Psychen16/CHRONICLES OF CULTUREnWords like liberal and conservativenhae been losing whatever meaningnthey once had. An old Tory wouldnnot hae seen anything very conservatienin free trade, and SenatornBob Taft would certainly have hadnreservations about America’s role asninternational policeman. But liberalnstill has discernible significancenin ethics, where the great liberalntraditions of Locke, Adam Smith,nand the Utilitarians are carried onnby able defenders like John Rawls,nRobert Nozick, and BrucenAckerman. Although the philosophersndisagree on a great manynthings, the}’ share certain operatingnassumptions which make possible anrich cross-pollination of liberal ethics.nAmong the truths they hold tonbe self-eident is the assumptionnthat ethical decisions are made bynindiiduals in confrontation withnother individuals; the most importantnquality of these decisions is thenfact of their universal applicationnwithout distinction of persons. Ifnsomething is right, it is right forneeryone under all circumstances.nConsiderations of kinship or nationalnidentity are irrelevant.nSince liberal ethics avoid referencento transcendent or supernaturalnbeings, they are forced to fallnback on certain abstract standards asna basis for ethical judgments. FornAdam Smith it was “the impartialnspectator” to whom we could appealnas a judge (an idea revived bynPeter Singer). Rawls goes back tonthe old state of nature myth in thenform of “the origiiaal posihon” ofnequality. By relentlessly emphasizingnequality, Rawls is led to a sort ofntotalitarian ethics of duty whichnwould require each of us to sharenour wealth and resources until wenwere roughly equal with the worstoff.nOn the other side,, Nozick sonemphasizes the rights side of thenequation that he ends up celebratingnanarchy. If there is a seriousnethical debate going on in the U.S.,nit is largely between liberals thatnREVISIONSnstress one or the other side of thenrights/duties coin.nEnter James Fishkin, at once thenmost trenchant critic of liberalismnand its ablest defender. In a series ofnbrilliant short books—Tyranny andnLegitimacy, The Limits of Obligation,nand justice. Equal Opportunity,nand the Family—he has exposednthe perils of moral absolutismnby demonstrating that all ersionsn— Ravvls’s leveling and Nozick’snlibertarianism—can be used to justifynobviously unethical conduct.nWhat is,just as serious, in Fishkin’sniew, is the extent to which thesenzealous absolutists impose an impossiblenburden on ordinary people.nNot everyone may be preparednto bear the burden of moral heroism.nThe unintended result may benthe withdrawal into a subjectivismnthat regards all ethical principles asnmere matters of taste. In his latestnbook. Beyond Subjective Morality:nEthical Reasoning and PoliticalnPhilosophy (Yale University Press;nNew Haen), Fishkin profiles a seriesnof “ordinary moral reasoners”nand explores their dilemma. Henoudines six characteristics whichnmost people expect of an ethicalnsystem. Listed in order of severity,nthey require ethical judgments: tonapply to oneself and to others, to benapplied consistently to similarncases, to be “objectively alid” (i.e.,nmost people would accept the reasoningnbehind them), to be inviolable,nand to be absolute or “rationallynunquestionable.” Ordinarynreasoners often conclude that sincennone of their judgments is likely tonfulfill these expectations, all moralnpositions are merely arbitrary.nAnyone familiar with Fishkin’snwork might predict that he wouldnadvocate a middle ground. In fact,nhe suggests that we might reasonablyncontent ourselves with a minimalnobjectivism which rejects absolutismnand inviolability, whilenretaining the expectation that judgmentsnwill be universal and objectivelynvalid.nAs a practical hypothesis fornnneveryday life, this minimal objectivismnmay offer a way out to manv’npeople trapped in their own subjectivity,nbut it does not address thenunderlying problem of individualistnethics. For one thing, there is nothingnin Fishkin’s position that rulesnout subjectivism: at best, his objectivitynis a possible alternative. Unlikenthe absolutisms of Plato or St.nThomas, Fishkin’s middle groundndoes not even claim for itself anninvincibility against relativism. It isna little like the Anglican via medianbetween the absolutism of thenRoman Church and the radical individualismnof the extreme Protestants.nLike Episcopalians, liberalsnmust always be tempted by the mostnavailable absolutist dogma in thenair. These days, temptation is notnlikely to come from Rome — ornanything even vaguely theistic, fornthat matter. Fishkin argues that “itnwould be out of bounds for a liberalnstate to base moral arguments . . .non the ultimate convictions of anvnparticular group,” in particular onn”our cherished beliefs about God.”nOn the other hand, “the Marxistnstrategy of basing claims to a kind ofnlegitimacv’ on historical inevitabilitynremains a possibility.” Marx, itnseems, is not mocked.nBut the greatest weakness innFishkin’s position is his refusal tonreconsider the fundamental principlenof abstract individualism. Hencontinues to graph human relationsnon the grid of I/thou intersections,nas if there were no other way. Aristotle,nwhom Fishkin never seems tonquote, wondered if a man could benconsidered happy if his good fortunendid not extend to his kin. Tonhis credit, Fishkin is beginning tonrealize that a man might owe specialnobligations to certain people,ne.g., wife and children, but hencontinues to express these obligationsnin the bloodless language ofnabstract individualism. Still, thenstrains to which he has subjectednhis own liberalism may be a signnthat he is outgrowing the tatterednchrysalis. (TJF) ccn