18 / CHRONICLESnpolitical conservatism is this: In the academy and in thenpress, a large number of empirical beliefs have beennaccepted not because they are correct, but because theynmeet a felt ideological need, and it is to demonstrate thenincorrectness of such empirical beliefs that I have devotednmuch of my career. For example, the belief that capitalnpunishment has been demonstrated to lack deterrent effect,nor that stereotypes are untrue, that neuroendocrinologicalndifferences between males and females are of little causalnimportance to male-female behavior—to use just a fewnexamples—are maintained not because they are correct butnbecause they are felt by the adherent to be required bynmoral or normative imperative.nThere is, in fact, no reason why anyone must feel this:nJust as an empirical “is” can never generate a moral ornnormative “ought,” so too a moral or normative “ought” isnimmune (as long as the “ought” is possible) from empiricalncriticism. So, for example, one who is morally againstncapital punishment is not in any way required to deny thendeterrent effect of the death penalty. He can accept thenpossibility of the deterrence of the death penalty whilenrejecting its morality; this is just what he would do if, fornexample, he were asked his opinion of invoking the deathnpenalty for double parking.nBut the liberal, like me but unlike the political conservative,naccepts the empiricism of the 20th century. He feels innhis bones that the ultimately subjective nature of the moralnor normative position that makes it immune to attack alsonrenders it incapable of persuading anyone who does notnalready accept its assumptions. Where the political conservativenrests easy with the admission that a moral position isnultimately rooted in a value, the liberal, seeing a value asnsubjective and therefore argumentatively worthless, acceptsnCultural Conservationn(continued from page 8)nbeen the first, and after him came Dryden, Addison,nSamuel Johnson, Coleridge, Matthew Arnold, and T.S.nEliot. The American side is heavily weighted towardsnphilosophical essayists—Emerson, Babbitt, Trilling, andnKirk himself These men turned prophet only after they hadnestablished their credentials as leading writers. They threwndown the gauntlet to barbarism and bad taste only after theynhad demonstrated their own right to represent this civilization.nArnold’s pronouncements on culture are sometimesnunendurably priggish, but he had earned his spurs both as anpoet and as a critic long before he assumed the propheticnmantie.nOne is forced to observe that few contemporary claimantsnfor the job of Elijah or Sam Johnson have ever produced ansonnet or short story—not, at least, one that has come tonour attention. They might reply that as the French Revolutionnhad no need of scientists, a populist mass movementnhas no need of poets and essayists. Unfortunately, there isnno such mass movement: There is only a mailing list. Andnif there were a resurgent populism of the Wallace type, itsnmembers would have little patience with manifestos onnvalues. At this point, only Jesse Jackson knows how to worknnnthe most dubious empirical belief if it camouflages thenbasically subjective nature of his (and all) moral andnnormative beliefs. One might look upon this liberal tendencynfavorably and see it as choosing the good over the true, ornhe may look at it unfavorably as choosing to lie in support ofnan arrogant assumption of infallibility. From an empiricistnpoint of view, the two are the same.nI used to believe that the conservative discovery of mynempiricism would cause conservatives to be understandablyndubious about my work. In fact, the conservative discoverynof my empiricist assumption has not led to any rejection ofnmy logical or empirical work. It seems that conservatism hasnhad to endure empiricists for so long now that it expectsnempiricism from all non-conservative writers. Conservativesnsimply ignore this and accept as an unexpected gift thenrefutations that demonstrate the inadequacy of liberalnempirical arguments.nThe liberal’s faith in empiricism may not be the entirenexplanation of their willingness to invoke fallacious empiricalnarguments. For the 40 years preceeding this decade (andnto the present, though less strongly), the universities and thennational media have been far more liberal than conservative.nThe liberal willingness to accept terrible empiricalnarguments to support liberal values may be owing not sonmuch to empiricism as the inevitable intellectual flaccidizationnthat comes with being in power too long. If this isncorrect, we may expect increasing numbers of fallaciousnconservative empirical arguments (reflecting the conservativenrise to political power in the 80’s). If, on the othernhand, my original explanation is correct, then we would notnexpect power to intellectually corrupt conservatives to thenextent it has already corrupted the liberals.na crowd with diatribes against bankers. New York City, andnbig business. Jackson knows very well that the true populistn—for all his settled virtues—is a radical consumed withnenvious rage against his superiors. Given half a chance, angood populist movement would tear down both the liberalnmanagerial state and the new conservative “counterestablishment.”nPopulists are the material out of whichnrevolutions, not restorations, are made.nAnyone who sets out to restore civilization in the UnitednStates will have to begin recruiting a few poets, novelists,nand musicians as a first step. So far, the conservativenmovement is overloaded with economists and politicalnanalysts. Wherever we turn on the right—old, new, ornneo—there is no sign of an Eliot on the horizon. RaynBradbury, perhaps, comes closest as a writer who fires thenreactionary imagination, and it is to Russell Kirk’s creditnthat he unmasked the conservative Bradbury. Until thenprojectors can succeed in recruiting more serious thinkersn(and better writers), cultural conservatism will remain whatnit is at this point: a highly advertised parade that consists of anpiccolo player and a few floats. We are still waiting for thenelephants.n