said that “there are no cryptographic orncommunications data of any importancento which he did not have access.nIt means that if he gave them everythingnhe could have given them, therenis nothing of importance about thenU.S. Navy they do not know.” AsnWalker himself commented, “If I hadnaccess to it, color it gone.”nPart of the problem in evaluatingnthe extent of the losses is the arcanennature of cryptography. Vitaly Yurehenko,na high level KGB defectorn(who later redefected), summed up thenWalkers’ contribution: “If there hadnbeen a war, we would have won it.”nSecretary of Defense Caspar Weinbergernconcurred. In a speech given innApril of 1987 Weinberger declarednthat the KGB considered this spy ringnto be the “most important” operationnin its history and indicated that morenthan one million messages may havenbeen intercepted.nIn addition to being able to read allntop secret Navy communications, it isnpossible that with access to all of ournNavy cryptography devices and overn1,200 daily key lists, the Soviets werenable to break the communications fornthe other armed services and branchesnof government. The structure andnlogic of all these systems are closelynrelated. Of course, it is always possiblenthat some Army, Air Force, FBI, ornCIA employee had already provided it.nBarron illustrates the value of theninformation by comparing it to Alliednsuccesses in WWII. By understandingnonly 10 to 12 percent of the Japanesencommunications. Admiral Nimitz defeatedna vastly superior Japanese navalnforce at Midway. In that contest, wenhad no battleships against their 11; wenhad eight cruisers versus their 23, andnwe had three carriers compared tontheir eight. To know the “Japanesenstrengths, weaknesses, and intentions”ngreatly affected the outcome of thisnbattle and throughout the war in thenPacific.nWhen in 1939 Polish intelligencendelivered Enigma, the German cryptographynsystem, they unquestionablynhurt the Germans’ air attack in thenBattle of Britain in 1940. To knownwhere, when, and in what strength thenluftwaffe attacked made it possible tonmarshal resources in the most efficientnmanner.nIn addition to providing the techni­ncal specifications for all key Navy ciphersnand their daily key lists, thenWalker ring provided the actual messagesnsent and received so the Sovietsncould check their deciphering. Thenring also gave information on Navyntargedng priorities, planned reactionsnto emergencies, threshold points forngoing nuclear, and detection avoidancentactics. This type of data obviouslynis not to be obscured by filling innsome nifty new key list for a cipher.nBarron believes the information givennover 18 years was a major factor in thenmodernization of the Soviet navy.nThat the exposure of the Walkernring depended on the decision of ansuffering alcoholic woman is appalling.nThis weakness in counterintelligencenis not a reflection on Americannagents, most of whom are exceptional,nbut on a strategic imbalance betweennSoviet and American intelligence forces:nOur people are simply outnumberednthree or four to one on theirnhome turf The CIA’s counterintelligencenused to be at about 280 in then1960’s, and it was reduced to 80 duringnthe tenure of William Colby in thenmid-I970’s. According to the deceasednJames Angleton, former director ofnCIA counterespionage, it was nevernbrought back to strength.nSecurity in the armed forces also hasnfailed the challenges of the last decade.nWhen John Walker was to be reinvestigatednin 1971 for his security clearance,nhe forged his own investigationnform, stamped it with a seal he boughtnfor $2.98, and inserted the form in hisnrecord. He was clear for another fivenyears. When we spend $100 billion onn20 new Trident submarines and theirnweapons systems, it seems obvious thatnwe should spend a small fraction ofnthis on security in the armed forcesnand in counterintelligence. Triplingnthe number of agents would be a smallnprice to pay compared with the benefitsnthat would accrue from insuringnthe security of these multi-billion dollarnweapons systems. One can onlynhope that Congress, once it has got thenIran/Contra hearings out of its system,nwill spend nine months on America’sncounterintelligence needs.nMichael Warder is executive vice presidentnof The Rockford Institute.nBOOKS IN BRIEF—IMPERIAL POLITICSnThe New Age Politics by Tobin James Mueller, Amherst, WI (318 N. Main St.): AmherstnPress/Pinetree Pubhshing; $9.95. A Hbertarian manifesto for the coming age. Mueller hasnwritten a plea for individualism and self-responsibility as the only true forms of liberation.nThe British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-39 by Anthony Clayton, Athens, GA: Universitynof Georgia Press; $30. In the 20’s and 30’s Britain worked very hard to maintain her globalnpresence. But, as Clayton points out in his carefully researched and exhaustive study,npresence is not the same as power. Despite her failure, Britain’s efforts were both honorablenand effective to the extent that they shaped the outcome of WWII as well as the postwarnstruggle between the U.S. and the USSR.nImperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind by Lewis Feuer, Buffalo, NY: PrometheusnBooks; $22.95. Feuer attempts to distinguish between good progressive empires and badnregressive empires, but at some points it appears as if the real difference lies in their treatmentnof Israel and Zionism.nWar in the Middle Ages by Philippe Contamine, translated by Michael Jones, Oxford: BasilnBlackwell. A very valuable comprehensive account of medieval warfare by a leading authoritynwho has restored war to its proper place in the life of the period.nAusten Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics by David Dutton, New Brunswick, NJ:nTransaction Books. Of three Chamberlains—Joseph, Neville, and Austen—Austen hasnreceived the least attention, despite his long and distinguished career in Parliament. A naturalnconservative, he was to some extent hampered by his family’s liberal tradition. Dutton’snbiography—both scholarly and readable—offers insight into Empire’s ruling class in itsncrucial period.nThe fust Polity: Populism, Law, and Human Welfare by Norman Pollack, Champaign, IL:nUniversity of Illinois Press; $29.95. Pollack has done a good job of tracing the intellectualnhistory of the populist movement, and this careful study may help to restore populism to itsnrightful place in American social and political history.nnnNOVEMBER 1987 141n