will resist it. We stand before an awakeningnvolcano, and we cannot guessnthe future course of the lava. Thisnmuch, however, is obvious. Somnolentnsince Yalta, Europe emerges from anstate of paralysis, flexes its muscles, andnthrows off its tutors. It is also in a statenof unstable equilibrium: material richesnin the West, cultural riches in the East.nWestern Europe is likely to follow itsnfour-decade routine, but the Eastnpromises to be recalcitrant, obstructive,nor at least hesitant about the availablenmodels. It rejects socialism as degeneratingninto regimentation; it also rejectsnliberalism because of its shallowness,nmaterialism, and confusion of values.nBesides, the public and private decencynEastern Europe wants does not dependnon the regime it chooses. ThenWest believes in an expanding civilnsociety, the East believes in the nation,nits faith, and untried talent. These arennot by necessity antagonistic beliefs,nand the osmosis between East andnWest will undoubtedly continue. Europenwill not be the same again.nThomas Molnar’s most recent book isnTwin Powers: Politics and the Sacred.nLetter From Parisnby Curtis CatenMore Verbal Panache ThannMilitary MusclenTwenty years have passed since Charlesnde Gaulle faded from the scene — fornold soldiers, as is well-known, never die.nNo one can therefore say just how henwould have responded to the presentncrisis in the Persian Gulf But if there isnone thing, in this highly mobile situation,nthat can be said with a certainndegree of accuracy, it is that the general’snpresent-day successor, FranqoisnMitterrand, initially assumed an essentiallynGaullist attitude, more marked bynverbal panache than military muscle.nOn August 2, when Saddam Hussein’snIraqi forces invaded Kuwait, as onnthe fateful August 13, 1961, when thenEast Germans began erecting the BerlinnWall, most French cabinet ministersnwere away from Paris on summer vacations.nPrime Minister Michel Rocardnwas off^ yachting in the Adriatic, whilenJean-Pierre Chevenement, the ministernof defense, was enjoying a tour ofnTuscany. Not until August 9, a fullnweek after the military occupation ofnKuwait, did President Mitterrand, morendetermined than ever to direct his country’snforeign and military policies, see fitnto convene a small cabinet meeting atnthe Elyse’e Palace to discuss whatnshould be done.nTwo practical measures were finallyndecided on, in a belated effort to offsetnan impression of French irresolution —nwhat the French aptly call a flottementn(floating wobbliness). The first was thendispatch to a number of North Africannand Middle Eastern capitals of 14nFrench politicians, including severalnfrom non-Socialist opposition parties,nwhose mission it was to explain thenParis government’s “point of view”n— a typical public relations gimmicknin this age of media “spectaculars”nintended to persuade the world and,nnot least of all, domestic opinion atnhome, that France had and was determinednto pursue a definite policy of itsnown and that it was not going to fallnobediently into step with PresidentnBush’s “hard line.” Underlying thisnneo-Gaullist attitude was the old familiarnfear, which has so bedevillednFranco-American and even British-nAmerican relations, that the Americansnwere about to “go off half-cocked” (thenwords once used by General Sir RohannDelacombe, the British commandantnin West Berfin, to describe Americannbehavior when General Lucius Claynhad U.S. Army tanks move up ton”Checkpoint Charlie” in mid-Octobernof 1961).nThe second practical measure, decidednupon after a good deal of handwringingnon the part of the notoriouslynpro-Arabic Jean-Pierre Chevenement,nwas an order for the aircraft carriernClemenceau to leave the naval base atnToulon and to head for the MiddlenEast. Few orders in modern naval historynhave been more nonchalantly carriednout. It took all of ten days tonprepare and to load the Clemenceaunwith its cargo of 40 rocket-armed helicopterngunships designed for antitanknwarfare, and ten more days were willfullynlost at Djibouti, on the Somalincoast, supposedly to permit pilots,ncrew, and 120 infantrymen to accustomnthemselves to the sultry heat of thenMiddle East. Most curious of all, innnnview of the French government’s claimnto be pursuing an independent policy,nwas the decision to send the Clemenceaunto the Gulf of Oman without anynof the carrier’s usual complement ofnfighter planes — which meant that ifnthe crisis had escalated into’a shootingnwar, its captain and crew would havenbeen in the humiliating position ofnhaving to rely on an American aerialn”umbrella.”nIt would have made more militarynand diplomatic sense, as FranqoisnFillon, the leading military expert ofnJacques Chirac’s RPR {Rassemblementnpour la Republique) pointed outnin eariy September, to have promptlyndispatched France’s other aircraft carrirner, Foch, to the Eastern Mediterraneannwith its complement of Super-Etendardnfighter-bombers (capable of hittingnIraq), and to have had severalnsquadrons of Mirage 2000 or F-1nfighter-bombers flown directly to AbounDhabi. For the predictable results ofnthis military procrastination was to exposenFrance to grumblings in the U.S.nCongress about French “tokenism”nand to encourage Saddam Hussein innISnTHE ROCKFORD INSTITUTEnIN YOUR WILL?nPerhaps a better question is:nDo you have a current will?nIf not, the laws of your particularnstate will determine what is to bendone with your estate upon yourndeath. What’s more, federal estatentaxes, unless there is proper planning,ncan claim up to 55% ofnyour property. If you would hkento discuss elements of your estatenplanning, please write or call:nMICHAEL WARDERnLEGACY PROGRAMnTHE ROCKFORD INSTITUTEn934 N. MAIN STREETnROCKFORD, IL 61103n(815) 964-5811nJANUARY 1991/45n