Russia), where France is virtually absent.nThe long and short of it is that hegemonic Germany doesnnot need a united Europe, and, together with Englandnalthough for different reasons, Kohl or his successors willnsystematically torpedo such a construct. Why England, afternMargaret Thatcher? Because no matter what Englishmannbecomes prime minister—tomorrow even Neil Kinnock—nhe will return to the Thatcherite line. England is not part ofnthe Continent, the Heseltine claim was a political gimmick;ntruth is. Englishmen detest the Continent, and the openingnof the tunnel may even exacerbate this feeling. What wenmay expect is that the January 1, 1993, deadline for unitynwill be put off to later, then again and again, until such timenthat the whole unmanageable mess will be dropped andnforgotten. For the past three or four years the notion of unitynwas a strategy of France to a) prevent German unification,nb) prevent Russo-German rapprochement (a new andndreaded Rapallo), and c) tie a relatively weak West Germanynto a permanently lame France. This strategy failed at everynpoint, although Mitterrand now puts on a good face —nhiding his fury.nYet, the clowning goes on, and Kohl, Andreotti, and JohnnMajor keep smiling at the prospect of unity, hiding theirnsecond thoughts, at least as long as Jacques Delors lords itnover in Brussels as high commissar of unity. Delors, a coldntechnocrat and a Christian Democrat to boot (a good masknfor deeper layers of Jacobinism, thus ultra-centralization ofnall powers), is a typical Frenchman in the sense of “either Inlead you, or I prevent you from playing the game.” Allngroups that include the French end up succumbing to thisnsense of superiority — except the Germans who, whennpowerful, display a different but just as devastating arrogance.nDelors’ mandate as Brussels’ superstar will soon end,nand chances are that Belgian Prime Minister Martens willnsucceed him. This means, since Martens is a Fleming andnnot a Walloon, that British interests will be better safeguardednthan the French, and we may then see an ephemeralnalliance between London and Berlin — against Paris. At anynrate, the triangular situation does not promise much “unity”nbut a lot of haggling, which will also be to the detriment ofnthe “small” ones, from Lisbon to Oslo to Athens —not tonspeak of Eastern Europe, still only interested in gettingnfunds.nThis is the happy harmony at the top; among thencitizens there is absolutely no enthusiasm for then”commonly shared” Europe. Juan Goytisolo asks in thenleading Spanish paper. El Pais, just what may be the issue ornthe tradition on which the nations of Europe would see eyento eye? The common man’s attitude is either completenindifference or indeed fear that he would lose his job tonbetter qualified European “brothers,” or that his littlenprivate sphere of life would be invaded by North Africansnand Asians. European unity may be efficacious in one area,nbut it will also breed racial hatred, which is already growingnas the laws issued from Brussels clearly advantage then”immigrant” over against the local population. The commonnman knows he is being sold a bill of goods; his reactionnis not yet savage, but his patience is not inexhaustible. Antypical reaction by a French shopkeeper: For the time being,nwe hardly manage to coexist with North Africans, and not atnall when they approach majority in any given arrondissementnor village; but God only knows what will happen ifnGermany kicks out its Turkish workers (replaced easily bynex-East Germans), who then merely cross our borders —nwithout a passport.nAlthough “European unity” is becoming a swear word,nthe Strasbourg “padiament,” blissfully ignoring popularnwishes, has just now voted a resolution turning the futurenEurope into a “federation.” Federation, confederation, totalnunity — whatever the label — all people expect the consumernsociety to continue and even to be further “Americanized.”nI said “all expect,” but this is not quite true. In thenWest, consumerist habits are by now so ingrained that notneven confiscatory taxes prevent the citizen from living a lifenof mindless purchase. In the East, things have not gone thatnfar, because a perhaps majority of citizens value theirnregained homeland and want to continue their nationalnexistence, interrupted for half a century. But inside everynEast European country there is also a vocal minority —ntechnocrats, liberals, agnostics, pro-capitalists — who wantnan instant consumer society, to hell with the nation’s pastnand communal interests. These people publish most of thennewspapers and magazines, shape the TV programs, teachnat the universities. Many young priests have joined theirnranks. Facing this strong minority, there is the usual silentnmajority, reluctant to disperse the national patrimony in thenname of “privatization,” and insistent on, for example,nreligious instruction in schools. You find the split betweennLech Walesa and Adam Michnik, or between Jozsef Antallnand Janos Kiss. For the time being, less than a year afternliberation from the Soviet nightmare, the forces of traditionnare strong enough to win elections for top posts; the zealousnbrothers from among western bankers and speculators have,nhowever, mounted their financial offensive to put the localnliberal Democrats in power. Walesa is the target of scurrilousnattacks — and his name stands here as a collective phenome­nnon.nAt any rate, it is hard to imagine that the cause ofnEuropean unity would resist the innumerable conflicts thatnare quite natural for Europe, although baffling to Americans.nHow do you achieve union when, on the one hand,nGermany is strong and vital enough to reabsorb in a matternof a few months her eastern provinces, while France is sonweak as to want to grant independence to Corsica? How donyou achieve union when all the nationality conflicts arenablaze in Eastern Europe, and Russia herself becomesnfragmented, each fragment entertaining hostile intentions?nNo wonder that under the circumstances those who begin tondoubt the magic January 1, 1993, are proposing newnconfigurations, not as artificial as Jacobin Jacques Delors’nRobespierrian abstraction. If not pan-European unity, theynsay, why not regional groupings, as suggested by Italy’snforeign minister, De Michelis, who foresees German hegemonynand proposes as a counterweight a line reachingnfrom Barcelona to Trieste, and farther up to Slovenia andnHungary. Others have a Baltic-to-the-Mediterranean axis innmind, reaching as far as Morocco. Skeptics say that one looknat the map demonstrates that the northern capitals (andnindustrial areas) are nearer each other, such as London tonStockholm, than the southern capitals, say from Madrid tonAnkara, a line that passes through vast underdevelopednnnAPRIL 1991/19n