others, he may be less than just. It isntrue, however, that Patton and othernAlHed generals usually enjoyed ancrushing superiority over their opponentsnin the offensive phase of the war.nYet, with few exceptions, their operationsnamounted to pounding the enemynto a pulp and forcing him back.nThe Allies repeatedly failed to blocknGerman retreats even in very favorablensituations. Montgomery’s failure to cutnoff Rommel’s retreat from Alamein tonTunisia, the delay in closing the Falaisengap, and the failure to block enemynevacuations across the Strait of Messinanand the Scheldt, are all cases innpoint.nNevertheless, while Ellis’s views arengenerally well-founded, he is not immunento the vices of overstatement andnone-sidedness, and, occasionally, of inaccuracy.nHe does not cover, or slidesnover, some cases where the Allies didnwell despite inferior strength — such as’nthe siege of Malta, Midway, Guadalcanal,nand the first stage of the Battle ofnthe Bulge. He unduly plays down thenItalian role in North Africa and Sicily,nthus somewhat inflating the Allied superioritynin those campaigns. While hisntreatment of Bomber Command’sncampaign against Germany is broadlyncorrect, it,contains a number of minornfactual errors. He eagerly cites thenstrong criticisms of the Allied armies’nperformance made by historians likenRussell Weigley, which refer to theneadier stages of the 1944-1945 cam­n44/CHRONICLESnLIBERAL ARTSnFISHER AMES ON CITIZENSHIPnpaign, but not the estimates by thensame men that the U.S. Army, especially,nwas performing far better in thenlast stages of the war. The same is true,nto some extent, of the Soviets. Ellisncites F.W. von Mellenthin’s grim descriptionnof Soviet tanks blunderingnaround in 1942, but merely commentsnthat later on Soviet tank commandersnacted with “more conviction andndash.” Mellenthin, by contrast, insistednthat by 1944 the Soviet armored forcesnwere “a highly mobile and keenlynedged tool, handled by daring andncapable commanders.” Allied performance,nif never as professional as thatnof the Germans, exhibited more improvementnover time than he allows.nThere is a curious gap in Ellis’snstudy of the war. While stressing Alliednsuperiority in production on one hand,nand operations and tactics on the other,nhe shows a curious reluctance to examinencritically Allied grand strategy, savenin making an unconvincing criticism ofnthe Americans for launching a dualndrive across the Pacific instead of attackingnalong a single axis, preferablynin MacArthur’s theater. (Ellis holds anmildly favorable view of MacArthur,nalthough he wrongly blames him fornthe foolish attacks against bypassednJapanese forces launched by the Australiansnin 1945.) This view is unconvincing,nbecause supply considerations,nand the availability of aircraftncarriers, favored a Gentral Pacific drivenonce the naval balance was clearly innWe have absurdly and presumptuously considered ourncondition as citizens, not as a state of probation for the trial ofnour virtues, but the heaven where their indolence is to findnrest, and their selfishness an evedasting reward. We havendared to suppose our political probation was over, and that anrepublican constitution, when once fairly engrossed in parchment,nwas a bridge over chaos that could defy the discord ofnall its elements. The decision of a majority, adopting such anconstitution, has sounded in our ears like a voice saying to thentempestuous sea of liberty, thus far shalt thou go, and herenshall thy proud waves be stayed.n—Boston Gazette, July 19, 1804nnnthe Americans’ favor. That offensivenafforded a quicker way to get across thenenemy’s supply line to Southeast Asia,nand obtain bases near Japan, than annattack based in the Southwest Pacific.nIt must be admitted, however, that it isnalmost refreshing to see a reasonablentreatment of MacArthur’s career, onenunmarked by the ideological resentmentsnthat have been all too apparentnin most recent American appraisals ofnthe man.nEllis strangely refrains from discussingnthe wisdom of a number of questionablenstrategic choices such as thendecision to land in Sicily instead ofnSardinia — although, as Eisenhowernand Mountbatten pointed out at thentime, the latter island was a betternavenue of approach to the Italiannmainland. Nor does he question thendecisions to land in southern France onnthe one hand, and to continue thenoffensive in Italy after August 1944.nMoreover, while John Ellis is eloquentnabout the brutality, slaughter,nand sheer misery involved in winningnWorld War II, the tenor of some of hisncriticisms of Allied generals suggestsnthat he has not entirely outgrown anromantic view of what can be expectednin battle. His ideas of success, and whatncan reasonably be expected in war,nsometimes suggest exaggerated expectationsnof what generalship cannachieve. Decisive victories with lopsidednlosses, successful battles of encirclement,nand triumphant pursuits ofndefeated enemy forces are particularlynfavored subjects for military historians,nbut are simply not that common innwar, even with highly skilled commanders.nSuch criticisms, however, should notnobscure the fact that Brute Force is innmany ways a remarkable book. Theynare, in fact, necessary because thisnwork will almost certainly become anclassic of military history. It would benunfortunate if its minor defects andnexaggerations gain acceptance, alongnwith its basic theses — theses that donnot make for self-congratulation, ornpleasant reading, but that are largelyntrue.nAlan J. Levine is a historian andnauthor of the recently publishednThe Soviet Union, the CommunistnMovement, and the Worldn(Praeger).n