22/CHRONICLES OF CULTUREnCOMMENDABLESnCriticism WithnCharacternby Thomas D. EiselenGeorge A. Panichas: The Courage ofnJudgment: Essays in Criticism, Culture,nand Society; University of TennesseenPress; Knoxville; $24.50.nThis book presents essays written bynGeorge Panichas, which initially appearednfrom 1962 to 1980. Panichas’snessays take the measure of a generation.nWhat is their verdict?nIt is not a happy one. Panichas findsnmodern conditions to be those definednby technology and Benthamism, bynempiricism and quantification, andneverywhere “humanistic values . . .nhave come under threat and attack.”nPanichas urges his readers “to challengenand to resist precisely those habits ofnmind that lead to the ascendancy ofnquantifying criteria at all levels of lifenand letters.” It is Panichas’s unceasingnefFort to unveil the “habits of mind”nthat define modern existence and tonlocate the roots of our language, culture,nand society at large.nPanichas wants to maintain—or,nbetter, to reestablish—“the character ofncriticism,” by which he means, specifically,nthe moral dimensions of criticism.n”The need to foment and instillncritical leadership is a moral need,” onenbased upon “the deeper meaning of lifenas judgment, as conduct, as character.”nThe character traits required for anyncriticism worthy of the name are moralnattributes, then, and their possession byna critic signals to Panichas that critic’snawareness of his responsibilities. “Authenticnfulfillment of critical responsibilityndemands a rigorous commitmentnto principles of order, to the making ofnhard choices and categorical decisions,nto the selection and espousal not merelynof aesthetic, literary, or linguistic valuesnbut of ethical and moral derivativesn—and imperatives.” Panichas’s idealncritic understands “the necessities ofncourage and judgment.”n”Lacking the courage of judgment,”nPanichas observes, some “have forciblynBOOKSHELVESnreconciled themselves to . . . new conditions,neven as they express seriousnreservations concerning the changesnthat are swiftly, furiously occurring.nOthers have enthusiastically enlisted innthe ranks of those who herald the newnLogos, insofar as they refuse to acceptn(even to understand) the role of moralnimperatives in imagination, in criticism,nin thought, and in culture andnsociety as a whole.” In such an atmospherenof disorientation and disintegrationnof the moral sense, the “humanenelement in criticism, with its overarchingnverities, thus becomes still anothernvictim of a continuing fragmentation.nIdentifying character as a centripetalnelement of the critical function becomesnan utter impossibility.” To try tonaccount for our critical failures by sayingnthat they result from our growingnmoral relativism or moral neutrality isnto say next to nothing, for these labelsnare merely a diagnosis, whereas wenwant an etiology and a cure.nPanichas accounts for our neglect ofnmoral necessities by pointing to “thendecline or even the disappearance of thenhumanistic tradition.”nThe ethos of this tradition isncentrally and singularly ethicalnand moral, stressing as it doesnthe sanctity of human worth. Inneffect the humanistic ethosnvalidates, qualitatively, man’sndestiny and resists relentlessnattempts to technicalize, tonobjectify, and to dehumanizenman’s significance and, indeed,nhis essentially spiritual being.nThis is not an endorsement of secularnhumanism; that alternative, says Panichas,nremains a “critical humanismnwithout a metaphysical basis,” one thatnaccordingly “remains incomplete, ineffectual.nIt fails, in short, as a totality ofnspiritual value.” The confrontation betweennthe new Logos and the old LogosnPanichas sees as one between “the twinntyranny of the secular and the material,”nand the “permanent things, asntranscendent and metaphysical constituentsnof humanism.” As Eliot observednin “Second Thoughts About Humanism”n(1929): “There is no avoiding thatndilemma: you must be either a naturalistnor a supernaturalist.” Panichas castsnnnhis lot with the latter, with the Word.nAnd, having done so, he sees in thenmodern conditions of criticism an exemplificationnof the conditions of modernnexistence. “As such, the crisis ofncriticism is related to the continuingncrisis of faith, which in turn leads to thencrisis of humanistic civilization.”nThat we are out of touch with thosenvirtues of prudence and justice thatnSam Johnson says are “of all times andnof all places,” no one can deny. Butnhave “we” ever been in possession ofnthese “permanent things,” these “overarchingnverities” or “transcendent values,”nas Panichas calls them? On variousnscattered occasions, undoubtedlynsome individuals and small groupsn—saints, heroes, and poets—have. Butnas a society or as a nation? I think not.nRather, I believe that no “golden age”nof adherence to these values can benfound, because the humanistic traditionnitself does not imagine its values tonbe historically fulfilled. Its vision, instead,ndepends upon our keeping beforenourselves these “verities” as constitutivenhuman ideals, as models of what it is tonbe truly or fully human. That we rarelynachieve them in fact is less importantnthan whether or not we continue tonaspire to their achievement. But, at thenmoment, it seems that we no longer sonaspire.nIt is this lack of aspiration that Panichasnconfronts in this book. “Criticismnis by its very nature confrontationn—confrontation that ultimately rests onnthe courage of judgment.” Panichasnenacts this confi:ontational strategy innhis writing by placing his courageousnjudgments in our way, making ourncontinued or habitual following of certainnways of thinking (and of seeing, ofnjudging) an effort, something that wenno longer can do thoughtlessly or heedlessly.nBy making himself an obstacle tonour habituated forms of thought, henmeans to provoke us into summoningnup our courage and exercising our perhapsnatrophied capacity to judge fornourselves.nWhether he is consistently successfulnin this attempt, I am not certain. Thenrole of provocateur can become confining,nand the voice of the moralist deafening,nor deadening. Still, Panichas isnright to insist that “a combative dissent-n