that Boozer does concerning Tillich’s conception of God —nthat Tillich’s thought is often paradoxical if not contradictory,nthat Tillich sees God as “being-itself,” that Tillich in thenend affirms a monistic system of theology not entirely unlikenPlotinus’s and Hegel’s, etc. Even so, it is possible to borrow anman’s ideas, arguments, and evidence but paraphrase hisnactual language in a way that manages to stop short ofnplagiarism.nBut, as Samuel Johnson made clear, when “there is anconcurrence of more resemblances than can be imagined tonhave happened by chance; as where the same ideas arenconjoined without any natural series or necessary coherence,nor where not only the thought but the words arencopied,” plagiarism is surely present. This remains to datenthe best definition of plagiarism, and if we apply it to thisncase we must reach the inescapable conclusion that Mr.nKing committed plagiarism repeatedly in the course of hisndissertation.nIt is not merely that King’s argument, language, andnchoice of words run parallel with Boozer’s, but that wholenphrases, sentences, and even paragraphs are lifted verbatimnfrom Boozer’s text. Dr. Luker of Emory is correct innpointing out that King acknowledges, on page five, that an”fine” dissertafion was done on Tillich in 1952. And Kingndoes say on page seven that “the present inquiry will utilizenfrom these valuable secondary sources any results whichnbear directly on the problem, and will indicate such use bynappropriate footnotes.” King, however, does not do this. Innfact, among the dozens of sections he lifts from Boozer, henfootnotes Boozer only twice, on pages 123 and 161—andnthen he gets both footnotes wrong (the first quote is foundnon page 193 of Boozer’s text, not page 209; and the secondnon page 63, not page 62).nA wrong footnote here or an incorrect page number therenwould not warrant a discussion of plagiarism. But such slipsnare symptoms and signs of a much more serious offense.nThere is virtually no section of King’s discussion of Tillichnthat cannot be found in Boozer’s text, and often the parallelsnare not simply similarities but downright duplications. Innother words, contrary to Dr. Carson’s claim, what isninvolved here is by no means a mere matter of inadequatencitation, as the following examples will make clear. Thencumbersome footnotes King and Boozer make to Tillich’snoriginal texts have been excluded. In none of the followingnpassages does King footnote Boozer. On the subject of thenTrinity:nKing:nFor Tillich the trinity isnnot the illogical andnirrational assertion thatnthree are one and one isnthree. It is a qualitativenrather than a quantitativencharacterization of God.nIt is an attempt to expressnthe richness andncomplexity of the divinenlife. … It is the abysmalncharacter of God, then26/CHRONICLESnBoozer:nThe doctrine of thentrinity is not the illogicalnassertion that threenare one. Rather itnis a qualitativencharacterization of God. .nIt is an effort to expressnthe richness of the divinenlife. … It is the abysmalncharacter of God, thenelement of power, whichnis the basis of thenelement of power whichnis the basis of thenGodhead, “which makesnGod God.” (pp. 152-n153)nOn dualism:nKing:n[Dualism] is aware ofnthe two poles of reality,nbut dualism conceivesnthese in a staticncomplementarynrelationship. Tillichnmaintains that these polesnare related in dynamicninteraction, that one polennever exists out ofnrelation to the other pole.nHerein is one of Tillich’snbasic criticisms of Hegel.nHegel, according tonTillich, transcends thentension of existentialninvolvement in thenconcept of a synthesis,n(p. 25)nOn God’s manifestation in history:nKing:nIn a real sense, then,nGod manifests himselfnin history. Thisnmanifestation is neverncomplete because God asnabyss is inexhaustible. ButnGod as logos is manifestnin history and is in realninterdependence withnman. (p. 27)nOn correlation:nKing:nGorrelation meansncorrespondence of datanin the sense of ancorrespondence betweennreligious symbols and thatnwhich is symbolized bynthem. It is upon thenassumption of thisncorrespondence that allnutterances about God’snnature are made. Thisncorrespondence is actualnin the logos nature ofnnnGodhead, “which makesnGod God.” (p. 214)nBoozer:nDualism is aware ofnthe two poles of reality,nbut dualism conceivesnthese in a staticncomplementarynrelationship. Tillichnmaintains that they arenrelated in a dynamicninteraction, that one polennever exists out ofnrelation to the other pole.nOne feels here again thatnit is upon this issue thatnTillich criticizes Hegel.nFor, according to Tillich,nHegel transcends thentension of existentialninvolvement in thenconcept of a synthesis,n(p. 268)nBoozer:nIn a real sense, then,nGod enters history,nGod manifests himselfnin history. Thisnmanifestation is neverncomplete because God asnabyss is inexhaustible. ButnGod as logos is manifestnin history and is in realninterdependence withnman and man’s logos.n(p. 270)nBoozer:nGorrelation meansncorrespondence of datanin the sense of ancorrespondence betweennreligious symbols and thatnwhich is symbolized bynthem. It is upon thenassumption of thisncorrespondence that allnutterances about God’snnature are made. Thisncorrespondence is actualnin the /ogos-nature ofn