Tragedy, Comedy, and Modern Timesne&B»n<^’:•–‘?*T^nThis essay grew out of a request that I conduct a reprisenof “The Bull’s Eye of Disaster,” my wrap-up conclusionsnon the Vietnam War that appeared in the August 1989nChronicles, in light of what’s happened in the post-ColdnWar world since that essay appeared. I was thus thrust ontonthe stage of modern times, to be whipped by the slipstream,nor dust-cloud, of a fast moving perestwika, and probablynbe doomed to follow the example of the average op-ednwriter of the past year — receiving praise for his rightsoundingnconclusions the day they came out, and beingnbooed for sounding silly in light of the status of affairs anweek later.nBut this is a magazine, and I have more room to marshalnperHnent explanations, to be cagey, and to sHck close tonwhat I believe to be solid ground. And the most solidncontinuum I can think of that connects what proved to benthe mistakes of the Vietnam period and lurks as a constantndanger of the post-Cold War period, is the bad habit ofnseeking the comfort of relying on the legitimacies andntruisms of the past. Today to be swept up in rallying calls ton”go to the defense of the brave freedom fighters of LowernSlobovia” (when the connection between such action andnAmerica’s vital interests is hazy), is to answer the same sirennsong L.B. Johnson heard from the “Wise Men” he insistednon consulting at the decision point of Vietnam commitment.nAt that juncture, LBJ marshaled the idols of hisnyouth, architects of American Cold War strategy in the laten40’s, and put it to them: “Should I go in or not?”nSpokesman Dean Acheson said that he had no choicenexcept to press on, and with that his colleagues (John J.nJames Bond Stockdale was awarded the CongressionalnMedal of Honor in 1976. With his wife, Sybil, he is thenauthor of In Love and War. Admiral Stockdale is a seniornresearch fellow at the Hoover Institution at StanfordnUniversity. This article is adapted from a speech he gavenunder the auspices of The Rockford Institute in June.n22/CHRONICLESnby James Bond Stockdalennni^aa’nMcCloy, Robert Lovett, and others) “came thundering innlike the charge of the Scot’s Greys at Waterloo.” It was Julyn8, 1965, when the “Wise Men” said “go.” Three weeksnlater, on July 28, LBJ doubled the draft call and addednanother fifty thousand troop increment. The latter markednthe beginning of a regrettable trip down a long road.nAmerica’s trip down that road turned out to be a casenstudy in how Cold War verities could wipe you out whennapplied to difficulties that were not generic to that 1947nmodel of a world in which two superpower ideologies werenlocked in eternal combat for world domination at centernstage and all else was window dressing.nWhen the “Wise Men” spoke in July 1965, it had alreadynbeen a long time since the world was that simple. Thoughnthe “best and the brightest” of the Vietnam buildup yearsnleft no evidence that they saw anything out there but one bignmonolithic communist menace, even I, insignificant fighternpilot Jim Stockdale, knew better than that in those days. Inn1958, seven years before, thirty-two years ago last summer, anterritorial squabble in the Far East, quickly and like anpowerful magnet, drew instantaneous Soviet and Americanninterest. China had commenced shelling two little offshorenislands under de facto control of their enemy and America’snally, Taiwan. Under the Formosa (Taiwan) Resolution ofn1955, America (the Seventh Fleet) was pledged to defendnTaiwan against attack from the mainland — and the UnitednStates had reserved the right to repel Chinese boardersnshould they be landed on those two little offshore islands,nQuemoy and Matsu. The Soviets and China had a mutualndefense pact that would draw the Soviet Union into anynfighting between China and the United States. I wasnoperations officer of the lead Fighter Squadron on scenenwith the Seventh Fleet, aboard the aircraft carrier Midwaynthat summer, and we flew daily over the Taiwan Straitsnstaring down MIG pilots on similar standoff missions overnthose two little islands below us. Worid War III seemednimminent, as Soviet leader Khruschev ridiculed the powern