the empiricist tradition of Hume tonargue that animals do behave “rationally,”nat least by the measures we haventhat human beings are rational. Thatnis, some animals seem to follow contractsnwith other animals and withnhuman owners, will tend to injurednmembers of the species, will shownaltruism, will “act guilty” when caughtnstealing, will solve problems, will usentools, will anticipate or remembernpain, and so on. But even Bentham’snUtilitarian focus upon pleasure andnpain does not provide a sufficient accountnfor taking animals as objectsnof moral concern. Rollin takes onnthe burden of proving animals haven”interests.”nHis argument is that every livingnthing has—as Aristotie said—a telos,n”a nature, a function, a set of activitiesnintrinsic to it, evolutionarily determinednand genetically imprinted.” Forna living thing to have “interests” is fornit to have needs that matter to it, and itnis “our ability to nurture or impedenfulfillment of these interests, not thenpleasure and pain, that make it enternthe moral arena.” The modern sciencenof ethology provides us with a stardingnarray of evidence of interests, extendingndown to insects, worms, and planaria,nthereby including these creaturesnin our scope of moral concern.nRollin concludes, therefore, that animalsnhave a basic right to be dealt withnas moral objects, regardless of the specificnmoral principles one might hold.nAnd if “being alive is the basis fornbeing a moral object, and if all othernneeds and interests are predicatednupon life, then the most basic, morallynrelevant aspect of a creature is its life.”nRollin does not hold that the “rightnto life” is absolute; weighing moralntrade-offs is a part of everyday life, andnrespecting an animal’s rights does notn18/CHRONICLES OF CULTUREnBOOKS IN BRIEFnmean subordinating or sacrificingnone’s own interests. But Rollin doesnwant us to understand that any violationnof the right to life must be defendednwith strong moral reasons. In additionnto the right to life is a livingnbeing’s right to its telos, to “the kind ofnlife that its nature dictates.” Like thenright to life, this right is not absolute,nbut violations must be justified. Ethologynagain serves us, for an animal’sntelos is for Rollin a scientific, testablenmatter.nRollin sees in the arguments of legalnphilosopher Ronald Dworkin (in TakingnRights Seriously) the basis for establishingnthe legal rights of animals.nDworkin’s attack on legal positivismnaccomplishes two things for Rollin’sncase. First, Dworkin reasserts the necessarynconnection between law andnmorality; and, second, Dworkin holdsnrights as the safeguards “of the moralnstatus of the individual and his humannnature or telos against the pressures ofnsocial convenience or general welfarenthat might otherwise tend to submergenhis individuality and crucial interests.”nFor Rollin, then, the moral status ofnanimals implies their entitiement tonlegal rights. Present law, representednby the Animal Welfare Acts of 1966nand 1970, is totally inadequate in Rollin’snview. What we must do is workntoward case law and legislative actionnextending animals’ legal rights. Havingnestablished the theoretical foundationnfor animal rights, Rollin turns hisnnotions upon the twin practical “problems”nof research with animals and ofnthe status of pet animals. Throughoutnthe last half of his book, the authorninvokes two principles to aid in decidingnhow we are to act toward animals.nThe utilitarian principle demandsn”that the benefit to humans (or tonhumans and animals) clearly out-n’Mined with a Motion’: Ttie Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins by Marylou Motto; RutgersnUniversity Press; Xew Brunswick, NJ; S22.50. Rescues Hopkins from unsympatheticnmodern critics. Hopkins, wlio realized the futiHty of the Romantic project of uniting man andnnature in poetr’, went back to the older tradition of Donne, Jonson, and Herbert.nBeyond Reagan: Alternatives for the 80’s; edited by Alan Gartner, et ai; Harper & Row;nNew York. What a shame that the democratic process somehow got in the way of thesenbrilliant plans for oerthrowing Reaganism through “citizen participation.”nFlannery O’Connor’s Library: Resources of Being by Arthur F. Kinney; University ofnGeorgia Press; Athens, GA; $25.00. What the author of Wise Blood and The Violent Bear ItnAway read and underlined in Maritain, Faulkner, Dostoevski, et al.nnnweighs the pain and suffering experiencednby experimental animals,” andnthe rights principle requires that, inncases where research is justified by thenutilitarian principle, “it should be conductednin such a way as to maximizenthe animal’s potential for living its lifenaccording to its nature or telos, andncertain fundamental rights should benpreserved as far as possible, given thenlogic of the research, regardless ofnconsiderations of cost.”nNo abolitionist, Rollin counsels hisnreaders to work realistically for reformnand urge scientists to work on the threenalternatives (the “three R’s) to presentnpractice in animal experimentation:nreduction of number of animals used,nrefinement of procedure to reducenpain, and replacement of laboratorynanimals wherever possible. Rollin targetsnthe education of scientists and ofnveterinarians as an area where reformnmakes a difference, and he testifiesnconvincingly from his own considerablensuccesses, including the creationnof the first course anywhere in veterinarynmedical ethics. Rollin is incisienin explaining how the sociology andnrhetoric of science sustain a particularncultural ideology of health and illnessnand how our culture needs a substantialn”gestalt switch” in perceiving thenmoral relevance of animals. The empathynwe have for our own pet animalsnis, for Rollin, the most promisingnsource of that shift, and he calls fornnonrevolutionary legislation that willndemand fitness and responsibility fromnthe human owners of pets.nMidgley takes a very different tack,nthough her case overlaps Rollin’s atnseveral crucial points. She joins thenassault on the rationalist foundationsnfor our present view of the moral statusnof animals, looking to ethology (asndoes Rollin) to establish that we reallynhave no better evidence for inferringnthe subjectivity and consciousness ofnanimals than we do of humans. Midgleyndeparts from Rollin on the crucialnmatter of rights, which she calls “antruly desperate word.” Seeing notnmuch chance of salvaging the wordn”for any clear, unambiguous use innthis discussion,” Midgley chooses insteadnequality as the pivotal conceptnfor bringing animals into the sphere ofnhuman morality.nUsing the notion of “equality” as thenlever on the issue of animal rightsn