32 I CHRONICLESnFirst Lovenby P.J. KavanaghnClever, the way SatannPoints out I don’t knownWhether is sounding nownNear pigeon, distant cow.nIf I beheve an horizonnMeasured, awaits us,nHe asks me how I can.nI think he thinks he isnA hard man.nBut if the dream was you^nAnd if the dream untrue,nLook where it leads me to,nThis almost infinite place!nIf what is best in usnWe muddle and disgrace.nWhat of a visitation.nBecause not my possession.nProof against poison?nNot a house, an horizon.nNever seen but believed in,nAs I believe in you, a treasure-nThat could be forgotten . . .nA different scale of measurenThat leaves no need to knownWhether is sounding now—nSoft, persistent, low—nNear pigeon, distant cow.n”we suffer a serious loss when we stripnourselves of the use of legal restraintsnagainst speech behavior we regard asnsocially destructive.” The “fortressnmodel” maintains there is a constantnthreat to free speech and that we neednto erect our legal barricades at somendistance from the center.nBollinger thinks it is right to let thenAmerican Nazis march through thenJewish neighborhood in Skokie, Illinois.nHis argument is psychologicalnand complex. Toleration of genuinelynoffensive and dangerous speech, hencontends, is a limited exercise in selfrestraintnthat. symbolizes our recognitionnof our more general impulse tonintolerance. Toleration nurtures annethic of self-restraint; it holds before usnthe intolerant mind we are to avoid innourselves and reminds us that in eachnof us is a shadow of the Nazi mind.nHe calls his view the “general toler­nance theory” and sees its justificationnin “symbdilically demonstrating a capacitynfor self-control” over intolerantnfeelirigs. It is like a religious fast.nBollinger seems to imply that if wenwere not sorely tempted by intolerance,nsuch exercises in self-restraintnwould be unnecessary, and then itnwould be best to ban the Nazi march.nBollinger offers Alexander Meiklejohn’snappeal to “community” as anprecursor of his argument. Meiklejohnnsees tolerance as a way the communityndefines itself, just as punishing criminalsnis said to reinforce both the criminals’nand the society’s social identity.nBut Meiklejohn’s argument can benused to yield the opposite conclusion.nA community does affirm its identitynby banning or punishing what strikesnat its common good, as the Nazinmarch certainly did. Bollinger impliesnthat the public values threatened bynextremist speech have less need forncommunity affirmation than has thenvalue of toleration (because of its symbolicnconnection with toleration inngeneral). But is this obvious? What ofnthe symbolic connection of the Nazincontempt for Jews with contempt fornanyone? And the fact that toleratingnthe disorder caused by the Nazi marchnis symbolic of tolerating disorder inngeneral?nThe toleration of extremist speech,nfor Bollinger, is essentially pedagogicnand character-building. It is a walkingon-hot-coalsntheory of why we shouldntolerate marching Nazis and Ku KluxnKlan rallies, “to test and develop angeneral character of mind throughnconfrontation.”nWhat, then, are the limits to extremistnspeech? He raises the questionnand discusses or mentions libel, obscenity,ngraffiti. Little Black Sambo,nand feminist objections to pornography.nHe concludes that we withdrawntolerance when self-restraint is just toondifficult to maintain. One expects antheory to supply a stronger way to drawna line—this is not an obvious outcomenof his general tolerance theory.nThe problem with graffiti, Bollingernsays, is that it is done secretively, likenan obscene phone call. But that maynnot be the right reason. The problemnwith graffiti is that tolerating it showsnthat society’s moral self-confidencenand self-respect have faltered. A city ornsubway system that tolerates graffiti isnnnlike a school that abandons its ritualsnand lets its appearance go to pot.nTolerating disorder and graffiti weakennour sense of community. Such magnanimityndiminishes citizens’ confidencenin a public space in which thenbehavior of strangers i$ reasonably predictablenand not frightening.nThe general question, whethernthere is too much freedom in America,nbears direcfly on graffiti, extremistnspeech, and obscenity. Tolerance is annimportant value, and Bollinger is asnsubtie and persuasive as any writer Inknow in taking free speech and tolerantncharacter seriously. As he sees it,nthey require that we tolerate Nazi andnKlan marches.nIs, on the other hand, the tolerationnof Nazi rriarches like the acceptance ofngraffiti and general disorder? Bollingernrightiy claims that the usual utilitariannarguments fail to justify extremistnspeech, and he ofiferS: us subtler utilitariannarguments instead. But they arenmere techniques—witnessing intolerance,ntesting oneself, reinforcing a tolerantncharacter, etc.—which assumenthat a society as tolerant as he proposesnis best. Bollinger doesn’t show that thenneed for community and felt securitynis outweighed by the pedagogic benefitsnof tolerating people who preach thensubhumanity of most of our speciesnwhile hinting at violent means tonachieve their ends.nBelonging to a community involvesna proprietary sense toward it, an assumptionnof a social identity, and genuinensacrifices of freedom. There arenpoints at which tolerance and the requirementsnof community clash, andnit is in no way obvious that communitynmust yield in the notorious cases Bollingerndiscusses. This moral controversy,nas most others of importance, takesnplace on slippery ground: “If you bannthe Nazis then you can ban the soand-sosnand then the Episcopalians.”nBut the rational approach to slipperynground is not to refuse to enter it, thusnremaining pinned at one of the twonextremes, but to dig in our claws andnstop when our judgment tells us wenhave gone as far as we should. At ancertain point, taking rights seriouslynwhile disregarding the wrongs presentsnus with a slovenly and alienating society,nwhere disorder, symbolic threats,nand diminished expectations of civilityntell us we have slid too far.n