train careening down the tracks, arguments about the unduernreach of executive power are both vahd and sensible and mustrnbe addressed. Republican history, American and Roman, providesrna key to having it both ways—the power of true fiscal disciplinernvested in the White House coupled with no importantrndiminution of congressional authority.rnPonder the Roman system of dealing with crisis in a counterbalancedrnsystem of government. History buffs will recallrnthat the division of powers among the legislature and executivernpursuant to the American constitutional system purposely parallels,rnin a very telling fashion, the Roman Republic’s equilibriumrnamong its three centers of political power during its flourishingrncenturies prior to 50 B.C. In short, there are some thingsrnto be learned from the Roman system of Republican governancernthat are quite apt to the American fiscal crisis.rnRoman constitutional usage allowed the creation, for periodsrnof six months, of a single-leader dictatorship. This short-termrndictator held powers ascendant even to those of the consuls,rnbut only during periods of grave, nation-threatening crisesrnsuch as foreign invasion or rebellion. Such dictatorships werernperiodic in nature and renewable semiannually and wouldrncease when the crisis ceased. George Washington’s admirationrnfor (and favorable comparison with) the statesmanship of LuciusrnQuinctius Cincinnatus, twice dictator of Rome duringrnsuch crises, is well grounded. Cincinnatus was a sufficient patriotrnof the Republic to forsake his powers and return to privaternlife after the successful completion of his tasks in each of hisrntwo dictatorships. Periodicity—emergency powers exercisablernonly during periods of extreme crisis—was at the core of thisrnpolicy.rnA modern extension of this historically successful concept ofrnperiodicity could take the sting out of the line item veto, justrnas it allayed Roman fear of undue power. The baseline fear wasrnthat someone would seek forcibly to make extraordinary, periodicrnpowers permanent. Prior to the Ides of March in 44 B.C.,rnJulius Caesar made himself dictator for ten years and later forrnlife. Americans wisely share the fear of permanent despotismrnof any kind—fiscal, military, or otherwise. Like the Romans,rnwe are more tolerant of short-term extraordinary powers duringrntimes of national crisis.rnA far-reaching line item veto, created by constitutionalrnamendment and vesting in the President the power to strike anyrnindividual appropriation or spending commitment from anyrnbill, can be limited by periodicity. Because of the nearly exponentialrndeficit growth arising out of cost of living adjustments,rnentitlements, and prior spending commitments, itrnwould also be extremely useful to extend the veto to any itemrnin the gross federal budget. Such a presidential power to cutrncould exist irrespective of the year in which any expenditure wasrnfirst committed. At first blush this is a somewhat startling concept.rnMadison’s core political dicta that men are not angelsrnand therefore should not be vested with sweeping powers withoutrn”ancillary precautions” comes to bear on this notion. Yetrnthe concept of periodicity is just such an “ancillary precaution.”rnTo safeguard against an undue permanent tilt of power tornthe executive branch, the law could tie the line itemrnveto to budgetary conditions from one fiscal year to another.rnSpecifically, the line item veto could come into existencernwhenever interest paid on the federal debt exceeded a fixed percentagernof the nation’s GDP (say 3.5 percent). Currently wernare in trouble. The GDP is running at about $5.7 trillion perrnyear while interest on the net debt is running at $200 billionrn—3.5 percent. In other words, if at some time during thernyear 1996 it was determined by a set of agreed-upon accountingrnprinciples that interest on the debt exceeded 3.5 percent ofrnGDP, whoever is then serving as President of the United Statesrnwould immediately enjoy the power to exercise a line itemrnveto over any congressional spending measures previously establishedrnor coming to his desk thereafter. The duration ofrnsuch power could be the time necessary to reduce such interestrnbelow 3.5 percent of GDP (using agreed-upon accountingrnprinciples) or until the new fiscal year began, whichever wasrngreater.rnEven in the midst of fiscal crises. Congress represents all toornwell the notion that “all politics are local politics.” Accordingly,rneven now Congress devotes its chief efforts and energy to devising,rnfunding, and overseeing governmental programs intendedrnto gratify constituent needs. These largely focus uponrnparochial clamoring for government largess, such as petroleumstaternresistance in Congress to energy taxes. Moreover and sadrnto say, a congressman representing Groton, Connecticut, cannotrnbe expected to raise his voice and his vote in vigorous oppositionrnto Pentagon submarine contracts. A senator representingrnIowa is not likely to oppose agricultural subsidies of arngenerous magnitude. Those legislators with significant numbersrnof AIDS victims in their districts cannot be expected to resistrnthe political demand to quadruple and then quadruplernagain the amount spent for research and treatment of thatrnplague. And under present conditions, national legislatorsrncoming from Connecticut, California, and Iowa can invariablyrnbe expected to collaborate in logrolling efforts to pass constituent-rnpleasing appropriations irrespective of national budgetaryrnimpact. On a political level, Congress is often incapablernof getting interest groups to defer present gratifications or exercisingrnnecessary levels of fiscal discipline.rnThe President, on the other hand, can be expected to take arnmore transcendent view of the nation’s welfare. As an institution,rnthe presidency was designed to be answerable at three levels:rnto immediate constituencies, to the nation as an entity-constituency,rnand to a posterity-constituency of the nonvoting,rneven yet unborn citizenry. One must hope that, given the President’srnrole as fiduciary for the nation’s future, occupants of thernOval Office will exercise greater political courage than mererncongressmen. Morally, the President answers not only to individualrnvoters in Groton or Mason City or Beverfy Hills, but alsornto posterity for the long-term economic health and viabilityrnof the entire country. A properly empowered Presidentrnmight often be expected to oppose the “grab some more benefitsrnnow and bill our grandchildren for it” mentality ofrnCongress. At the least, intellectual honesty should cause a Presidentrnto admit that a great deal of what is spent is wasted andrncould readily be terminated. (The GAO, the Grace Commission,rnand former Chairman of the House Budget CommitteernLeon Panetta figured that about $100 billion a year is usuallyrnwasted.)rnThere is a powerful commonality between people distressedrnover our environmental habits and people distressed over ourrnfiscal habits. In the area of environmental protection, mostrnAmericans wish to bequeath unto their issue reasonably cleanrnair and water and reasonable amounts of forest and naturalrnparks. We also, when we take a moment to think about it, wishrnto bequeath to our issue an economic environment that is notrndrowning in unpaid pork bills, an economic engine not so de-rnOCTOBER 1993/23rnrnrn