“class” would support the substitution of “news and information”rnfor “ideas and information.” This is something thcvrncan more readily quantify and thus understand. It does not involvernquality, something which they find difficult to discuss; itrnis easier to manage a flow of information than a flow of ideas.rnEven the Soviet leadership understood this more than a quarterrnof a century ago and was far more ready to allow “news”rnthan discussion of ideas. There has been a widespread misunderstandingrnin America that the dead hand of Stalin continuedrnto keep all information out of the Soviet Union untilrnthe arrival of glasnost. hi fact, it is not information but ratherrnwhat thinking people will do with information that frightensrnoppressors. They are not afraid that information will changernthe world, but they know that ideas do. Thev fear debates, discussions,rnphilosophy, argument, anvthing controversial, unproved,rnunquantified. The demand for a purely informationalrnrole was always in conflict with the need for talentedrncommentary. Management has increasingly come to preferrn”news features,” that is, translations of articles from the Westernrnpress, over genuine commentaries.rnToday the Radios are at a crossroads. Their future mission,rnindeed their future existence, is in question. Yet the report ofrnthe President’s task force alreadv contains the seed of the solution.rnIts central recommendation—to change the role ofrnthe Radios from a surrogate medium of facts to an alternativernmedium for the exchange and enrichment of ideas—is exactlyrnwhat is needed. It is at heart the same thing for which creativernjournalists, commentators, writers, and dissidents at thernRadios have fought for decades. But the Radios do not have arnfuture if they are limited to being a surrogate source of information,rnand this is becoming the dominant activity at thernRadios. Even with the new offices in the formerly communistrncountries and with the dozens of stringers who are workingrnfor them, the domestic media can generally do this job nornworse than the Radios. The reason is simple: freedom of thernpress has led to numerous new independent newspapers andrnradio stations throughout the formerly communist world.rnThev have real advantages over the Radios; it will be impossiblernand unnecessary to compete with them in the sphere ofrnmere news.rnTo be sure, the predominantly informational role was importantrnduring the attempted August coup: for three days outrnof 365, the Radios basked in their old glory of being a surrogaternsource of information. This vital role should be enough tornjustify continuation of the Radios as a defense against anyrnbacksliding.rnWere there to be another coup attempt, one suspects therernwould be a better effort by the putschists to control the flow ofrninformation. In the August coup all they could do was controlrncentral television; they did not break RL’s links. Since then,rnhowever, the Radios’ management has decided to shut downrnthe monitoring unit that, by recording and transcribing whatrnSoviet and post-So’ict radio, TV, and electronic media had tornsay, has kept the Radios abreast of events in a way that nornother radio broadcast from abroad could match, in a way thatrncompensated in significant degree for the immediate presencernof domestic media. Once that monitoring capability isrngone it will not be easy to restore. Those who plan the nextrncoup, and there will be such plans, will only have to cut telephonernlines to the Radios’ bureaus and stringers to slicernthrough the bonds that tie the Radios inextricably into thernfabric of the countries to which thev broadcast.rnGene Pell, president of the Radios, has argued that thernmost important role for the Western Radios should be that ofrnproiding a “Marshall Plan for ideas.” This very formulationrnshows how, even when management is trying to spread ideas,rnit finds ideas hard to cope with. It is moderately useful, butrndangerously insufficient, if the Radios see their role as providingrnlisteners with translations of articles from the Westernrnpress. Lessons in American democracy arc welcome, but it isrnnecessary to keep in mind that the Radios’ listeners are also inheritorsrnof a great historical culture, that much of America’srnexperience is peculiar and not universal, that there is no needrnto borrow from another culture what one can find in his ownrnhistorv. It is necessary to be “interactive” with the great culturesrnof the people to whom we broadcast and to communicaternin the “language” of these cultures, not just, e.g., in thernRussian language. In an’ dialogue, in any culture, or betvccnrnany cultures, acceptance is the key, making something one’srnown. The American example of the Western experience canrnbe inspected and adapted, but it cannot be transplanted. Itrncan contribute to what happens elsewhere only after someonernelse has incorporated what he wants, modified, tested,rnrejected, fitted together with other ideas from his own traditions.rnAbove all, it cannot be packaged, counted, and deliveredrnlike foreign aid. If the Radios’ management cannot practicerntolerance and encouragement of intellectual curiosity, theyrncannot teach it.rnIt is sad that an enterprise created bv Americans—the Radiosrn—functions in a style so similar to the So’iet’s. Perhapsrnthe stvle is similar because the Radios are government basedrnand do not have to satisfy the marketplace—the audience.rnAt the same time this suggests that institutional structurernrather than human nature creates the mindless processing andrncalculating of quantifiable bits of information that used torncharacterize Soviet society. It gives, then, some reason forrnhope that, if Russians find themselves in different, market circumstances,rntheir bureaucratic overhang will wither away.rnIn a sense, the problem facing the Radios is similar to thernproblem always facing the worid: the opposition between therneasiest management criterion, quantit’, and the more difficultrncriteria of creativity and responsiveness to individual situations.rnIs the President’s task force correct in viewing the Radiosrnas needed in the future? To be sure, yes it is. The Radiosrnare the strongest single instrument of American influence insidernthe formerly communist states. It is also correct in pointingrnout that the future is unpredictable. Reactionary turnsrncan recur. Nationalists can create an unstable situation. ThernRadios should continue to exist. I would go even further andrnsa) that all the reasons that existed in the early 50’s to establishrnthe Radios today provide justification for initiating broadcastingrnto the peoples of the former Yugoslavia and of Chinarnand East Asia.rnAll of this can happen, if the Radios will change their structurernand adapt their programmatic focus as advised b’ therntask force. Employees at the Radios often jokingly ask, “Whenrnwill glasnost and perestroika come to RFE and RL?” Therndream of the cultural staff at the Radios is that this day will finallyrndawn. As if to express their dream, the Gladilin novel hasrnthe president of the Radios going to Moscow to receive a decorationrnfor having fought together witli Gorbachev for glasnost.rnPerhaps the decades-old criticisms of the Radios can finallyrnhelp them. If the changes arc ever to come, they must comernnow. crn24/CHRONICLESrnrnrn