reformer. But Lukacs writes ofnChurchill with real understanding andna warm sympathy, as he does of thenBritish and West European milieu innwhich Churchill worked. He remindsnus that Churchill, for much of the 20’snand 30’s, was generally regarded as anhas-been and widely distrusted as anmaverick, or even a nut. His few admirersnand supporters were an equallynunpopular fringe element.nAfter all, it was not merely Churchill’snindividual stands, but their combinations,nwhich were strange. He was anfree trader in a protectionist party andnera, a strong supporter of the Empirenin an age of retreat when even manynEnglishmen were starting to see Gandhinas a saint (an illusion, incidentally,nthat Lukacs deftly explodes by quotingnGandhi’s very strange view of Hitler).nChurchill was a pro-Zionist when almostnall other supporters of a strongnimperial role were ardent Arabophiles.nAbove all, of course, he distrusted (hendid not hate) the Germans — not justnthe Nazis — and he correctly read Hitlernwhen most of the British were sunknin regrets over the First World War andnself-delusion about Nazi Germany.nJust how isolated he was, Lukacs notes,nwas understood by Churchill himself:n”If one were dependent on the peoplenwho had been right in the last fewnyears, what a tiny handful one wouldnhave to depend on.”nMany Conservatives continued tondistrust Churchill’s judgment, and thenresulting shenanigans in the Cabinet,nmost importantly Lord Halifax’s attemptnto seek “acceptable” peacenterms through Mussolini, are wellchronicled.nLukacs’ account of this andnof the congealing of British resistancenand the realization of people on thenConhnent that Hitler had not, after all,nbeen completely victorious are the bestnparts of the book. Although it seemsnclear that the minimum demands evennHalifax insisted on would never havenbeen granted by Hitler, an approach ofnthis sort might have ruined Britishnmorale. But in the black period ofnDunkirk, not even Churchill couldnsimply reject it. And Lukacs tends tonsupport suggestions that Churchillnused Sir David Kelly, the British ministernto Switzerland, in an attempt tonlead the Germans to think that Britainnmight just make peace in the hope ofndelaying their preparations for an at­ntack on Britain. Churchill himself dangerouslyninvited Lloyd George, ansuper-appeaser far more extreme thannNeville Chamberlain or Lord Halifax,nto join the Cabinet, perhaps calculatingnthat, if he were toppled, it would ben•better if Lloyd George replaced himnthan Oswald Mosley. Fortunately, thenWelsh demagogue did not take up thenoffer. It was not one of Churchill’snbetter ideas; somewhat similar miscalculationsnled the French Prime Minister,nPaul Reynaud, to prefer PhilippenPetain to Camille Chautemps, withndisastrous results.nLukacs’ analysis of Hitler’s aims andndecisions is not up to his treatment ofnChurchill. He portrays the Nazi tyrantnas altogether too normal, too unernotional.n”What was frightening in hisncharacter was his cold and almost inhumanndetachment.” While it is true thatnthe stories of Hitler’s frothing at thenmouth and chewing the rug are falsen— they are transplants from GeneralnLudendorffs behavior in 1918 — thenFiihrer was nevertheless a highly emotionalnman given to memorable rages.nMore serious is Lukacs’ surprising dismissalnof Hitler’s ideological consistencynand minimizing of his aims; althoughnhe is never entirely clear aboutnwhat Hitler did want, he goes so far asnto allege that, “What Hitler’s ultimatenwar airns were we do not know,” andnelsewhere concedes that Hitler didnconsistently seek domination overnEastern Europe. At one point, Lukacsnsays, “Hitler did not want to conquernthe worid. He knew that he could notnachieve that. The world was too largenfor one nation to control. That — andnnot only his half-baked respect fornBritish imperialism — was the mainnreason for the grand design of his offernfor a settlement: America for thenAmericans, Europe dominated by thenThird Reich, the British Empire largelynuntouched.” In any case, Hitler hadnno aims in the Americas, and in 1940nwas solely interested in dealing withnBritain’s resistance. However, manynhistorians — notably Gerhard Weinberg,nAndreas Hillgruber, and NormannRich — have shown the untenability ofnthese propositions.nPossibly most exasperating, however,nis Lukacs’ treatment of the story onnthe American side of the Atlantic. Bynomission, perhaps, he implies that FDRnnnwas far colder toward the Allied causenand slower to back Churchill than henreally was. Curiously, while understatingnthe legal difficulties and attive oppositionnthat delayed the famous Destroyer-for-Basesndeal, Lukacs is unablento portray the isolationist oppositionnwith any fairness or even any sense ofnreality; a failure that is related, I think, tonthe contempt for American conservativesnfrequently expressed in his othernbooks. Lukacs remarks that the mainnelement in appeasement, in Europe,nwas “not cowardice but an insufficiencynof vision.” Curiously, this reasonable,nalbeit over-generous, attitude towardnEuropean appeasers is not replicated innhis view of American isolationists,nthough (given their distance from Hitler)ntheir follies would seem to be a bitnmore defensible. Lukacs’ version ofnisolationism is as follows: “consistentnisolationists were few and far between.nMost isolationists, bitter opponents ofnRoosevelt and his administration, werennot opposed to armaments and thenmilitary. What they opposed was thisnGENDER ISSUES QUIZnAm Conservatives smarter than Liberals?nWhat do prehistoric “families,” housingnprojects and barnyards have in common?nChaos! caused by absence of the socialncontract between males and females.nWhat is the social contract?nIt is the delineation of inter-family rights andnresponsibilities, whereby a woman is assurednby a man of protection and sustenance,nin return for legitimate, inalienablenchildren. This is thefoundation of civilization.nWhat went wrong in modern times?’nGovernment negated the contract. Divorcencourts routinely evict and pauperize fathers,nthe welfare empire seel