the first casualty, followed by Vietnamnand the rest. A new theory of “limitednwar” was contrived, but unlike thenolder concept where the differencenbetween limited and global war wasngeographical, the new theory placednlimits on weapons and tactics withinnthe theater of war. Victory was abandonednas being an “unlimited” objectnin favor of “coercive diplomacy” aimednat a negotiated, compromise settlement.nHowever, this quickly slid intonthe cliche of seeking “political” rathernthan “military” solutions (translation:naccepting most if not all of the enemy’snterms rather than impose our own).nEmphasis was also shifted^ to socialnreform as the way to head off Communismn(thus implicitly accepting the leftistnexplanation for the cause of conflict),na program much more to liberalntastes than fighting. When this approachnbrought disaster, the next phasenwas to avoid conflicts altogether. Sincendefeat was inevitable, the methodsnneeded to win being unacceptable onnmoral grounds, it was best to take thenlowest-cost route to defeat.nThe Reagan administration attemptednto regain the initiative bynsupporting anticommunist wars of liberation.nBut even when it adoptedndemocracy and social reform as itsncentral themes, the effort was condemned.nThe flaps over “deathnsquads,” “assassination manuals,” andnthe covert mining of Nicaraguan harborsnused by ships delivering Sovietnweapons revealed the enormous gapnbetween the liberal view of the worldnand reality. Even attempts to rebuild an”special operations” capability for usenagainst terrorists and drug dealers madenlittle progress. Yet the success of thenmujahideen in Afghanistan and thenpromise shown by anticommunist resistancenmovements in Nicaragua andnAngola should put the lie to the notionnthat Soviet and leftist forces are invinciblenin this kind of warfare.nThe basic principles of modern warnare not secret. The US has thenresources to meet and beat the Sovietsnin revolutionary warfare, whether supportingninsurgents or regimes. Theninhibiting factor is an inability to considernwar and Realpolitik to be thennormal practice of statecraft. It is clearnfrom the writings of Shultz and Suvorovnthat the Soviets have no such inhibitions.n<^nFrom a Jacobean Playnby Tom MurraynYou who are mad but nor’-nor’-westnLook kindlier on those possessednand predestined to facenTheir lunatic compass-point;nWhose times are out of joint.nWho miss the beat or lose the place,nSee plans revealed in prismsnTo turn to corn the ocean’s waves,nKnock on a thousand doors announcing ismsnOr man’s return to dust.nTip entire nations into bloody gravesnOr waste their sweat in lust.nForgive them when the daemons ceasenTheir hold and finally are fled.nLook down with mercy on their deadnRejuvenated faces.nFind there insteadnWonder and innocence and peace.nnnJULY 1989/25n