241 CHRONICLESnOPINIONSnTradition and Justice by E. Christian KopffnWe have forgotten the origin of morality in factnand circumstance.n—Wendell BerrynWhose Justice? WhichnRationaUty? by AlasdairnMaclntyre, Notre Dame:nUniversity of Notre Dame Press.nAlasdair Maclntyre is our most relentlessntracker of the crisis of thenliberal regime. In After Virtue, henrecounted the history of the triumph ofn”emotivism” in ethics. In Whose Justice?nWhich Rationality? he has begunnthe process of pointing the way out ofnthe seemingly pathless forest of ethicalnsubjectivism. He is not afraid to assertnthat the cure for our present crisis liesnin reading the great texts of philosophy.nThat liberalism is in crisis has beennclear for some time. It has been compellednto deny almost all of its fundamentalnethical and political positions.nE. Christian Kopff is professor ofnclassics at the University of Colorado,nBoulder.nHaving asserted the morality of OnenMan, One Vote, it found it possible tonremain in power only by gerrymanderingnthe House of Representatives, sonthat that body can no longer be affectednby the changing will of the majority.nIt championed the rights of the helpless,nbut now supports a system thatncondemns millions of guiltless childrennto death without the right of duenprocess. It proclaimed the Century ofnthe Common Man, but maintains itsnrule through an autocracy of judgesnand bureaucrats who despise the averagenAmerican and his way of life.nThere is, however, a more deepseatedncrisis, one that threatens thenminds and hearts of the true believers.nSince the Enlightenment, liberalismnhas maintained a consistent antipathynto attitudes rooted in tradition andnsupported by prejudice, especially religiousntradition and prejudice. The resultnhas been stated by James Fishkin.nThe viability of liberalism as annnpolitical theory is closely tied tonthe possibility of a secular moralnculture founded on somethingnother than the controversialnreligious and metaphysicalnassumptions of any particularngroup. If, in order to maintainnneutrality among religious andnmetaphysical assumptions, anliberal state must be constrainednfrom any rational basis for valuesnat all, then its foundationalnassumptions are selfdelegitimating,nthat is, theynundermine their own moralnlegitimacy by entailing thenarbitrariness, the sheernsubjectivity, of all moral claims,nincluding any claims that cannbe made on behalf of thenliberal state itselfnIn Beyond Subjective Morality Fishkinnexamined the plight of the averageneducated person trying to establish anrational system of practical ethics basednon individualism and a rejection ofntradition. Those who did not repudiatenliberalism ended up on one level ornanother of subjectivism (what Maclntyrenwould call emotivism). Ethicsnbecame a matter of personal taste. FornSam, one of Fishkin’s subjects, his tastenfor honesty “has no more basis than hisntaste for T-bone steaks”: “I grew upnand developed a taste for honesty —nthat’s as far as I can take it,” Samnmused. “Even if I believed in, say,ncommunism, as a political system, thenway I am now, I wouldn’t believe thatnthat would give me a right to dictate tonsome capitalist that communism wasnthe right system for him.” Fishkinnattempts to show that it is logicallynpossible to escape the lowest depths ofnsubjectivism. He never shows that thenvarious stages of subjectivism are notnlogical conclusions of liberalism’snpremises:nIndependent of particularn