ed to do was gobble up a small feudalnenclave that could not possibly havenexisted without superpower protectionnand to raise the price of oil so he couldnpay off the $70-billion debt he piled upnduring his nine-year war with Iran.nOf course, his drastic and bloodthirstynmeans of satisfying that ambitionndid raise serious implications fornthe national security and economicnwell-being of the United States, andneven more so for those of WesternnEurope and Japan. There was amplenreason for Mr. Bush, in concert withnthe Europeans and the Japanese, tonexplain patiently but firmly to Mr.nHussein that while, like any othernThird Wodd cobra, he might sink hisnfangs into the flesh of any of hisnneighbors he chose, he’d better forgetnabout any plans to bite or blackmail thenWest. Hussein should have been opennto this argument, since, in the longnrun, he needs the markets of the Westnas much as we need the oil itself, andneventually, if market forces had prevailed,nwe would probably have gottennthe oil, albeit at a somewhat highernprice, without finding our economy innruins or even having to stand in line atnthe pump to buy it. That at leastnseemed to be the consensus of most oilnexperts as the crisis began quickly tonturn into a disaster.nBut the wrath directed against Mr.nHussein went far beyond any legitimatenconcern for the concrete securitynand economic interests of the West ornthe United States, and when Mr. Bushnaddressed the American people on thenmorning of August 8 to explain why henwas sending their sons and daughtersnto gape into the jaws of the new GreatnSatan, he made only passing referencento our own national interests and security.nAfter roundly denouncing Hussein’sn”outrageous and brutal act ofnaggression” against Kuwait, Mr. Bushnasserted what he called four “principles”nthat would guide our policy andnthat presumably justified his use ofnmilitary power. These were the withdrawalnof Iraqi forces from Kuwait, thenrestoration of “Kuwait’s legitimate government,”n”the security and stability ofnthe Persian Gulf,” and the protectionnof the lives of American citizens. Withnthe exception of the last, however,nnone of these “principles” — in fact,nthey are merely policy goals or objec­n10/CHRONICLESntives— arose from any expression ofnthe real interests and security of thenUnited States, nor was it likely that anynof them could be achieved through thenmeans the President had chosen.nIt would require far more militarynpower than the United States deployednto the sands of Araby to force Husseinnout of Kuwait, let alone deposit thenemir back into his palace, and Mr.nBush did not seem to contemplate anninvasion of Iraq. In the absence of suchna military blow to his solar plexus,nHussein had no reason to disgorge thenrich morsel he had just masticated. Mr.nBush, moreover, never explained hisnsolicitude for the emir and his governmentnor why Americans should benprepared to die for it.nNor did Mr. Bush’s goal of stabilizingnthe Persian Gulf reflect an accuratenreading of U.S. interests there. Then”Carter Doctrine,” which was dustednoff and hauled out to justify U.S.nintervention, says nothing about then”security and stability” of the Gulf, butnrather warns against efforts .by anyn”outside power” — namely, the Soviets—nto gain control of it. Grantednthat we have a strong interest in keepingnoutside powers from dominatingnaccess to our oil supply, it does notnfollow that we should use force tonmanage the internal squabbles of thenGulf powers themselves, unless thesenconflicts threaten to close off our access,nwhich Iraq’s invasion did not.n• Mr. Bush’s lx)urth principle — protectingnAmerican lives abroad — is certainlyna legitimate U.S. interest, andnone that legitimately may requirenforce. But Mr. Hussein did not threatennthe lives of the three thousand-oddnAmerican citizens living in Iraq andnKuwait. He simply forbade them tonleave the country, as he did othernforeigners resident there, and he forciblynrounded up a number of Yanks andnhosted them at five-star hotels in Baghdad.nOf course his intentions werenunclear and his methods uncalled for,nbut he acted only after Mr. Bush hadndeclared an embargo against Iraq andnfrozen its assets in the United States.nGiven the absence of any hostile act onnthe part of Iraq against this country, thenPresident’s policy could be construednonly as an act of aggression by thenUnited States against Iraq. In othernwords, the Iraqi detention of Americanncitizens, as frightening as it was, was annnresponse to a U.S. provocation, not annact of aggression. The United Statesnloves to slam sanctions on countries itndoesn’t approve of and to strut aboutnsetting an example to the world, but itnwould be well for our policymakers tonconsider that sanctions and embargoesnare serious matters in international affairsnand invite retaliation. Not allncountries are as supine about a cut-offnof their economic lifelines as SouthnAfrica has been.nIn sum, then, despite brief referencesnto U.S. dependence on foreignnoil — far less now than it was in theneady I970’s — Mr. Bush said absolutelynnothing to show that the interestsnand security of the United States werenso seriously jeopardized by Mr. Hussein’sninvasion that American militarynforces were needed abroad. What,nthen, are the real reasons for the President’snactions and for the nearly hystericalnchorus of assent to his response tonan act of conquest that was neithernunique nor unprecedented?nThe real reasons may be elicitednfrom Mr. Bush’s other remarks in hisnaddress and from what a number ofncommentators let drop in their ownnjeremiads against Iraq. “We’re beginningna new era,” the President intonednin his speech. “This new era can benfull of promise, an age of freedom, antime of peace for all peoples. But ifnhistory teaches us anything, it is that wenmust resist aggression, or it will destroynour freedoms.”nThe real reason why Americanntroops must risk their lives for the emirnof Kuwait and the safety of his tribe,nthe reason for the strong support fornthe President’s action among publicistsnwho have made a career out of denouncingnthe United States when itnacts unilaterally in its own interests andnof concocting extenuations of aggressionnwhen it was committed by thenSoviets, the Vietnamese, the Sandinistas,nand the Gubans, and the reasonnfor the quick endorsement and cooperationnfrom the Soviets and the UnitednNations is that they all have seen thenfuture and it works. That future is to benone in which specific nations and theirninterests are to be subordinated to then”global economy,” the “new internationalnorder,” the needs of the “globalnvillage,” and other cosmopolitan shadowsnthat flit through the speeches andnbooks produced by the emerging trans-n