required us to “stay in arms agreementsnthat the Soviets were violating,”nhe explained.nwhen he says that this is “reasonndisthroned,” Beichman does not exaggerate.nThere was, of course, an obviousnstep that the Reagan administrationncould have taken. It could havenbroken off negotiations already underwaynfor the next treaty (for there wasnalways a next one). If Reagan had donenthis, going on TV with an explanation,narms control would have been underminednand Congress would have beennimpotent. But Reagan didn’t want tondo any such thing. He enjoyed thenceremonial encounters with Gorbachev,nand by the time he left thenWhite House, having signed a treatynwith very unwise provisions (denyingnourselves the right to put nonnuclearnwarheads in ground-launched Cruisenmissiles, for example), he was no doubtnconvinced that the charade of signingnembossed parchment really did preserventhe peace.nReagan always wanted to performnon the stage of history more than henwanted to write the script. The liberalsnaccused him of being an actor, but theynwithdrew the charge when they saw henwas prepared to read their lines. Thencalculation in the executive branchnseemed to be that the cost (in terms ofnpublicity) of ending negotiations is alwaysnhigher than the cost (in terms ofnsecurity) of making one more concession.nThe media will make you looknbad if you suspend the talks! So lawyersnblurred the wording and everyonenhoped the Soviet violations wouldn’tnoccur too embarrassingly soon.nBeichman points out that Americannappeasement has been pretty muchnconfined to our dealings with the SovietnUnion. (Notice in contrast our lacknof restraint in attacking Iraq, guilty ofnthe U.N.-abhorred crime of borderncrossing.) I wish Beichman had relaxedna little and waxed philosophical on thenquestion: why were we for so long sonconsistently deferential to Soviet rulers?nIn recent decades sheer fear hasnplayed a big part, of course. But FranklinnRoosevelt displayed the same respectfulnattitude, so it predates thenSoviet nuclear arsenal.nOne thought is that American-stylenliberalism and Soviet communism arencognate ideologies. There are differences,nof course. We have accepted thenrestrictions imposed on ofRce-holdersnby democracy. (But those are merenrules of succession. Constitutional restraintsnon state power per se have beennmostly removed in the U.S.) ThenCommunists disdained such bourgeoisninhibitions. Both systems are Godless,n”progressive,” and redistributionist;nboth unsympathetic (in practice) tonproperty and family; and both havenbeen driven by the destructive egalitariannideal: in our case inchoately andnunofficially, in the Soviets’ forthrightlynand officially.nPossibly, then, historians a hundrednyears from now will regard the ColdnWar as a contest between two versionsnof socialism; theirs a forthright andnzealous faith, ours wishy-washy andnfainthearted (pragmatically allowingnthe wealth-creation needed for its subsequentnredistribution). They burnednheretics at the stake, or at least shotnthem in Lubyanka Prison, or sent themnto Siberia. But perversely they held thenmoral high ground as they did so. Wenbelieved what they believed, but far lessnfervently. James Burnham pointed outnin The Suicide of the West that it wasnour acceptance of their ideals thatndemoralized and disarmed us.nThis metaphorical disarmament wasnthen reified in the foolish treaty-makingnthat rightly disturbs Beichman. Itnwas not that the Soviets outwitted us innnegotiation, or that we were too afraidnof what the public would think or thenmedia would say if “talks” were brokennoff. It was that, deep down, Americannelites believed that the “Communist”nversion of the ideology we held inncommon was purer and therefore morallynsuperior to our namby-pamby democracy.nThis has now changed, however.nBeichman would not agree with thenthree preceding paragraphs, I fear. Henhas always insisted on viewing communismnas a separate and distinct thing,ntaxonomically apart from our virtuouslyndemocratic government. ThenSoviets were always more strenuouslynresisted by George Meany-led labornunions than by our boardroom types,nhe would point out. But, overlookingnmy suggestion that we are really dealingnwith different denominations of thensame church, he will regard my furthernsuggestion that there has been somenrecent change in the struggle as anterrible heresy. “Nothing fundamentalnnnhas changed in Moscow” is and longnhas been his battle cry.nIt may be, but there has been anchange in the West. We no longer takenSoviet claims at face value, or entertainnany hope that communism will lead usninto the Promised Land or create thenNew Man. The watershed event, Inbelieve, was Mikhail Gorbachev’s ceremonialnarrival in Washington, D.G., innDecember 1987. The INF Treaty wasnto be signed, but protesters werenmassed on the Mall, mostly Jewishngroups, some from as far away asnAlaska. I wrote at the time that this wasnthe beginning of the end for communism.nBeichman’s mistake, I believe, is tonthink that a faith survives until it isnformally repudiated. “For me,” henwrites, “the Soviet/Russian futurenhinges on whether or not the legitimizingnideology of Marxism-Leninism isnformally and openly delegitimized bynthe Soviet Politburo.” He is right toninsist that there has been no suchnrepudiation. But the faith is witheringnaway anyway and it will continue to donso. All along it was not so muchninternal police as external believersnwho nourished it. It was a Westernnexperiment that was tried out on thenRussian people, and the experiment isnnow over. It remains only for its apparatusnto dissolve.nBeichman would reply that Communistsnstill in power relish that powernand won’t give it up without a fight.nThe other day I noticed a headline innthe San Francisco Chronicle and againnthought of Beichman: “GorbachevnWarns Cold War Could Be Revived.”nThe world, Gorbachev was quoted asnsaying, “could once again plunge intonthe abyss of the Cold War.” Analystsnand “Western diplomats in Moscow”nwere “speculating” that George Bush’sn”cool reception to Moscow’s pendingnrequest for $1.5 billion in farm creditsncould be worrying Gorbachev.” Threendays later the headline in the New YorknTimes was as follows: “Bush Is Leaningnto Food Credits for the Soviets.”nThis will have come as no surprisento Beichman. And he is partly right.nThe Soviets will continue to exportnmoney from us by veiled and not-soveilednthreats. But the effects of suchnfood aid will be to ensure that thennecessary economic reforms do notntake place. And without fundamentalnAUGUST 1991/39n