper.rnBut ultimately, these changes wouldrnbe no more than palliatives. What wernJANUARY 1995/43rnrnrn