they appeal to the authority of Scripturen(which many Christians and Jewsnwould want to do), but because theyninsist that their conclusions do notnallow room for discussion.nNeuhaus indicts the politically liberalnestablishment of main-line Protestantismneven more severely. They areneliminated in the search for a publicnphilosophy because they too often failnNeuhaus’s requirement that one mustnbelieve that, on balance and consideringnthe alternatives, America is a forcenfor good in the world. At this point,nand in related remarks, it becomesnclear that Neuhaus is further limitingnhis call for religion in public life to ancall only for religion that will yield anparticular political stance. He wants anRepublican public square.nHaving eliminated the whole religiousnfar right and also the Protestantnleft, we are left with a muchnnarrower conception of religion in thenpublic square. The only people remainingnare those who are moderatenreligiously, lean to the right politically,nand are duly modest about theirnviews, after the model of ReinholdnNiebuhr. These are often fine people.nBut can this group of right-leaningncentrists establish a religiously basednconsensus for American culture, law,nand politics? Neuhaus points out thatnthere are many Catholics, Lutherans,nand evangelicals who might make upnthis group. But if we eliminate thosenpolitically on the left, the ideologicalnright, and the religiously or politicallynindifferent, how many remain? Neuhaus’snproposals are too sophisticatednto have wide public appeal. What hen8/CHRONICLES OF CULTUREnIN THE MAILnreally seems to want is a religiouslynbased moral leadership by an “elite”n(as he puts it) who meet his criteria.nThis is a quite different proposalnfrom Neuhaus’s seemingly general callnfor an across-the-board religious inputninto public debate. What is puzzlingnto me is how the sophisticated Neuhausiannelite hope to control the religiousnideologues on the right and thenleft. More religion in public life mightnwell destroy the already weakened consensusnin American public philosophy.nNeuhaus arrives at his puzzling andnpossibly self-defeating conclusion, Inthink, because of a faulty premise innhis argument. “Religion in our popularnlife,” he says, “is the moralitybearingnpart of culture, and in thatnsense the heart of culture.” Workingnfrom this premise, he argues that thenissue today is that of morality or lacknthereof in the public square. Moralitynthen is, according to the premise,ndependent on religion; so the real issuenis whether “the religiously groundednvalues of the American people arenruled out of order in public discourse.”nFor one thing, ruling out religiouslyngrounded values is nearly impossible.nMore important though, is that thenissue in America today is not betweennreligiously based morality and nonreligiousnnonmorality. Rather it is betweenncompeting systems of morality.nSecularists do not lack moral standards.nFor instance, left-leaning secularistsntake strong morally based standsnon behalf of the poor, for the rights ofnminorities, for the rights of individuals,nor against various types of violence.nOne does not have to be reli-nMy Darling Clementine, directed by John Ford; edited by Robert Lyons: Rutgers UniversitynPress; New Brunswick, NJ. Once again Wyatt Earp and Doc Holliday gun it out with thenClantons at the O. K. Corral. The transcript of the film, together with portions of the shootingnscript, reveal a director who was not too scrupulous with historical fact but who believed thatnWesterns should “have a basically moral quality.” That was long before The Wild Bunch.nGalina: A Russian Story by Galina Vishnevskaya; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; San Diego.nThe autobiography of a Russian opera star who—before leaving for the West a decadenago—helped others, including Solzhenitsyn, raise their voices against communist oppression.nBravo.nPeace Now: Blueprint for National Suicide by Dan Nimrod; Dawn; Montreal. Recent yearsnhave seen the rise of a new Jewish movement in Israel, America, and Europe of those (mostlynon the left) who believe that the time has come for Israel to negotiate for peace with thenPalestinians. Dan Nimrod fears that this movement—like the American antiwar movementnof the Vietnam era—will bring only the peace of surrender.nnngious to see these as questions ofnmorality. The same can be said aboutnthe moral-political positions of thenAmerican right. Sometimes theirnmoral basis is derived from religion,nsometimes from secular sources. SonNeuhaus’s premise of “no religion, nonmorality” seems incorrect. Hence hisnsolution—that to put more religionndirectly into the public debate is thenonly way to revive a morally groundednpublic philosophy—simply lacks thenbasis he supposes.nWhat I see missing from his analysisnis sufficient regard for just the pointnthat led the 18th-century founders ofnthis nation symbolically to distance,nnot separate by a wall, religion fromnthe public square. Public morality willnarise substantially from the religiousnconvictions of the populace. But thatndoes not imply that religions shouldn(or that mutually contradictory religionsnor religiously based moralitiesncould) provide the best frame of referencenfor the public debate about morality.nNeuhaus’s analysis, despite somencentral weaknesses, contains many insightsnon religion, politics, and morality.nCertainly he is right that Judeo-nChristian religion often contributesnmightily to the moral health and stabilitynof a culture. But if we distinguishnpolity from culture, then it is not clearnthat the more directly religion shapesnthe polity the better that polity will be.nThis is not to deny that people shouldnbe encouraged to relate their religionnto their morality and politics. Neuhausnis also right in saying that religionnshould not be systematically excludednfrom public debate. But the primarynground for such political debatenshould be sought, as it was in the 18thncentury, in the common principlesnthat many people share because ofntheir common humanity and similarnheritages. Such debate has the possibilitynof fostering some consensus betweennsecularists and theists concerningnpublic philosophy, rather thannfurther dividing them over questions ofnreligious authority. The public squarenthen will not be devoid of coherentlyndefended moral principles; but neithernwill it be needlessly polarized by religiousnconflict, which can, as NorthernnIreland and Lebanon illustrate, destroynthe public square itself. ccn