lacked if he had demanded a recount.rnTom Wicker wrote these long-forgottenrnsentences in the New York Times: “Nobodyrnknows to this day whom the Americanrnpeople really elected President inrn1960. Under the prevailing system JohnrnF. Kennedy was inaugurated but it wasrnnot at all clear if this was really the will ofrnthe people, or, if so, by what means andrnmargin that will was expressed.”rnIn reading the Aitken biography Irnmade no deliberate attempt to comparernit with previous biographies, such as thernthree volumes by Stephen E. Ambrose.rnThis book is unique because Nixon gavernthe author, a British M.P., 60 hours of interviewsrnand opened up private archives,rnletters and diaries, personal and familyrnpapers for his unrestricted use. No otherrnbiographer had such access, includingrn155 interviews with almost everybodyrnwho was ever involved with Nixon. Thisrnis biography not hagiography, althoughrnAitken makes no attempt to conceal hisrnadmiration for Nixon. Interestingly,rnthere is one person whom he did not interviewrn—Henry Kissinger. Why not?rnThe author, who is biting in his assessmentrnof the former Secretary of State,rndoes not explain this singular omissionrnfrom his list of interviewees.rnThe overwhelming—and probablyrnunanswerable—question that emergesrnfrom his massive tome is this: How couldrnsomebody as smart as Nixon have sornshafted himself as to end up in disgrace,rnthe only President in our history who resignedrnrather than face impeachmentrnand probable removal from office?rnThere can be no question that hadrnNixon opened up after the arrest of thernWatergate burglars in 1972 instead ofrnparticipating in the coverup, or had herndestroyed the incriminating tapes asrnsoon as the cancer on the presidency beganrnto metastasize, he would have servedrnout his second term. So why didn’t herndo either? Was there something inrnNixon’s character that drove him tornmake colossal errors, allowing a nincompooprnlike John Dean to act as counsel tornthe President of the United States? Appointingrnto the Supreme Court twornjudges who couldn’t possibly have wonrna Senate confirmation vote and thenrnending up with Harry Blackmun as therncompromise? Permitting the DanielrnEllsberg burglary? Ordering the CIA tornblock an FBI probe into Watergate?rnRunning a losing race for governor ofrnCalifornia?rnAitken, who knew Nixon from 1966rnon, talks about “dark corners” in Nixon’srnmental world, the “dark” side of his nature,rna man who followed his “worst instincts.”rnHe says Kissinger “knew how tornexploit Nixon’s darker nature becausernhe had one of his own.” Aitken comesrnvery close to blaming the former Secretaryrnof State for Nixon’s downfall. He indictsrnKissinger for maintaining Nixon’srnconfidence in him “by dubious methodsrn.. . pandering to Nixon’s worst instinctsrnwith cunning sycophancy.” Nixon wasrnso troubled by Kissinger’s mood swingsrnthat he “at one stage considered whetherrnthis National Security Adviser shouldrnseek psychiatric care.”rnMatters got so bad between them thatrnNixon told Charles Colson to order thernSecret Service to tap Kissinger’s calls.rnThere is a remarkable piece of dialoguernwhen Colson reports to the Presidentrnthe contents of a Kissinger phone call tornJoseph Kraft. Aitken believes that whatrnsaved Kissinger from dismissal was Watergate.rnYet on page 520, he reports thatrnin his preresignation conferences withrnVice President Ford, Nixon “emphasizedrnthat Henry Kissinger was indispensablernas Secretary of State” (italics added).rnGo figure.rnAitken recounts that Kissinger wasrnready to resign at the height of the Watergaternscandal after Nixon appointedrnGeneral Alexander Haig to succeed H.R.rnHaldeman as White House Chief ofrnStaff. Kissinger took umbrage at thernidea of having to report to Haig, his formerrnassistant, and arranged to see Nixonrnto hand in his resignation. BeforernKissinger entered the Oval Office, RosernMary Woods, Nixon’s secretary, deliveredrna diatribe to the Secretary of Staternthat ended with this line: “For once inrnyour life, Henry, just behave like a man.”rnKissinger entered the Oval Office andrnnever mentioned resignation.rnWho was “Deep Throat,” the highlyrnplaced individual who told all to thernWashington Post team of Woodward andrnBernstein? It is remarkable in a capitalrncity where nothing is a secret for morernthan a day that the identity of this informerrnis still a question. What doesrnAitken think? Here I will insist that, becausernof the many interviews Nixonrngranted him, Aitken’s theories are alsornNixon’s theories. Aitken focuses hisrnDeep Throat hypothesis on one of thernunsolved mysteries of the Watergate drama:rnthe 18 and one-half minute gap inrnthe White House tapes that Ms. Woodsrnwas transcribing. Only six people hadrnknown of the erasure when Deep Throatrnleaked the story about “deliberate erasures”rnto the Woodstein duo. The sixrnwere: Nixon; Ms. Woods; Haig; FredrnBuzhardt, White House counsel; StevernBull, who replaced Alexander Butterfield,rnthe man who told the Senate investigatorsrnabout the White House tapingrnsystem; and Haig’s deputy, MajorrnGeneral John C. Bennett. Eliminate thernfirst two—Nixon and Woods—sincernthey wouldn’t leak stories about themselves.rnThat leaves four possible WashingtonrnPost informants. Libel laws andrnlack of definite proof prevent Aitkenrnfrom voicing his—or Nixon’s—suspicion.rnI have long been persuaded that inrnactual fact there is no one Deep Throatrnbut several persons whom Woodsteinrnhave elided into a single individual tornprevent any personal identification.rnLittle space remains for a discussion ofrnNixon’s foreign and domestic policies,rnand there isn’t much good to sav aboutrnany of them, despite Aitken’s Cheeryblelikernattitude. On the domestic scene,rnNixon talked conservati’e while pursuingrnpolitics that would have done JimmyrnCarter or Bill Clinton proud—wage andrnprice controls in peacetime and the expansionrnof Lyndon Johnson’s Great Societyrnsocial programs, family assistance,rnaffirmative action orders, budgetaryrndeficits, etc. As for foreign policy, withrnthe fall of the Soviet Empire the subjectrnmay be moot, since all sides in the debaterncan claim credit for theunexpectedrnachievement. There is no question inrnmy mind that Nixon’s detente amountedrnto appeasement of the Soviet Union,rnof communist China—and of the Councilrnon Foreign Relations and similarlvrnminded American liberals.rnPerhaps the last word ought to berngiven to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, nowrnback in his Russian homeland. Criticalrnof detente, he identified what he calledrnthe “Kissinger syndrome,” wherebyrn”individuals, while holding high office,rnpursue a policy of appeasement andrncapitulation . . . but immediately uponrnretirement the scales fall from their eyesrnand they begin to advocate firmness andrnresolution. How can this be? Whatrncaused the change? Enlightenment justrndoesn’t come that suddenly! Might wernnot assume that they were well aware ofrnthe real state of affairs all along, butrnsimply drifted with the political tide,rnclinging to their posts?”rn30/CHRONICLESrnrnrn