of like that, but maybe it’s not cuddlyrnenough to be commercial. A greatrnchoice would have been Br’er Rabbit, arnsymbol rich in associations: the tricksterrnfigure of African-American folk culturernlovingly exploited by a white Atlantarnnewspaperman and now known worldwidernthanks to Walt Disney. It’s almostrna metaphor.rnBut if he wouldn’t do (and it mightrnbe misunderstood), then how aboutrnPogo Possum? I think it was Roy BlountrnJr.—if not it should have been—whornsuggested once that Pogo was an appropriaternmascot for the entire South, andrnPogo’s a Georgian, from just down thernroad in the Okefenokee Swamp. He’srncute, he’s smart, he’s lovable, he’s marketable,rnhe’s native, and nobody has tornask “What is it?” But no, Atlanta hasrnstuck us with this meaningless, embarrassingrnnothing—in Union blue, no less.rnEvery nation gets the capital it deserves,rnI guess, but what has the South done torndeserve Atlanta?rnYou’ll be hearing more about thernstruggle for the soul of the 1996rnOlympics—or, more precisely, the strugglernabout whether they are to have anyrnsoul. As a matter of fact, you may bernhearing more from me next month, if Irncan bring myself to write about thernGeorgia state flag controversy.rnJohn Shelton Reed writes from ChapelrnHill, North Carolina, and gets hisrnexercise by not owning a remote controlrnfor his television.rnLetter FromrnBudapestrnby Thomas MolnarrnCommunism, Nationalism,rnLiberalismrnI chose the three words in my title becausernthey summarize the situation inrnEastern Europe, a situation simple yetrncomplicated, tragic yet full of hope. 1rnapologize for the cliches, but they becomernmore profound as this article proceeds.rnNotwithstanding those who advertisernthe “clear and present danger” of a communistrncomeback (and who would otherwisernbecome intellectually unemployedrn—without compensation), therernis no such danger, not even locally. Thisrndoes not mean that no nostalgia forrncommunism exists, for it does: amongrnmasses of people whom privatization reducesrnto an even deeper misery andrnamong intellectuals who regret the passingrnof the good old times when booksrnwere inexpensive, the classics abounded,rntheater and concert tickets were lowpriced,rnand Marxism provided grit forrnengaging discussions and camouflaged,rnsubtle arguments. Even reliably anticommunistrnbourgeois will openly tellrnyou that “ten years ago it was better”: arnsteadier income, safety in public places,rnless crime, more expeditious methodsrnof dealing with criminals, and a publicrnphilosophy ostensibly in favor of socialrnissues and economic rescue for the underprivilegedrn(retired people). This mayrnsound strange to Westerners who thinkrnin black and white, but consider this:rnthere are now close to three hundredrnthousand unemployed in Hungary, andrnthe government coldly forecasts a halfmillionrnof them by the end of the year!rnAnd the iceberg of privatization, a nicernword for savage capitalism, shows arngrowing stratum of brand-new multimillionairesrnwhose dollars or marks arerninvested in massage parlors, drug deals,rnor luxury restaurants.rnThis explains the relatively flourishingrnstatus of the former Communist Party,rnnow called “Socialist,” whose members,rnwhen told they will not be legallyrnpenalized but should at least show repentance,rnask: “For what?” For the reintroductionrnof capitalism and the spreadingrnmisery in the coming cold winter?rnYet, I repeat, communism is dead andrngone, and what we sec in Yugoslavia andrnRumania can be explained by Balkan attitudesrnas old as the Turkish occupation.rnAs far as the other countries are concerned,rnfrom the Baltic states to Croatiarn(minus the incredibly savage war),rnprogress has begun with brilliant initiativesrnand a tenacious will, showing signsrnof hope that Prague, Warsaw, Budapest,rnetc., are heading in the right direction.rnBut what is the right direction? Thisrnis where two of the terms used in the titlernbecome clearer. Contrary to Mr.rnBush’s excursion in Latin with the paxrnuniversalis (who whispered it in hisrncars?), no such thing is likely to emergernby a long shot. Improvement—and itrnmay take several decades—must choosernbetween two paths: either nationalismrnor liberalism. As a Budapest newspaperrnexplained it the other day, there is nornsuch thing as “national liberalism”; therntwo words, at least in Eastern Europe,rnare incompatible, regardless of whatrnWestern think-tanks conclude. Yet,rnsince politics is also the playing withrnwords, the governments now in power,rnas well as the opposition parties, aim atrnregimes and policies that would be bothrnliberal and nationalistic, fully aware thatrnthis remains a pious wish. After all,rnthroughout the l9th century this was thernissue: in Russia the conflict was betweenrnpopulists and partisans of a Western orientationrn(Herzen and Turgenev vs.rnBakunin and Dostoyevsky); in Hungary,rnbetween the nationalist Kossuth and thernmoderate Deak; and in Czechoslovakia,rnPoland, and Rumania between similarrnfreres ennemis. This is not due to splitrnnational personalities but to geopoliticsrnand history: one nation’s circumstancesrnand experiences determine its policiesrnand choices.rnBut let me concentrate on the Magyarrndilemma. By temperament, Hungaryrnis inward-looking, its treasure is notrnthe future but rather memories to whichrneach great turn of events adds an indeliblernnote and symbol. Prosperity on arncollective level is looked upon as a strokernof fortune, almost distractedly, notrnsomething for which essential things andrnlifestyles should be sacrificed. Liberalismrndoes exist in this sui generis milieu,rnbut it is the liberalism of 150 years ago,rnwhen the Anglophile Count Szechenyirnintroduced horse races and modernrnbanking, built the first permanent bridgernover the Danube, and launched numerousrnenterprises. He was a liberal whorndied in despair (somewhat like SimonrnBolivar a generation before him), disappointedrnby the obstacles, both foreignrn(Habsburg) and domestic (a certain inertiarnand ceaseless conflicts). Ever since,rnliberalism has chalked up notable victoriesrnbut has remained the spirit of a relativelyrnsmall minority, by no means arnmass-mentality. Thus if it reappears, itrncannot enjoy full independence; the nationrnwould not as a whole trust it, findingrnin it a foreign factor. Not that nationalismrnwould be liberalism’s exactrnand purposeful opponent; but it is somethingrnelse, hardly articulable in any modernrnideological or party language. “Staternliberalism,” if there is such a thing,rnwould be what people would under-rnNOVEMBER 1992/43rnrnrn