34 / CHRONICLESnhis apparent career. After Burgess’ andnMaclean’s flight to the Soviet Union,nBlunt was questioned by MI 5 about hisnloyalties 11 times in the next 13 years.nAgain, there was no hard evidence, andnBlunt kept his contacts and friendshipsnin British intelligence. Finally MichaelnStraight, an American who studied atnCambridge in the 1930’s, made authoritativenstatements about Blunt tonthe FBI, in June of 1963. MIS wasnable to confront Blunt in April ofn1964. The contractual nature of thenconspiracy of silence became evidentnwhen Blunt negotiated a deal unbelievablynfavorable to his own interests. Henwould cooperate in the investigationsnand provide information in return fornimmunity from prosecution and anpledge of public silence about his past.nThe government felt they could notnprosecute Blunt and that such a dealnwas the best way they could get informationnabout Soviet intelligence.nIt would be another 15 years fromnthe time of Blunt’s confession untilnMargaret Thatcher, forced by threat ofnindependent revelations, delivered tonthe public the astounding fact that thenknighted Keeper of the Queen’s Picturesnwas a confessed Soviet spy. Thencentral message of Penrose and Freemannreflects their professional interests:nthe secrecy of British intelligencenis much too extreme; if there werenmore public information surroundingnintelligence, mistakes and abusesnwould occur with less frequency.nPeter Wright, understandably, has andifferent message in Spy Catcher.nWright was formerly assistant directornof MI 5. The son of a leading scientistnat the Marconi Company, he had tonwait a few years to attend Oxfordnbecause of his father’s depressioninducednbout with alcoholism and unemployment.nAfter attending Oxfordnfor a year, at the outbreak of WorldnWar II, he signed on with the Navy,nwhere he was a scientist in electronicsnresearch. After the war, on meritn(though he never earned a universityndegree) he became Principal ScientificnOfficer at the Services Electronics ResearchnLaboratory. In 1949 Wrightnbecame “external science adviser” tonMI 5 while still technically employed atnthe SLRL. In 1955 he became thenprincipal scientist for MI 5.nThis biographical information is importantnsince Wright’s motives andnmental stability have been attackednfollowing the summer of 1984 whennhe first made public allegations aboutnSoviet penetration of MIS. The firstnwave of reviews of his book, now onnbest-seller lists for almost a year, oftennrepeat these ad hominem attacks.n(Journalists Penrose and Simon characterizednWright as an “anachronism”nand “zealot” who believed that only henknew the truth.) Unfortunately,nWright does little to dissuade his amateurnpsychoanalyst detractors. For instance,nhe notes that those with “privilegednbackground and educationndenied to me” turned to Communismn”while my family suffered at the capriciousnhand of capitalism,” and yet “Inbecame the hunter and they thenhunted.”nIn addition to the resentments ofnsocial class, there are the scars of pastnbureaucratic wars as possible explanationsnof “Wright’s revenge.” ButnWright does not seem so bitter as tonallow his basic reasoning to be warped.nHe describes the various turf wars andnhis own personal disappointments innsome detail. He admits personal unhappinessnwhen another man was chosennchief scientist for an MIS and MI6njoint science staff. He describes morenthan a few drinking episodes with hisncolleagues, including James Angleton,ndirector of counterintelligence for thenCIA. And throughout the book acrimoniousnreference is made to an”gentleman’s agreement” to considernWright’s 14 years of government servicenprior to MIS a part of his pension.nPerhaps it is this broken promise thatnwas a factor in Wright’s decision tonbreak his oath of secrecy.nWhile Wright reveals his personalnstruggles, he also lays out the case,nquite persuasively, that there must havenbeen high-level presentation of MISnand that much circumstantial evidencenpointed to Roger Hollis, the director ofnMIS from 1956 until late in 1965. Fornthree years Wright chaired a high-levelnsix-person counterintelligence investigationncommittee (code-named FLU­nENCY), organized in the wake of thenBlunt confession, which unanimouslynsupported this astounding conclusion.nThis study was then totally taken overnby an officially constituted penetrationsninvestigations unit which reached thensame conclusion as Wright’s committee.nIn fairness, it should be pointednnnout that Wright always states this conclusionnabout Hollis as tentative andnbest fitting the evidence.nWhat was the evidence? First therenwas analysis of massive amounts ofnradio communications that led to thenconclusion that there were at least fivenspies at high levels in Great Britain.nBurgess, Maclean, Philby, and Bluntnwere four, and the key question hasnbeen, who is the fifth man? (Thisnanalysis was done over many years andninvolved a large number of people. Itnwas not Wright’s personal conclusion.)nNext, there was the testimony ofnseveral different East Bloc defectorsnfrom different periods and from widelyndifferent backgrounds. This testimonynmentioned high-level penetration ofncounterintelligence, but actual namesnwere not known, although certainnpersonal clues were repeated. Overntime the scraps of descriptions parallelednthe career path of Hollis. Somenhave accused Wright of relying toonheavily on one controversial defector,nAnatoli Golitsin. However, Wrightnconsulted a variety of defectors andndiscarded that part of Golitsin’s testimonynfor which there was no corroborativenevidence. He seems quite capablenof distinguishing what Golitsinnknows from what Golitsin guesses.nNext, there were certain operationalnresponses of Soviet spies to severalndifferent surveillance techniques.nThese ranged from the sudden locationnof bugging devices to actual Sovietnreactions in the field to changes in MISnoperations known only at the highestnlevels. Some of these events were directlyntraceable to Hollis’ movements.nFinally, there were a whole series ofnstories in the institutional memory ofnMIS.nThe FLUENCY report sat with thentop of MIS for many years. WhilenWright and his colleagues pursuednspies from within, they became unwelcomento many who knew little of theirnfindings. Worse, Wright could not revealnhis findings, and most members ofnBritish intelligence did not know thentruth about Blunt until 15 years afternhe was unmasked. In the meantime,nother members of the Cambridge networknwere being removed from positionsnof trust. For example, AlistairnWatson was an Apostle at Cambridgenwho, according to Blunt (as quoted bynWright), taught Blunt Marxist theory.n