primitive man also militates against thenpossibility of forming such a socialncontract. In total contrast to Aristotlenand Burke, Rousseau denied that civilnsociety and its institutions are “natural”nto man; he believed that organizednsociety is “artificial.” He would havenwholly rejected Burke’s aphorism, “Artnis man’s nature,” and its derivativenargument that “the state of civil societyn… is a state of nature — and muchnmore truly so than a savage and incoherentnmode of life.” But to understandnRousseau’s Social Contract it isnnecessary to see it in the light of hisneadier work, the Discourse on Inequality.nRousseau had made it plain that henconceived the original “social contract”nas a colossal fraud, because thendivision of labor in primitive societynhad led to inequities through privatenproperty, and to a rigid class structurenthat perpetuated injustice and conflictsnbetween the rich and the poor. Inequalitynin economic and social conditionsnwas to Rousseau the source ofnevery evil. He argued that society corruptsnmen by destroying the amour densoi-meme found in “nature,” convertingnit into amour-propre, the desire innsociety to dominate others. Thus henclaimed that civil society, not weaknessesninherent in human nature, causesnsuch vices as pride, envy, avarice,nvanity, etc. He assumed that the economicnpie could not be enlarged, sonthat the wealth of the rich was to himnthe cause of the poverty of the poor.nFrom this assumption he wrote tonMme. de Francueil and defended hisndecision, beginning in 1746, to put hisnfive illegitimate children in an orphanagenat birth: “The earth producesnenough for everybody; it is the life-stylenof the rich, it is your life-style whichnrobs my children of bread.” Fifteennyears later, in 1761, when Rousseaunwas sick and thought he was about tondie, his troubled conscience causednhim to have a search made in thenfoundling hospital records in Paris, butnnothing was discovered regarding hisnchildren. Rousseau’s social contractnwith his own children was indeed ancolossal fraud.nCranston notes that Rousseau’s SocialnContract “was to prove far morenexplosive, far more subversive of thenAncien Regime than anything Voltairenwrote.” This is quite true. Rousseau’sn30/CHRONICLESnrevolutionary political treatise presentsnthe second of what Cranston calls “twonsocial contracts.” It was written out ofnRousseau’s belief that he was uniquelynchosen by God or Nature to redeemnhumanity from the injustices and slaverynof the “original” social contractnthat had been perverted by rulersnthroughout history. To the pure allnthings are poor. The important Calvinistnresidue in Rousseau’s consciencenand spirit reveals itself in his convictionnthat compared with the unregeneratenmass of humanity he is one of God’snelect, not in religion but in politics, andnthat he possesses from his selfgeneratedninner light unique politicalnrevelations that are vital for the salvationnof mankind. Cranston notes thenexplicit substantive similarities in politicalnideas between Rousseau, Hobbes,nand Machiavelli, but mentions nothingnof the more important assumed Calviriistnpsychology in his Social Contract.nWith fine analytical skill Cranstonnexplicates Rousseau’s SocialnContract and gives due considerationnto some of the chief weaknesses in itsnthesis. He is not troubled bynRousseau’s idea that the state can forcena man to be free, and he denies thatnthis idea can be equated with modernntotalitarianism, as claimed by J.L.nTalmon, Lester Crocker, and others.nYet recent scholarship on Rousseau bynNorman Hampson, James Miller, andnespecially Carol Blum strengthens theninterpretation of Talmon and Crocker.nCranston is well aware of Rousseau’sngreat’ difficulty (Jacques Maritain saidnthe impossibility) in attempting to harmonizenthe various particular interests,nand individual wills and “rights” ofnprivate citizens and corporate bodies,nwith his “General Will” or volontengenerate, which determines sovereigntynin the national community. AmongnRousseau scholars the range of interpretationsnof what he meant by volontengenerale is almost as broad as thennumber of scholars, and Cranston addsnnothing original to our understandingnof this grand, abstract concept. LikenHobbes, Rousseau reduced thenChurch to a department of the statenand identified religion with patriotism.nLike practically all Rousseau scholars,nCranston is acutely embarrassed bynwhat he calls Rousseau’s “most aston­nnnishing chapter” on civil religion. Thenman of feeling explicitly advocates religiousnpersecution, and his doctrine isnvery similar to the Civil Constitution ofnthe Clergy adopted by the Jacobinsnduring the French Revolution in Julyn1790. Rousseau’s theory, like the practicenof the Jacobins, banishes from thennation anyone who rejects the civicnreligious patriotism of the new order,nand sanctions “punishment by death”nfor any citizen who acts as if he doesnnot believe in its patriotic articles ofnfaith.nAlthough Cranston makes as good anpositive case for Rousseau’s politicalntheory as any scholar since C.E.nVaughan, in the final analysis he comesnto his conclusions by minimizing thengreat difficulties embedded innRousseau’s original conditional premisesnand in his abstractions, ambiguities,nparadoxes, and contradictions. Early innthe 20th century, Gustav Lanson saidnthat Rousseau is rife with contradictionsnand that his most sophisticatednand clever scholars have not been ablento harmonize his thought. This stillnappears to be true. Cranston achieves ancertain degree of unity by ignoring thenmore dubious elements in Rousseau’sntheory. For example, he says nothingnabout the chief function of Rousseau’snlawgiver, the “legislator” who, likenLenin, would change human nature bynannihilating each individual’s “naturalnresources” in order to form the newncharacter of a good citizen innRousseau’s republic of virtue. Thenmodel of his republic is an idealizednimage of Calvin’s Geneva mated withnthe discipline of ancient Sparta. It isngenerally supposed that in his SocialnContract Rousseau regarded himself asnthe true lawgiver to his proposed regeneratednsocial order. However thatnmay be in abstract theory, in concretenpractice during the French Revolutionnthe Abbe Sieyes, Robespierre, andnMarat each separately assumed that henwas Rousseau’s lawgiver for the regeneratednsocial order of revolutionarynFrance. But of course, in practice, thenfinal true lawgiver of revolutionarynFrance was Napoleon Bonaparte.nIn a way, Cranston recognizes thatnRousseau’s aesthetic and moral sensibilitynis even more important than hisnpolitical one. He notes that in 1761,nwhen Rousseau published Julie, thennovel “transformed Rousseau from an