surgency.nThe formula worked as long as thenTeflon President was there, and it hasnworked for his successor since GoodnOld Dutch was strapped to his ponynand hauled back to his ranch. But it maynnot work much longer if recession andnthe economic woes Mr. Phillips discussesnpop out of the political woodwork asnthey seem to be doing.nWhat is surprising in Mr. Phillips’snanalysis is not his conclusionnthat Reaganism actually endangerednmiddle-class aspirations but his neglectnof the continuing power of the culturalnand social frustrations he has so admirablynpenetrated elsewhere. In his 1982nbook, Post-Conservative America, henpredicted that what historian FritznStern called “the politics of culturalndespair” — racial, national, and socialnhostilities and dislocations — would coalescenwith economic frustrations tonyield a chauvinist, authoritarian, andnperhaps overtly racialist political movementnon the order of what occurred innWeimar Germany. In his present book,nthere is virtually no reference to thatnthesis despite its continuing relevance.nInstead, he suggests that a newn”populist” movement led by liberalnDemocrats in the image of MichaelnDukakis, Richard Gephardt, or JessenJackson could successfully challengenthe Reaganite Republican establishmentnthrough a “New Nationalist”nprogram that recalls the similar slogansnadopted by Theodore Roosevelt andnHerbert Croly in the early 20th century.nSuch a program, as Mr. Phillipsnenvisions it, would evidently be littlenmore than a revival of the redistributionistnpolitics and policies of the Progressivist-NewnDeal-Great Societyneras. What he does not seem to recognizenis that the kind of electoral coalitionnnecessary for this kind of movementnis today not possible.nMr. Phillips’s model presupposesnthat a crippled middle class could benbrought into the same political tentnwith an underclass that, he argues, alsonsuffered from the policies of the Reaganitencorporate establishment. The factnis that in the 1990’s the dominantnnoneconomic issue that is emerging isnthat of race and group identity —nmanifested in the rise of black demagoguesnsuch as Jackson, Louis Farrakhan,nMarion Barry, Al Sharpton,n34/CHRONICLESnand a host of lesser fry, as well as innwhite counterparts like David Dukenand those who will soon be emulatingnhim. The Reaganite formula did notnreally resolve the fissures causing whatnMr. Phillips earlier called the “Balkanizationnof America” but only covered itnup with a generous serving of politicalnapplesauce, and the emergence ofnovert racialism is one species of thendecomposition and fragmentation thatnhas been occurring in the UnitednStates ever since the unifying bourgeoisnfabric was shredded. But sincenpurely racialist movements can appealnonly to members of a given ethnicngroup, which by itself is a minority, nonsuch movement, black or white, canntake power in the United States merelynby relying on racial rhetoric and ideology.nIf, however, such a movement cannsynthesize its appeal to group identityn(racial or national) through an imagerynof “us against them” with a demandnfor the redress of perceived economicngrievances (the burden of poverty or ofntaxation or of the loss of a materialnlifestyle), then it might take wing andnfly. Such a synthesis, the combinationnof nationalism and socialism that hasnbeen the dominant theme of 20thcenturyndemocratic politics, not only innWeimar but also in the United States,nwould broaden the racial and nationalnappeal beyond mere biology to nonracialnsocial and political aspirations.nMr. Phillips is surely aware of thenopportunities offered by such a nationalist-socialistnprogram and of the powernof such issues as immigration, civilnrights laws and litigation, and the emergencenof a Sorelian myth of racialnconsciousness among Americannblacks, though he does not addressnthese opportunities in this book. Hendoes, however, quote liberal economistnRobert Kuttner on the failure of MichaelnDukakis to exploit the nationalsocialistnsynthesis effectively in 1988.nDukakis, in Kuttner’s view, “had violatednone of his party’s basic historicalnverities: that ‘Democrats do best whennnnthey develop broad, embracing, expansivenvisions combining national purposenwith economic advancement, andnrally masses of non-rich voters.'”nThat is simply a more elegant way ofnstating a secret understood by successfulnpoliticians from Adolf Hitier tonFranklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnsonnand also by historian John Lukacs,nwho writes that nationalism and socialismnand their relationship are “thenprincipal political phenomena of thisncentury.” The political masses are motivatednlargely by slogans, programs,nand policies that revolve around thensentiments of “us against them” andn”something for nothing.” As long asnthe Democrats understood this secret,nthey flourished. When they forgot itnand went in for Vietcong flags, parolingnrapists, homosexual rights, nationalnguilt trips, AGLU membership cards,nand especially for the interests of nonwhitesnat the expense of their traditionalnwhite working-class constituency,nthey flopped. Mr. Reagan successfullynexploited the Democrats’ neglect ofnthe nationalist sibling of the nationalsocialistnSiamese twin while seeming tonoffer what Mr. Phillips (and the Democrats)nargue is an illusory economicnsecurity that defused economic issuesnin politics. Those who have followednhim are far less aware of the secretnpower of group identity and far lessnskilled in exploiting it, nor will emergingneconomic dislocations allow themnto rely exclusively on national-culturalracialnthemes to gain and keep power.nIf there is to be a successful “newnnationalism” in the next decade, itsnleaders will have to understand thensecret of the 20th century and how tonuse it, whether the “nation” is that ofnJesse Jackson or George Wallace. ThenPolitics of Rich and Poor is a goodnplace for them to begin to understandnthe economic aspects of that secret,nthough it is unfortunate that Mr. Phillips,nwhose chillingly cold-bloodednanalyses of politics and power havenproven so fruitful in the past, hasnneglected any clear discussion of thensecret in his present book. But he isnundoubtedly right that one thing isnclear: the emerging economic dislocationsnthat the Reagan era bequeathednto the United States will bring an earlyndeath to the apparent social and politicalnequilibrium that characterized then1980’s. n