all three are aware that the forevernturbulent regional powers, Russia andnGermany, must be locked into a policynof mutual benefit, if the national projectsnof the other East European countriesnare to succeed — incidentally, thenfirst such projects since about 1500,nwhen the Turkish night descended onnthe East European Renaissance, andnsuccessive reigns of Habsburgs andnMuscovites snuffed out all velleities ofnindependence. But finally now, fromnZagreb to Kiev, from Riga to Sofia,nthere is a tremendous will on the partnof all nations to shape their own destinies.nCan the West understand it, with itsnown independent political evolutionnand its protected culture? Hardly.nIt may be that the seeds of newnEast/West conflicts are just now beingnplanted, and that the planned “Europeannunity” will be the first casualty.nSome things ought to be evident: therenwas full independence in the area onlynbetween 1920 and 1940, 20 years outnof five centuries, and even that wasnthreatened by the need for Prague,nWarsaw, Bucharest, Vilnius, and Belgradento live in Germany’s shadownagainst Russia, or as Soviet client-statesnvis-a-vis Germany. The Western powers,nthen as now, were interested onlynin investments, not in the politicalnconsolidation of places where theyninvested. Hence the first importancenand the urgency today is for a Russo-nGerman cooperation, a Mitlebensraum.n(I said, today; in twenty or thirtynyears Berlin and Moscow may be atnwar again.)nWhere would this settlement leavenNATO, the American presence in Europe,nand Europe’s 1992 politicalnunion? Perhaps in a kind of diplomaticnno-man’s-land. Institutions, alliances,nand military bases are likely to survivenfor a while, but since they will be innnobody’s particular interest, they maynjust wither away, and the Europeannpolitical union with them. The tacitnpurpose of that union has been to tienGermany indissolubly to West Europe,nto spare France the embarrassment ofndeclining from a second-rate to a thirdratenpower, and to save England from annew threat from the continent. Butnwith the falling dominoes Germanynwill henceforth not volunteer to havenchains put on her eighty million peoplenby a weak, strike-ridden, and inefficientn50/CHRONICLESnFrance where the battle between LouisnXVI and Robespierre is still raging.nNor will Germany remain “European”nfor the sake of England’s sense ofnsecurity. Of course, what bureaucratsnin Brussels and Strasbourg have so farnconcocted, a maze of laws impossiblento implement, is likely to remain “onnthe books.” But January 1, 1993, willncome and go, the union will be postponed,nand then forgotten — exceptnthat Germany and Japan will use thendocuments as justification for submergingnEurope under their merchandise.nAre all these revolutionary changes?nMitterrand, pathetically attempting tonkeep Germany divided, or at least keepna united Germany chained to “Europe,”nhad the right words: “We arenretreating to the 19th century!” Thatnis, into suspicious nations, powerblocksninside Europe, hegemonies. With dangernfrom the East receding, then vanishing,npolitics will again take the placenof ideology. It is a secret only tonidealistic Westerners that before 1940nthe East European countries were exploitedneconomically by England,nFrance, Germany, and Belgium, forntheir oil, iron, bauxite, cattle, agriculturalnproducts, and electricity. Lowernwages than those in the West nownagain attract investors hoping to cutncosts, then re-export. A neocolonialnsituation may arise that local governmentsnand revived labor unions willnhardly cherish.nAnother issue was voiced by Italy’snforeign minister, Gianni de Michelis.nIn a recent interview he refused to hidenfears that a united Europe would havenits gravitational center somewherenbetween Paris and Berlin, a northernnaxis. His own project is to call into existencena Barcelona-Marseilles-Trieste-nLjubljana-Budapest line, the southernnaxis, as a counterweight. An Italian,nAustrian, Yugoslavian, and Hungariannblock is already getting underway.nRecent visits and conversations shednfurther light on the future of East andnGentral Europe, a future that is fastnbecoming the present. One watchesnwith amazement the ease with whichnpeople settle into new conditions, howntheir moral and intellectual orientationnhas not changed in four decades ofnmisery. Suddenly, problems declarednby Western experts to be insolublenseem to dissipate. For many years it wasnnnheld, for example, that young peoplenhad surrendered to nihilism, were interestednonly in videos and drugs. It hasnalso been said that German studentsnwant consumer goods, not reunification,netc., etc. The truth is vastlyndifferent. Gonversations have convincednme that a large elite —nprofessors, students, journalists, scholars,nparty leaders — exists, ready to takenmatters in hand. Students, seventeennand eighteen years old, were the first tondrive trucks with food and clothing tonTransylvania upon the news thatnGeausescu had fallen, although thenSecuritate shot down a good number;nretired people, poor among the poor,nbrought forth their provisions ofncanned food to offer it to hungryncompatriots. With all this, there is anveritable renaissance of studies andnscholarship. The rector of a .college innBudapest showed me dissertations asnrichly documented as the best in Westernnuniversities.nIt is, of course, not possible to conveynall the signs of this blooming of annew life. It is nothing short of a miraclenthat, squeezed for 50 years betweennoriental despotism and Western decomposition.nEastern Europe has survivedninternally intact. I have seenndecolonization in Africa and Asia accompaniednneither by joy nor by annoutburst of nation- and culturebuildingnenergy. What I find inn”decolonized” Eastern Europe is veryndifferent. It is almost enough to restorenone’s faith in Western man and Ghristianncivilization.nFinally, the German queshon. Angreat power always poses problems, butnmainly for those who believe that relationsnbetween nations ought to be lovenaffairs. It is hard to love even a smallncountry from the point of view ofnanother, and it is impossible to love angreat power. Rome, Spain, England —nnone were loved when they were atntheir zenith, nor is the U.S. today.nGermany as a past and future greatnpower is in a special class because it is ancontinental power, wedged amongnjealous states over which it exercisesnpolitical and cultural hegemony. (It isnbetter for a great power to be geographicallyndistant from its clients.) YetnGermany is European through andnthrough; its blood and sinews are continental,nfrom Arminius to Barbarossa,nfrom Goethe to Heidegger. In spite ofn