permits Midgley to explore issues ignorednby most other writers on animalnrights. She unveils persuasively, fornexample, the symbohc meanings ofnwomen and animals in human cultures,nnoting the mystery and dangernwe find in that symbolism and concludingnthat these deep meanings arensignificant barriers to the equality ofnthese creatures. She sharply criticizesnsocial contract thinking, both becausenits model of reciprocity limits its abilitynto deal with animals, “women, slaves,naliens and other beings suspected ofnnot being proper contractors” and becausenit privileges speech as the wayncontracts are made. Ethology and anthropologynhave taught us, says Midgley,nhow much more important isnnonerbal communication for creatingnorder among living beings. And shenfinds fault with Singer’s creating “speciesism”nas a parallel for racism andnsexism. Her ‘iew is that species loyaltyncan be a natural bond rather than anhierarchical evaluation. What wenshould do is learn to appreciate then”mixed community” of beings andntheir subjective states. If we take animalsnto ha’e subjecti-e consciousnessndesering equal treatment, then we arenlikely to appreciate and befriend them.nIt is commonplace for anthropologistsnto think of Nature as presentingnitself to us pretty much as an undifferentiatedncontinuum of experience, an”stream of consciousness” WilliamnJames said. One function of culture,nin this view, is to order that stream, tonname the distinct parts, and to treatnthe ambiguous in-between zones asnmysterious, as dangerous, as taboo.nThe adocates of a moral status fornanimals tend to emphasize the continuum,ninsisting that evolutionary theorynposits both continuity between lifenforms and very small steps along then20th-century Great Chain of Being.nRollin and Midgley push even furthernin this direction, relying fearlessly forntheir test cases upon the taboo zonesnwhere being human and being animalnoverlap, as in Rollin’s example of thenape with a tested IQ of 85, higher thannmany “retarded” humans, or in Singer’snclaim that many apes surpassnhuman infants and brain-damagednadults on several measures of what wentake to define humanity. Why drawnattention to these tabooed zones at thisntime, 1975-85? What does the explo­nration of these zones have to teach usnabout our human telos?nI think these intellectual currentsnhave much to do with the women’snmovement, with feminist theory, andnwith the effects of the movement uponnthe status of children in Americannculture over the past two decades.nFrom this perspective, the talk aboutnanimals is also talk about the moralnand legal status of women and children.nSometimes the talk is coded, butnat other hmes it is quite direct. Rollin’snexamples often point to “how the studynof the moral status of animals cannilluminate dark areas of human ethics,”nsuch as euthanasia. Rollin makesnhis case for granting legal rights tonanimals by pointing to the relevantnanalogy: the legal rights of children,nwho are not the property of theirnparents and whose rights can benpressed in courts by social welfarenagencies, guardians, and the like. Thencurrent public concerns about childnabuse and about the abuse of animalsnmay be reflections of the same basicnbreach in our moral theory.nIf animals stand for children in Rollin’snargument, then his argument fornanimals’ fundamental rights to lifenleads inexorably to the issue of abortion.nRollin must realize the additionalncontroversy inherent in pursuing hisnpoint, for he mentions this connectionnonly once, early in the book, and ofiFersnit only as a personal example of thenway the dialectic between moral intuitionsnand moral theories is makingnhim rethink his previous pro-choicenposition.nWhereas animals might stand fornchildren in Rollin’s discussion, innMidgley’s they stand for the wholenclass of “different” creatures who lienoutside the mainstream of white malenpower and morals. Midgley’s recurringntheme of the crisis of liberal politicalntheory, for instance, reminds me atntimes of a more recent book. Habits ofnthe Heart: Individualism and Commitmentnin American Life (1985), innwhich sociologist-of-religion RobertnN. Bellah and four colleagues examinenthe moral vocabularies of Americannindividualism. Discovering thenlimits of “utilitarian” and “expressive”nsorts of individualism, Bellah and hisncoauthors conclude that “perhaps onlynthe ci’ic and biblical forms ofnindividualism—forms that see the in­nnndividual in relation to a larger whole, ancommunity and a tradition—are capablenof sustaining genuine individualitynand nurturing both public andnprivate life.”nMidgley’s chapter on “Women,nAnimals, and Other AwkwardnCases” makes the same case, notingnthat the rationalist tradition has treatednsimilarly the rights and moral status ofnwomen, sraes, nonwhite races, andnnonhuman animals. Her later chaptersnon “the Significance of Species”nand “the Mixed Community” arguenfor the alternative model of bondingnand kinship within diversity and flexibility,na model that begins in eolutionarynbiology but extends easilynenough to legitimate plural humannsocieties. Midgley’s argument—harmonizingnwith recent feminist theory,nstressing kinship and moral community,nsubstituting “equality” forn”rights,” dissenting from liberal contractntheory, insisting upon evolutionaryncooperation over competition, andnseeking to balance reason and emotion—contrastsnsharply with Rollin’s.nBut the two philosophers would landnon the same side of most practicalnquestions regarding the treatment ofnanimals.nAs one who has read the scholarlynliterature of the debate over animalnrights and has talked with animalnrights activists who march the longnmarches, stand vigil outside primatenresearch centers, and engage in civilndisobedience in order to be arrestednand make their case in public court, Inmust say that Midgley’s book seemsnmore relevant than Rollin’s to thenAmerican moral intuition that is sustainingnthe movement. Rollin’s argumentsnand reform strategies serve wellnenough the veterinarians and otherninsiders who are likely to be able tonwrite the legislation and legal briefsnextending legal rights to animals, but itnis Midgley’s intuitions that capture thenstyle and most radical content of thenprotest. For as gentle as Midgley’s booknis, hers is a critical vision that seesnclearly the spider’s web of assumptionsnconnecting disparate phenomena innWestern culture and that is capable ofnunmasking the ideology of even somenother advocates for the moral status ofnanimals. ccnAUGUST 1385119n