certain length of time, custom would change the vile,nimperfect brute into a New Man.nTo bring into existence all these new structures, a newnorder of lay monks was to be founded, whose task would bento create the New Man—by knout, iron, and blood, ifnnecessary. Only demiurges with steel nerves could belong tonthis order, obliged as they were to carry out the mostnthankless tasks today so that, tomorrow, humanity might bengrateful.nAlthough discourse on the Grand Idea has been given upnin all the countries where it became the religion of the state,nit is still not quite dead in the West. This is because in thenWest it still deals with some future time and has not yet beennsubjected to the test of reality. The American, British, andnCanadian intellectuals who dabble in it do so with thennostalgia proper to the end of an empire, for it has becomenthe last wild dream of those who have seen their illusionsntorn too brutally from them.nFrom a purely logical point of view, socialist reasoningnappears flawless. The ideas fit into a mental construct whichnwe are forced to admire, although from an existential pointnof view the discourse of these Western Marxists leaves usnessentially unsatisfied. It quickly becomes clear that whilenthe discourse itself may be irreproachable, its basic premisesnare not. Its appeal consists precisely of dazzling its opponentsnby rigorous reasoning, which is nonetheless based onndubious maxims.nIn Eastern European totalitarian countries, ideologicalndiscourse takes place within a very closed circuit, distinguishednby three poles of attraction: the governing body, thengreat witch doctors of Marxist philosophy, and the ideologicalnpress. It is the rulers who start the ball rolling, usuallynonly when pushed by the force of events. After this thenprofessors of Marxism are required to adapt the ongoingnpraxis to the canons of the Grand Idea, while the journalistsnare given the job of making the whole thing comprehensiblento the general public — as if the people had any real interestnin the ideological orthodoxy of their rulers. Naturally, it isncommon knowledge in Eastern Europe that no one is reallyninterested in ideological discourse, but we must not forgetnthat totalitarian societies are fictional worlds where everythingnmust be done as if—as if the people could really vote,nas if power really devolved from them, and as if the judiciarynwere really able to render judgments independently — innshort, maintaining the illusion of real life as known tonmemory, instinct, and common sense.nThe almost total schism between the discourse of thenrulers and the ruled may be admirably illustrated by anphenomenon both linguistic and sociopolitical. In thenpopular speech of Eastern Europe, the pronoun They servesnto designate the leaders of the Communist Party. When ancitizen of Romania, for example, says “They do what theynwant,” there is no doubt in the mind of any other Romaniannas to whom he means by They.nCuriously enough, this ideological white noise may givenWestern observers the impression of an intense exchange ofnideas between the citizens and their government. To sustainnthe illusion of a living ideological discourse, the governmentnis continually organizing meetings, discussions, and “spontaneous”ndemonstrations. The whole thing amounts to ansort of monumental avant-garde theater, where the publicnplays the role of a troupe of mimes while the producers takenthe part of spectators — confirming, in a way, Carl Sagan’snwords that “life exists for the cosmos to experience itself”nEver since the October Revolution, the proponents of thentotalitarian argument have had their eyes fixed firmly uponnthe US — to catch up with America and leave it behind isntheir dearest dream. They seem to be hoping that America’sndevelopment will simply stop so that their own may drawneven with it. Was it not Khrushchev who announced to thenBritish ambassador in 1962 that Britain would soon bencommunist? And was not the Soviet Union supposed tonattain communist utopia sometime during the I970’s, alsonaccording to Khrushchev? During the first oil crisis in 1973,nwas it not Pravda that announced the onset of the end ofncapitalism?nAlthough discourse on the Grand Idea has been givennup in all the countries where it became the religion ofnthe state, it is still not quite dead in the W^st.nTo understand the power of the Marxist dream, we mightntry to imagine it in terms of Puvis de Chavannes’ bucolicnfrescoes. Attracted to its rosy glow, we find names asncelebrated as Romain Rolland or Irene and Frederic Joliot-nCurie, along with myriads of others. To understand whatnwas to become of the discourse of the Grand Idea duringnthe revolution, we must know that in the minds of itsnprotagonists, the revolution corresponded to the creation ofnthe world in the Old Testament: it was to be the birth of annew world out of chaos and the separation of good and evilnout of a molten volcanic mass. The arguments whichnaccompanied this upheaval were all-encompassing —ngrandiose, heroic, pathetic, generous to some and mercilessnto others, filled with folly and audacity. For those whoncreated it, the revolution was a time charged with annextraordinary historical intensity, all the more for beingnhistory’s last event.nWith the seizure of power and under the pressuresnof reality, the discourse was to change considerably. Itsnnew leaders, previously masters only of the polemic,nfound themselves confronted with the difficulties inherentnin any state apparatus, especially the complex problems ofneconomics. They realized at once how impossible it wouldnbe to make good on all the promises offered with suchnassurance earlier. From that moment on, they were to feelnthemselves threatened, afraid of the rage of the people. Tonguard against this danger, either real or imagined, thendiscourse of the Grand Idea was enriched with a wholenpanoply of “enemies of the people” — “speculators,” “traffickers,”n”saboteurs,” “bearers of false rumors” (which,nmost of the time, were perfectly true), and other subversivenelements. Thus the infernal cycle began: the limitation andnrepression of liberty that was to swell the ranks of thenmalcontents, in Yugoslavia, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, ofnthose disillusioned with the revolution which the authoritiesnfelt obliged to save by taking still more coercive measuresnagainst the “enemies of the people,” and so on, indefinitelyn. . .nnnDECEMBER 19881 ISn