monarchy, but it had little appeal for those who were forcednto exchange one foreign ruler for another. For the Germansnstranded in a newly emerged and bloated Poland ornRomania in 1919, or for the Slovaks in a hybrid Czechoslovaknstate, the right to home rule meant nothing less than thencreation of their own separate nation-states.nYugoslavia, too, has owed its relative longevity more tonWestern liberal well-wishers that to the true consensus of itsndisparate peoples. For the last seventy years the Yugoslavnexperience has been an exercise in civil wars and constantnethnic strife among four of its major ethnic groups. Naturally,nin light of the present salvos being exchanged betweennthe Croats and the Serbs, the question that comes to mind isnwhy does the artificial blending of diflFerent peoples alwaysnlead to instability and ethnic chaos? The answer seems to benrather obvious: that the rights of peoples are incompatiblenwith universalism. Ethnic particularities cannot coexist in anstate that places abstract principles of human rights over thenreal principles of peoples’ rights.nIt would be impossible to chronicle with precision who isnright or wrong in the present ethnic turmoil that besetsnYugoslavia. A litany of grievances can be heard today amongnCroats, Serbs, Slovenes, and ethnic Albanians, of whichneach group is tirelessly trying to outdo the others with itsnown impressive victimology. As Yugoslavia demonstrates, inn•multiethnic-countries the notion of justice depends solely onn. the,constantlyf,shifting inter-ethnic balance of power, as wellnas the perception that each ethnic group may have of itsnneighbor. Both Serbs and Croats, the two largest ethnicngroups in Yugoslavia, are today utterly disappointed withntheir country; the former, on the grounds that Yugoslavia isnnot centralized enough to allow the consolidation of thenYugoslav state; the latter, on the grounds that Yugoslavia isnalready too centralized. The lesson to draw today from thenYugoslav experience is that in multiethnic states democracyncan only function when the national question has beennresolved.nMoreover, democracy can take root only within thenethnographic frontiers of various peoples, who will definenthat word in accordance with their genius loci and their ownnhistory. Just as:,it was foolish some time ago to talk aboutnYugoslav anticommunist dissidence, so it is foolish now tonanticipate the emergence of the all-out “Yugoslav” democracy.nWhat seems good for a Croatian democrat today maynbe seen as a direct threat by somebody who styles himself anSerbian democrat tomorrow. Even America, because of itsnerratic immigration policy and the declining birthratenamong whites, may soon find itself in a similar situation ofnhaving to redefine the concept of democracy. The legacy ofnthe Founding Fathers, in the years to come, may beninterpreted differentiy given the changing racial fabric ofnAmerica. Voting preferences are likely to hinge on skinncolor, which could lead to a Balkanization worse than thenone presentiy threatening Yugoslavia.nDemocracy in any multiethnic state, at least as the globalndemocrats would like to see it, is semantic nonsense; thenliberal principle of “one man, one vote” is inapplicable in ancountry of diverse ethnic groups. Consequentiy, the genuinendemocratization of Yugoslavia, or for that matter thenmultiethnic Soviet Union, would require the disintegrationnof the country and the establishment of new nation-states.nThe German Holy Empire was an example of a rathernstable confederal system that lasted for almost one thousandnyears, although at one point it was divided into threenhundred sovereign principalities.nParadoxical as it may seem, the ideology of globalndemocracy seems to parallel closely the failed communistnUtopia, with one exception: it is presently more successful innthe pursuit of its goals. What we are witnessing in the Westnis a liberal transposition of the Christian ideal of one worldninto a post-industrial society — a civitas dei in an age ofncable TV and Michael Jackson. Everything presages, however,nthat this brand of universalism can be as dangerous fornthe peoples of Eastern Europe as the now moribundncommunism. From the point of view of a globe-trottingnmerchant a centralized and unified Yugoslavia, or SovietnUnion, organized into giant free markets, would be the bestnsolution insofar as that would facilitate the free movement ofncapital, and thus better ease the strain of ethnic animosity.nIndeed, the prospects of having to deal with an additionalntwenty states on the Euro-Asian continent is a nightmare tona businessman more interested in the free flow of capitalnthan in the self-determination of ethnic groups. Thenpolitical liberal will surely endorse a global village thatnincludes different ethnic parades — so long as they do notnturn into military marches. Such a line of thinking, thatn”economics determines politics,” clearly points to thenMarxian morphology inherent in liberalism, confirming,nonce again, that communism is nothing else but its peskynbrainchild.nBut will the free bazaar in the global village dissolvenethnic passions? Although the masses in franchised EasternnEurope are today mimicking every move of the West,nnothing indicates that their honeymoon with the globalnvillage will last long. Ethnic intolerance will only worsennonce the peoples of Eastern Europe realize that the globalnvillage promises a lot but delivers litfle.nWhat makes a people? A people has a commonnheritage and a will to a common destiny. A peoplenexists despite superficial cleavages such as parties, interestngroups, and passing trends in ideologies. As GeorgesnDumezil, Mircea Eliade, and Carl G. Jung have demonstrated,na people shares a “mythe fondateur” — a communalnmyth that gives birth to original cultural endeavors. Thenculture of a people, recalls Alain de Benoist, is its identityncard and its mental respiration, and “it is the passport for anfuture that takes the shape of destiny.”nWhen a people becomes oblivious of its founding myth itnis doomed to perish. Worse, it may turn into an aggregate ofnhappy robots whose new dictum of universal human rightsncould be just another cloak for mindless hedonism. WesternnEurope is already experiencing this kind of ethnic andncultural oblivion. Paris in August resembles Gran or Marrakesh,nand wide stretches of Beriin, at noon, have the distinctnflavor of Anatolia. To many foreigners France is becomingnmore a synonym for its famous goat cheese and less a symbolnof Corneillian heroism, and if one decides to go to Florencenit is for a good bottie of Chianti rather than the mysticntranscendence experienced through Botticelli’s paintings.nYugoslavia, founded on similar principles of multiculturalism,nis a product of the Russian 19th-century pan-SlavismnnnJANUARY 1991/23n